Rethinking biopolitical (B)ordering in EUrope: survival, migration and the politics of perseverance

Rethinking Biopolitical (B)ordering in EUrope: Survival, Migration and the Politics of Perseverance

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DECLARATION

I declare that the work presented in the thesis is my own.

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ABSTRACT

The governance of migration as a 'crisis' in the context of EUrope forces us to rethink the ways in which strategies of (b)ordering are being deployed to maintain relations between borders and migrants. By considering (b)ordering, biopolitics and survival, this thesis aims to frame practices and discourses that limit migrants' political potential. Migrants are confronted with (im)mobilities that (b)order their conditions to *mere* survival, life *with* death. Survival here epitomises this process of (b)ordering as the result of what (bio)politics considers relevant for administering 'life' and modes of governing that reduce migrants' lives to *mere* survival. Through the production of migrants as *surviving bodies* - remnants in excess, as securitised and (de)humanised bodies inserted in continuous and overlapping processes of (b)ordering - this work follows migrants' journeys with the aim of punctuating not just mobilities in space, or highlight multiple ways of (b)ordering, but also to provide a reading of 'affirmative' survival that accounts for migrants' resistance. From the Mediterranean Sea to Rome and Calais, the realism of borders is confronted with modes of governing migrants that aim to reduce them to lives that should *(only)* survive, therefore delimiting their political engagements to it. As survival itself is a form of resistance, migrants' struggles to life will be rearticulated through the language of the politics of perseverance as *life as politics*. The thesis argues that while (b)orderings aim to reduce life to minimal forms of survival, migrants, and their alliances with aid workers, and indirectly artists, have the potential to rearticulate life otherwise, bringing their 'lived experienced' to the core of *life as politics*. These engagements disrupt *mere* survival as a measure of how life should be lived politically.

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> "It is easy to acknowledge, but almost impossible to realize for long, that we are mirrors whose brightness, if we are bright, is wholly derived from the sun that shines upon us".
>
> C.S. Lewis[1]

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I hope to deserve all your 'rays of sunshine'.

[1] Lewis C. S. (1971) *The Four Loves* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), 143.

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INTRODUCTION

The Governance of Life *with* Death



Figure 1. Gustav Klimt, Death and Life, 1910/15[1]

In *Death and Life* (fig.1) the symbolist painter Gustav Klimt addresses the cycle of human life. While entangled in this cycle, death and life are depicted in the painting as irremediably distinct. To the left, we see a grim reaper that is the personification of death, covered in a robe with crosses. To the right, we see life that is nurtured and fructifies through the figures of a mother and a child, an old woman, a loving couple and four women who all lay down on a flowered bed.[2] Both death and life are somehow treated in the painting as possessing univocal functions: death watches and awaits for life at a certain distance while human beings flourish in life. Death and life are depicted by Klimt

[1] Klimt G., *Death and Life*, Leopold Museum, Vienna, Austria: https://www.leopoldmuseum.org/en/collection/highlights/146 [accessed 27 February 2020].
[2] *Idem*.

as being reconciliatory, harmoniously coexisting by being located at the antipodes of our existence. This general representation of life and death that exist as fixed and separated, seems to be inadequate for thinking about how life and death interact: functions of life and death in Klimt's painting do not account for how life is governed *with* death.

This painting helps us introduce one of the main points of this thesis, namely the rethinking of biopolitical processes of (b)ordering life *and* death (and life *in* death) as those of life *with* death within the context of border/migration management in EUrope.[3] Starting from the Foucauldian framework of biopolitics and departing from the 'making live/letting die' of the binary biopolitical formula, this thesis aims to bring to the fore a more complex reading of (b)ordering. By considering the relationship between biopolitical life and politically engaged life in the making of borders and the management of migration, this thesis argues that modes of governing inclusive of a wide range of practices of surveillance/exclusion and biopolitical forms of control[4] to the point that "sovereign power [..] circulates within biopower" are only one part of the story.[5] Sovereign power and biopower have two different referent objects: the first one is more concerned with how to contain life processes while the second aspires to expand them but only for some subjects to the detriment of others. Sovereign and biopolitical power are understood as productive and destructive processes that regulate life *with* death conjugating processes of survival.

Complex processes of survival as a product of (b)ordering, however, cannot be conceptualised only through the logic of sovereignty, that of the exception, the camp or bare life but need to be considered in the framework of more nuanced politics.[6] What

[3] Throughout the thesis I refer to the political and geographical space of the European Union as EUrope.
[4] *See* Topak E. O., 'The Biopolitical Border in Practice: Surveillance and Death at the Greece-Turkey Borderzones', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (2014), 32(5), 815-33, 816; Debrix F., Barder A. D. (2013) *Beyond Biopolitics: Theory, Violence and Horror in World Politics* (Abingdon: Routledge).
[5] Butler J. (2004) *Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence* (Verso Books) *qtd in* De Larrinaga M., Doucet M. G., 'Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security', *Security Dialogue* (2008), 39(5), 517-37, 519.
[6] Squire V., 'Acts of Desertion: Abandonment and Renouncement at the Sonoran Borderzone', *Antipode* (2015), 47(2), 500-16, 503.

counts as biopolitics should not be regarded simply as post-sovereign mechanisms of governance[7] but as renewed spaces in which life for certain people is administered *with* death through multiple means of control/circulation/containment. In order to account for these processes of survival, this thesis does not aim to trace the historical roots of biopower and sovereign power, explain their respective function in detail or fully engage with the concept of biopolitics, but it attempts to rethink the effects of (b)ordering through discourses and practices by making connections about biopolitical rationales and modes of governance. Techniques of governance, in fact, go hand in hand with the erection of new boundaries.[8] These new boundaries are being drawn by the emergence of ways of governing forms of life *with* forms of death, not as thanatopolitics or through the more general idea of death as necropolitics, but as something in between extremes, as a (b)ordering strategy that that allows *mere* survival.

In *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive,* Agamben takes as starting point the condition of life in the camp in order to better explain the kind of caesura that biopower determines. In the Nazi camp the effects of absolute biopower are exemplified by the figure of the Muselmann (literally "the Muslim") who represents what is being let to exist in the context of its imminent annihilation. Agamben describes the Muselmann as the perfect cypher of the camp as it embodies the negation of humanity at its fullest. The paradoxical ethical situation of the Muselmann, that effectively ceases to be human while existing as a biological entity, is deployed by Agamben as a figure of analysis, one that makes visible death through the biological continuation of survival.[9] According to Agamben, survivability is what defines twentieth-century biopolitics: "the decisive activity of biopower in our time consists in the production not of life and death, but rather

[7] *See* Coleman M., Grove K., 'Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (2009), 27(3), 489-507.
[8] Ansems de Vries L. (2015) *Re-imagining a Politics of Life. From Governance of Order to Politics of Movement* (London: Rowan & Littlefield International), 71.
[9] Agamben G., (translated by Heller-Roazen D.) (1999) *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive* (Zone Books: New York).

of a mutable and virtually infinite survival".[10] Survival is framed by Agamben as another mechanism of power that puts life in a limbo for the time needed to its annihilation.[11] The Muselmann embodies the actualisation of the supreme ambition of biopower: the point in which the prisoner becomes the Muselmann is identified by Agamben as a point where death cannot be called death as the very humanity of a man disappears as only appears through the body.[12]

Theoretically, Agamben identifies a crucial ambiguity with the verb 'to survive' (from the latin *supervivo* "that indicates the person/thing with respect to which there is survival") as "it implies the reference to something or someone that is survived [but also it makes explicit that] the one who survives and the person to whom something survives coincide".[13] He identifies two different ways of approaching survival. On the one hand, "survival designates the pure and simple continuation of bare life with respect to the truer and more human life" (Bettelheim),[14] on the other hand, it "refers to the person who, in fighting against death, has survived the human" (Des Pres).[15] In the context of the Nazi camp, ultimately, Agamben relies on Foucault's conceptualisation of 20th century biopolitics as *make survive* to complicate the binarism which opposes the old sovereign and territorial power expressed through *make die and let live*, and the modern biopower of *make live and let die.*[16]

In other words, the idea of survival as a continuation of bare life, what I refer to as life *in* death, needs to be rethought outside the absolute extremes of the Nazi camp in order to put into focus the more generalised biopolitical borders that it creates.[17] *Mere*

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[10] *Ibid.*, 155.
[11] Agamben G. (2000) *Means Without End: Notes on politics (Theory Out of Bounds)* (University of Minnesota Press), 8.
[12] Agamben G., *Remnants of Auschwitz,* 84-5, 70.
[13] *Ibid.,*132.
[14] Bettelheim B. (1979) *Surviving and other essays* (New York: Knopf) *qtd in* Agamben G., *Remnants of Auschwitz.*, 133.
[15] Des Pres T. (1966) *The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camp* (New York: Washington Square Press)*, qtd in* Agamben G., *Remnants of Auschwitz, 133.*
[16] *Ibid*., 155
[17] Vaughan-Williams N., 'The generalised biopolitical border? Re-conceptualising the limits of sovereign power', *Review of International Relations* (October 2009), 35(4), 729-49.

survival is considered in the thesis as a product of processes of (b)ordering that makes up subjects whose survival is intertwined with modes of governance that reduce migrants' lives. Migrants are thought to be *surviving bodies* as effect of biopolitical (b)ordering but also the product of more complex relationships between ontological and epistemological articulations of the 'human' and practices and discourses that securitise them. To begin with, this work substantially departs from Agamben's analysis of the camp, survival and bare life with the attempt of foregrounding a more dynamic and less deterministic interpretation of how life interacts *with* death in survival. Contrary to Agamben's analysis of biopolitical survival as the point in which life and death coincide as life *in* death, survival is considered in the thesis as the point at which life is made to coexist *with* death in a condition that is not as extreme as the one of the camps, its difficulties notwithstanding.

Tazzioli and Aradau identify three different paths that have been developed in relation to the conceptualisation of biopolitics[18]. These literatures have (1) supplemented, (2) specified or (3) displaced the concept of biopolitics.

(1) Firstly, many authors have attempted to supplement accounts of biopolitics by exposing the co-constitution of life and death through concepts such as thanatopolitics and necropolitics by reading "life as subjugated to death".[19] Otherwise, life and death have been opposed through a vital/negative dualism raising criticism about their accuracy when representing the governing of migration in the European Union.[20]

(2) A second approach has highlighted the necessity to make the concept of biopolitics less general by distinguishing it from the politics of life. These authors

[18] Tazzioli M., Aradau C., 'Biopolitics Multiple: Migration, Extraction, Subtraction', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (2019), 00(0), 1-23, 7-10.
[19] Agamben G. (translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen) (1995) *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford University Press, 1998); Mbembe A., 'Necropolitics', *Public Culture* (Winter 2003), 15(1), 11-40.
[20] Vaughan-Williams N. (2015) *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond* (Oxford University Press), 12.

have not altered the concept of biopolitics per se but worked toward specifying how it needs to be distinguished from other interventions on life.[21]

(3) Lastly, Tazzioli and Aradau identify a third engagement with the limits of biopolitics, one that aims to displace it in order to approach it in the context of neoliberal capitalism and racialisation.[22]

The contribution that this thesis aims to make can be situated in the interstices of different forms of critical engagements with biopolitics as I aim to rethink not the concept of biopolitics itself but the heterogenous ways of governing migrants' lives through (b)ordering and the limitations of (b)ordering itself. The thesis mobilises the concept of biopolitics in order to reveal a rationale of governing 'life' that accounts only for basic survival. As such, I depart from Foucault's formulas making live/letting die and making die/letting live to consider ways of (b)ordering that do not simply involve making death, but that reduce people to live *with* it. In particular, I am interested to highlight a more complex view of modes of governing migration that account for (b)ordering as overlapping strategies for ensuring migrants *mere* survival. In my reading, the relationship between life and death needs to be supplemented by a more complex approach that accounts for degrees of living and dying. These degrees produce subjects whose life is governed without 'letting' them die. Analyses of the different ways in which the function of death works as a function of life are to be revisited through modes of governance that recognise survival as the new (bio)political limit of (im)mobility.[23] In this process of rethinking the effects of (b)ordering, biopolitics is mobilised to reveal the

[21] Fassin D. (2018) *Life: A Critical User's Manual* (Polity Press).

[22] *See* Howell A., Richter-Montpetit M., 'Racism in Foucauldian Security Studies: Biopolitics, Liberal War, and the Whitewashing of Colonial and Racial Violence', *International Political Sociology* (2018), 13(1), 1-19; Lemke T., 'Biopolitics and Beyond. On the Reception of a Vital Foucauldian Notion'. Available at: https://transmediji.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/biopolitics_and_beyond_thomas-lemke.pdf [accessed 27 February 2020].

[23] Throughout the thesis (im)mobility is deployed as a key concept that accounts at once for the ways in which migrants are made mobile but also immobilised. As a political concept, (im)mobility captures the liminality (b)ordering migrants to (only) survive by promoting both a calculated autonomy and control. Ultimately, (im)mobility aims to make migrants' lives precarious, keeping them in circulation or contained so that their political engagements can be reduced.

limits of processes that, ultimately, reduce migrants to *mere* survival and, more broadly, expose 'life' as a method of containment that is voided of political relevance. (B)ordering understood as a technology for dividing and ordering lives, generates modes of abjection that normalise both life and death and the possibility of a life that needs to be just preserved.

Redfield talks about "minimalist biopolitics" to highlight situations in which "the political dynamic emerging from situations of life and death contracts into an attenuated form focused on survival".[24] According to Redfield, the political concern for life encompasses "destruction" when it aims at assisting populations by maintaining their physical existence, even when such efforts do not lead to more than ensuring that the bare minimum is provided.[25] The temporary administration of survival becomes a priority for humanitarian actors who intervene to maintain people alive. However, I suggest that survival needs to be treated as a specific mode of governing that informs practices where people are kept closer to both life and death, to live *with* death, as a function of what biopolitical life renders necessary. Returning to Klimt's painting, we can then say that his symbolic representation of life and death as vital but separate components of the harmonious circle of human life is disrupted by the ways of governing life we have just examined. Focusing on survival means to recognise how processes of (b)ordering reduce some forms of lives and allow life and death to 'touch each other', coexisting but never fully coinciding. At the same time however, one could also observe that despite the ominous presence of death, the figures which represent life get on with their lives and, through multiple contortions, negotiate and renegotiate their positions and roles. These renegotiations will be discussed in particular in the last three chapters which will focus on humanitarian activists, migrants, and artists in order to demonstrate the importance of

[24] Redfield P., 'Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis', *Cultural Anthropology* (2005), 20(3), 328-61, 329.
[25] *Idem*.

establishing alliances which contribute to nurture and create a more fulfilled and fulfilling (political) life.

Borders, (B)ordering and Migration

> "The spectacle of mass movement draws attention inevitably to the borders, the porous places, the vulnerable points where one's concept of home is seen as being menaced by foreigners. Much of the alarm hovering at the borders, the gates, is stoked, it seems to me, by (1) both the threat and the promise of globalism and (2) an uneasy relationship with our own foreignness, our own rapidly disintegrating sense of belonging"
> Toni Morrison[26]

> "I stood at the border, I stood at the edge and claimed it as central. Claimed it as central and let the rest of the world move over to where I was"
> Toni Morrison[27]

There is something particularly evocative in the words with which Toni Morrison describes both the eternal fixation of borders on identity-making, and the need to decentralise them following those who challenge their own (b)ordering from the centre. These words seem to speak directly to the fabric of everyday life that places the borders of the nation state at the centre of relationships of (b)ordering: we 'stand at the border' but we also 'move over to where the border is not supposed to be'. The question of what borders are, often signifies what borders do, but this relationship changes when borders are stretched beyond the edges of territorial states through (b)ordering. In *What is a Border?* Manlio Graziano considers the return of borders in the international context. By providing a geopolitical mapping of the history of borders, Graziano considers how today borders are still relevant not because they are what we currently need, but because their existence is inescapable.[28] While Graziano focuses on particular border sites, he insists that as political objects of conflict and contact, borders need to be considered from a

[26] Morrison T. (2019) *The Source of Self-Regard: Selected Essays, Speeches, and Meditations* (Alfred A. Knopf), 5-6.
[27] Morrison T., Interview with Jana Wendt (1998). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DQ0mMjII22I [accessed 27 February 2020].
[28] Graziano M. (2018) *What is a Border?* (Stanford University Press), 2.

dynamic point of view: as products of history; as means and not an end; as institutions of the state.[29]

This thesis starts from the conditions of the present,[30] and regards borders *as means of the state,* and a starting point for rethinking functions of (b)ordering as more than dividing lines that specify life and ways of living. What borders are and do, therefore, changes according to who encounters, crosses and resists them.[31] As the invention of borders historically proceeded with the invention of the nation, sovereignty is today being reconfigured as exceeding the territorial limits of its "imagined communities".[32] As such, the political idea of borders as mechanism of ideological, legal, economic and identitiarian exclusion is maintained as possible only through means of re-territorialisation.[33] It can be argued then that the "borderless world" imagined by Ohmae at the end of the 1990s is today nothing more than a speculative thought of those times.[34] Far from disappearing, the physical borders of sovereign states are not becoming obsolete per se, but they are morphing into processes that contain, control and follow movements of people. Most importantly, as we will see throughout this thesis, these borders today do not only serve the purpose of dividing territories but, as Thomas Nail reminds us, they re-arrange social motion by distributing kinetic surplus.[35] Borders can then take different shapes, from the fence to the wall, from the checkpoint to the frontier, none of which can answer the more elusive concept of what a border is. From classic realist ideas of borders that mark the limits of sovereign jurisdiction to manifest the intelligibility of power (and

[29] *Ibid.*, 3-4.
[30] This differs from Foucault's genealogical approach interested in presenting a 'history of the present' by re-valuating contemporary phenomena and putting them in perspective. While studies of migration have been criticised for being too rooted in the present, therefore erasing historical process, this thesis maintains thought rooted in historical practices but questions present dynamics of governance in order to situate political rationalities that are considered to be always in the making. To understand Foucault's genealogic inquiry, *see* Garland D., 'What is a "history of the present"? On Foucault's genealogies and their critical preconditions', *Punishment & Society* (2014), 16(4), 365-84.
[31] Salter M. B., "The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics", *Alternatives* (2006), 31, 167-89.
[32] Anderson B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 2006).
[33] According to Deleuze and Guattari deterritorializations are always accompanied by reterritorialisation that is how power re-designs itself through space. *See* Deleuze G., Guattari F. (1988) *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (trans. Brian Massumi, London: Athlone).
[34] Ohmae K. (1990) *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy* (Harper Business, 1999).
[35] Nail T. (2016) *Theory of the Border* (New York: Oxford University Press).

purity) of nations, we are increasingly confronted with ways of (b)ordering that aim not to mark the *limiting potential* of borders but to *expand their functions.* These functions extend to "discourses of truths"[36] about what borders are and do, therefore remapping where borders can be found.

As Balibar convincingly noticed, "borders have a polysemic nature" and are "dispersed a little everywhere […] wherever the movement of information, people and things is happening and is controlled". [37] Since the 1980s, as Brambilla has argued, critical border studies has experienced a "processual turn" where borders as given and almost naturalised entities began to be questioned and delinked from the univocal territorial logic of states.[38] This shift was followed by a rethinking of (b)ordering processes as multiple and mobile so that the forms and functions of borders no longer coincided with their physical location.[39] This "everywhere" of borders translates today into processes of (b)ordering that are mutually reinforcing: if the border is ubiquitous, then its effects need to be felt everywhere too.[40] In discussing what borders do, therefore, this work makes a conceptual shift that accounts for different processes of (b)ordering. Located at the intersection between the political and the sociocultural, (b)ordering is a process that is continuously happening by maintaining social order connected with notions of material borders and migration: "crossing borders […] is only one way in which bordering has come to play a major part in people's everyday lives".[41]

[36] When referring in the thesis to the notions of 'discourse' and 'truth', I understand these to be rooted on relations of power as theorised by Foucault who writes: "in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth." *See* Gordon C. (ed.) *Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Michel Foucault* (New York: Pantheon Books), 93.
[37] Balibar E. (2002) *Politics and the Other Scene* (London: Verso), 71.
[38] Brambilla C., 'Exploring the Critical Potential of the Borderscapes Concept', *Geopolitics* (2015), 20(1), 14-34.
[39] This even though the need to make the border visible in various ways still persists. *See* for example: Amlhat Szary A., 'Walls and Border Art: The Politics of Art Display', *Journal of Borderlands Studies* (2012), 27(2), 213-28.
[40] Balibar E., *Politics and the Other Scene.*
[41] Yuval-Davis N., Wemyss G. and Cassidy K. (2019) *Bordering* (Cambridge: Polity Press), 22.

Yuval-Davis and others emphasise four major complementary arguments about bordering:

> "1) contemporary borderings are central and constitutive of a myriad of political, economic and social processes; 2) different and contesting political projects of governance and belonging make up bordering; 3) these processes produce and are produced by intersectional inequalities; 4) differently situated social agents make bordering relevant to a wide range of bordering scapes".[42]

However, while Yuval-Davis and others speak of bordering, (b)ordering adds extra layers to this in the sense that it does not constitute a specific form of a political project of belonging per se, but it refers to a more general process of border-making, ordering, and othering that is both spatial and political and aims to create borders that are more fluid. Processes of (b)ordering do not only differentiate between us/them or inside/outside, but they also juxtapose belonging to processes of (b)ordering.[43] Drawing on this, (b)ordering is understood in the thesis as a key aspect for thinking about how people on the move[44] are kept (im)mobile, securitised and 'humanised' by maintaining crucial relations with linear borders. In the thesis, I interrogate (b)ordering by considering discourses and practices that contribute to the construction of the figure of the migrant as a 'life that needs to be rescued' because of his/her humanity and as 'a life that we should protect ourselves against' through his/her securitisation. Such a construction contributes to the making of processes of survival that include and exclude at the same time by (b)ordering those who should minimally survive instead.

In the context of the European Union, these processes of (b)ordering have become particularly visible with the political construction of migrants' movement as 'crisis'. Especially since 2015, the hegemonic framing of migration in EUrope as a crisis has been highly debated as this raises two major problems. On the one hand, the crisis is said to be

[42] *Ibid.*, 160.
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] While in the thesis I refer to migrants by critically engaging with the conceptualisation of this state centric category, I also refer to people on the move as a mean to emphasise people's precarious conditions and uncertain status as ''illegalised'' and 'mobile' individualities. In this work, I mobilise the two terms in a very similar way, as mutually reinforcing categories, that well capture migrants illegalisation and precarity of status.

provoked by an excess of people crossing borders illegally. This has led to "the proliferation of physical, technological and mental borders within and outside the EU [which] has made the movement of migrants into a crisis".[45] On the other hand, the discursive register of the crisis is one that does not account for the structural responsibilities that EUrope possesses in ensuring that its borders keep people out.[46] Borders make migrants: "if there were no borders, there would be no migrants - only mobility."[47] Concomitantly, mobility as a mean for protection for the most vulnerable is often downplayed:[48] there are only *migrants*. In the thesis, I refer to a crisis of *uneven mobility* in this sense, by shifting attention from a problem of distribution of 'too many migrants', to the structural production of excesses sanctioned by unequal mobility caused by borders.

This framing also helps us to draw attention to what Fassin calls a "moral crisis" of governance in the management of migration in EUrope.[49] This "moral crisis" redefines the notion of human mobility by dividing people between those who can be mobile and those who are 'illegalised' because of their mobility and shape the way in which the European Union, and its member states in their specificity, establish and re-stablish new relationships of security between individuals on the move. New biopolitical borders generating more pervasive asymmetrical realities of survival or life *with* death, are also drawn to address the limits of what political life should *mean* for those who struggle for life: as part of the European project,[50] in fact, borders as "artefacts on the ground"[51] are

[45] Ansems de Vries L., Carrera S., Guild E., 'Documenting the Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean: Spaces of Transit, Migration Management and Migrant Agency', *CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe* (13 September 2016), 94. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2859431 [accessed 10 October 2019], 2.
[46] Jones R. (2016) *Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move* (London: Verso).
[47] De Genova N., 'We are of the connections': migration, methodological nationalism, and 'militant research', *Postcolonial Studies* (2013), 16(3), 250-8.
[48] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'Humanitarian Rescue/Sovereign Capture and the Policing of Possible Responses to Violent Borders', *Global Policy* (February 2017), 8(1), 19-24, 23.
[49] Fassin D., 'From Right to Favour: The Refugee Question as Moral Crisis', *The Nation*, 5 April 2016. Available at: https://www.thenation.com/article/from-right-to-favor/ [accessed 27 February 2020].
[50] I draw here on Glissant idea that Europe is not a place but a project. *See* Glissant E. (1989) *Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays* (University Press of Virginia).
[51] Agnew J., "Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking", *Ethics and Global Politics* (2008), 1-16, 1.

being continuously redrawn by a series of displacements that make borders mobile,[52] virtual[53] and more violent.[54] As De Genova remarks, the question of Europe itself is entangled with that of migration so that its putative borders are both displaced and eminently and politically kept still.[55] I will consider this contradictory border regime by *standing at the border* (my field work Calais) but also by *taking the edges to the centre of (b)ordering* (re-centralising the migrants' lived experience and the politics of perseverance practised by migrants, activist aid workers, and artists).

The Landscape of Migration in EUrope: *Securitisation* and *Humanisation*

In *Europe's Border Crisis: Biopolitical Security and Beyond,* Vaughan-Williams addresses the ambiguities of European governance which, for the aim of securing its communitarian borders, manages migration through policies and practices that expose a reality/rhetoric gap between humanitarian interventions and the construction of migrants as irregular. This framing ends up sustaining a reality/rhetoric of fear-necessity and human value.[56] Specifically, Vaughan-Williams underlines this by showing how the figure of the 'irregular' migrant is central to the constitution of the present 'crisis':

> "On the one hand, the 'irregular' migrant is cast in 'official' documentation as a political subject who potentially threatens the identity, economy and security of the EU and its member states […] On the other hand, alongside these dynamics there has also emerged a strong humanitarian discourse of 'migrant centredness' associated with the EU's Commission's 2011 renewed 'Global Approach to Migration and Mobility' [GAMM]".[57]

[52] Amlhat Szary A., Giraut F. (2015) (eds) *Borderities and the Politics of Contemporary Mobile Borders* (Palgrave Macmillan, London)
[53] Dillon M., 'Virtual Security: A Life Science of (Dis)order', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (2003), 32(3), 531-58.
[54] Jones R., *Violent Borders.*
[55] De Genova N., '"The Borders of "Europe" and the European Question' in De Genova N. (ed.) (2017) *The Borders of "Europe": Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering* (Duke University Press), 22.
[56] Vaughan-Williams N., *Europe's Border Crisis.*
[57] EU Commission, 2011, 'The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility', 18-11-2011. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration_en [accessed 21 January 2018]; EU Commission, 2010, 'The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe'. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-598_en.htm?locale=en [accessed 21 January 2018] *qtd in* Vaughan-Williams N., *Europe's Border Crisis*.

The impact of such impasse is made visible by the author who explores how in our contemporary life we are experiencing a conceptual crisis where political significations are inexorably entrenched with two main elements of biopolitical governmentality: humanitarianism and securitisation.[58] The GAMM commits the EU state members to protect the more general category of the migrant, rather than the formal juridical-political category of migrants, upholding the human rights sanctioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in their territorial limits and migratory routes.[59] Such a commitment is differently operationalised by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, Frontex. Frontex, in fact, operates within a sort of exceptionalism of power and too often qualifies its actions in terms of irregular push-backs, omissions, abandonment of migrants in hostile environments, and causing border violence that results in retaining migrants in spaces of detention.[60]

While European border security exposes migrants to violence for the need of protecting EU citizens, it does so by committing to the necessity of upholding the human rights of endangered lives.[61] Vaughan-Williams investigates such paradox by stressing how the figure of the 'irregular' migrant is now co-opted into such managerial mechanisms of power and results in identifying threats and political subjects differently, without drawing a clear line between the two. According to him, in fact, this ambiguity reproduces "lives worthy of protection" and "lives from which we should protect ourselves against".[62] Because migration is increasingly becoming a de-politicised security issue to be managed, the construction of 'irregularity' constitutes a specific technology of power that re-politicises humanitarian interventions. Vaughan-Williams looks into the thanatopolitical and zoopolitical drift within biopolitical border regimes,

[58] *Idem*.
[59] *Idem*.
[60] *See* Vaughan-Williams N., *Europe's Border Crisis*, Chapter 3, "Thanatopolitical Borders".
[61] *Idem*.
[62] *Ibid.*

questioning how an affirmative approach to Europe's border management could have a more positive impact on the politics of migration.[63] However, while he suggests that we need to move beyond the gap between the policy-rhetoric of humanitarianism and the reality-irregularity of securitisation,[64] conceptually it is key to rethink this gap as it allows us to better interrogate the 'making' of migration as a field of intervention where migrants are (allegedly) in need of only minimal interventions.

Taking this central ambiguity as a starting point, and further extending this 'gap' to include entrenched interventions in the field of security and humanitarianism, throughout this work I argue that relationships of (b)ordering are maintained by promoting migrants' *mere* survival. Migrants are not just *surviving* the injustice and violence of borders, but they are also caught up between the imperfect synthesis of what their securitisation and 'humanisation' cannot hide. As such, and through a complex array of interventions, migrants' lives are often reduced to be in need of only minimal interventions that preserve their lives. In a broad sense, security as *securitisation* and humanitarianism as *humanisation* refer to the processes through which bodies are both qualified as more or less 'human' in need of protection and disqualified as 'security threats' to be contained. This tension casts migrants as people in need of only minimal interventions giving rise to discourses and practices of care and control, recovery and abandonment, tolerance and exhaustion that, ultimately, further impact their lives. These complementary processes capture not only policy rationales of politicisation of migration but also draw attention to the production of subjects who should *(only)* survive. As Aradau has insisted when talking about constructions of human trafficking, people can be *a risk* and *at risk* depending on security and humanitarian articulations of mutually reinforcing interventions:[65] in other words, "politics of pity" are enmeshed with "politics

[63] *Idem*. *See* also: 'Zoopolitical Borders', Chapter 4.
[64] *Ibid.*, Conclusions.
[65] Aradau C., 'The perverse politics of four-letter words: Risk and pity in the securitisation of human trafficking', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (2004), 33(2), 251–77.

of risk".[66] Interventions in the field of migration governance, therefore, simultaneously render migrants humans in need of (minimal) care and subjects of security concern.

The question of the meaning of security and the question of the meaning of the 'human' within it, are understood as problems of knowledge construction and practices of containment that make up framings of life. As Huysmans has argued, the politics of framing insecurity relay on the fabrication of domains of knowledge that modulate relations between threats and methods for managing them.[67] As such, these processes are more than 'speech acts' and account for multidimensional aspects in which a threat, for example, is less the result of discourses of danger and more of "logics of security practice that traverse and connect events, institutional sites, skills, knowledge, etc".[68] It is possible, in fact, to look at processes of *securitisation* and '*humanisation'* as political rationales that, while being historically rooted,[69] conjecturally morph subjects who can be victims in danger and dangerous victims who are both made to exist in excess.

Political Border-lines: *Surviving Migrants*

Terms such as "surplus humanity",[70] "surplus population" or "reserve army of labour",[71] "surplus people",[72] and "human waste"[73] and refer to the more general idea of people who exist in excess. Excesses are never a natural outcome, but they are the amount of something that is strategically considered as not necessary, therefore disposable. While

[66] *Idem*.
[67] Huysmans J. (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU* (London/New York: Routledge).
[68] *Ibid.*,153.
[69] While this thesis looks at processes that are in the making, it acknowledges that these processes need also to be grounded within studies that contextualise the rise of humanitarian rationales. *See* Edkins, J., 'Humanitarianism, Humanity, Human', *Journal of Human Rights* (2003), 2(2), 253–58.
[70] *See* Davis M. (2006) *Planet of Slums* (London: Verso).
[71] Marx refers to 'surplus population' as the consequence of the capitalist economic system. From his analysis of the function of capital it is possible to think of the idea that what has been made in excess is people's labour in relation to wage levels. Such people become reserve of labour that are furtherly exploited within a capitalist system of surpluses. For instance, unemployment becomes functional to the accumulation of wealth that is the uneven distribution of modes of production. By referring to the unemployed and under-employed as "reserve army of labour", Marx theorises surplus as being made in excess to the condition of labour that a capitalist society demands. In this sense, population is made to be in relative surplus as in the circuit of capital not all find a place within it. *See* Marx K., (1894) *Capital. Critique of Political Economy* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform), Vol. 1, Chapter 25.
[72] Bauman Z. (2007) *Liquid Times: Living in an age of uncertainty* (Polity Press).
[73] Bauman Z. (2004) *Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

this thesis briefly discusses the production of "surplus lives" in the context of a bioeconomy of life, it substantially engages with the concept of excess in order to better capture the processes through which inequalities of lives are produced. Far from being only the remnants of "unabsorbed capitalism", in fact, in this thesis, migrants are more widely considered to be *remnants in excess* for two main reasons: they *remain* if they are not channelled within the legal frameworks of asylum (or otherwise channelled) and qualified as politically recoverable; they are in *excess* as deportable, as an 'illegalised' surplus in need of a set of interventions.[74] This framing aims to counteract the state-centric construction of excesses as a natural outcome of necessary governance that represents remnants as the product of excessive asylum claims being considered, a surplus of 'dangerous' bodies knocking at European's doors, illegal border-crossers. This idea of excesses, that is closely linked to that of crisis, in fact, tells us more about why people are managed in the way they are, rather than how the crisis is fabricated, legitimised and normalised.

One way of exploring the making of migration through the EU and its member states qualification of excesses is that of starting by considering, and problematising, Agamben's idea of bare life. Agamben argues that refugees/'illegalised' migrants can be thought as a contemporary example of bare life. Bare life is a condition that is produced by a sovereign political act of exclusion that does not separate political life and natural life as such but makes life indistinguishable to its qualification from the polis.[75] According to Agamben, sovereignty poses the "naked life" of the individual as a presupposition of its governability. "Vita nuda" – "naked life" – is a form of life that is without appeal once the human is dehumanised as a natural entity. Naked life or 'bare

[74] In chapter 5 this idea of institutional excesses of biopolitical governance will be better complemented by considering excess also from the point of view of the sociability and mobility of migrants.
[75] Whitley L. M., *More than a Line: Bodies as Embodied Borders*. PhD thesis, Goldsmith, University of London. Available at: https://research.gold.ac.uk/12314/1/CUL_thesis_WhitleyL_2015.pdf [accessed 10 February 2020].

life' does not simply refer to natural life,[76] and it does not exist before sovereign power intervention,[77] but is a condition that defines life, and situates it, closer to death. Death needs to exist as a threat, sustained as possible by the instruments of politics. I refer in this thesis as life *in* death to epitomise this.

The proximity to death that defines bare life, in Agamben's view, is potential for everybody. As ontological category, therefore, bare life is also a homogenous category that fails to take into account how power functions asymmetrically and people are vulnerable in different ways[78] and how these vulnerabilities are the product of hierarchical interventions predicated on race, gender, class and sexuality.[79] By proposing a concept that functions as an "empty abstraction",[80] therefore, Agamben's disregards the role of structural violence and the working of racism in the distribution of death.[81] Moreover, it can be argued that such abstraction is not only empty but also too simplistic and universalising. While Agamben refers to bare life as intrinsic in the logic of sovereignty and the camp, he focuses on the exceptional circumstances of the Holocaust, "the most extreme condition inhumane that has ever existed on earth".[82] The idea of grounding his analysis on the extremes conditions of the Nazi camp to then generalise these conditions to any life can in fact be contested and one could argue that what he calls 'bare life' is not simply subjected to death and cannot always be reduced to being solely the product of the rule of law or sovereign decisions.[83]

More attention, therefore, should be paid to the ways in which thresholds of life are crossed and how (b)ordering can be contested otherwise the agency of the migrant is

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[76] De Genova, N., 'The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement' *in* De Genova, N., Peutz, N. (2010) (eds.) *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and the Freedom of Movement* (Durham & London: Duke University Press) 33-68; Murray, A. (2010) *Giorgio Agamben* (London and New York: Routledge).
[77] *Ibid.*
[78] Butler J., *Precarious Life,* 68.
[79] Coleman M., Grove K., 'Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty'.
[80] Deuber-Mankowsky, A., 'Cutting off Mediation: Agamben as Master Thinker', (2005), The Irvine Critical Theory Institute.
[81] Foucault M. (1997) *Society must be defended* (Penguin books), 254-56.
[82] Agamben G., *Homo Sacer,* 166.
[83] Lemke T. 'A Zone of Indistinction' – A Critique of Giorgio Agamben's Concept of Biopolitics', *Outlines. Critical Practice Studies* (2005), 7(1), 3-13, 10.

not factored in. If we read the figure of the migrant as bare life, in fact, migrants are reduced to mere breathing beings, that is perpetuating a form of subjectivity that reduces life to its biological minimum and denies the possibility of resistance. Obviously, many studies have convincingly engaged with these limitations and have considered the rendering of (potential) bare life in a range of contexts and fields.[84] This work aims to supplement these accounts by focusing on a different logic of governing migration and borders. For this aim, this thesis retains Agamben's analysis on how the production of survival contributes to governing biopolitical life only in general terms and resituates it within accounts of how degrees of non-*life* and non-*death* are re-valued once the political limbo in which life *with* death is inserted is no longer considered without any appeal, but recast as differently appealable. Life is "naked" insofar as its definition proceeds unquestioned, and, as we will see in the last chapters of this work, oppression always triggers (im)perceptible and creative forms of resistance. In order to engage fully with the concept of survival, therefore, we need to move beyond the idea of bare life as put forward by Agamben and rethink the complexity of survival in all its manifestations.

It is important to rethink survival not as an achievement (with all the positivity that the concept entail) but also as a never-ending condition whereby (b)ordering reduces its subjects to a predicament in which they can only aspire to survive in basic terms and in which a more fulfilled life and a political life are denied *a priori*. 'Surviving' migrants are those who are rescued and tolerated while also being criminalised and conceived as a threat; those who are made to cope for their life *with* death condition and denied any aspirations. (B)ordered between the necessity to care for them and that of controlling them, they do not die, strictly speaking, but are made to remain in excess, and for this reason their life needs to take also a form of death. In the thesis, the governance of life

[84] In particular, *see* Doty R. L., 'Bare Life: Border-Crossing deaths and Spaces of Moral Alibi', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (2011), 29(4), 599-612; Darling J., 'Becoming Bare Life: Asylum, Hospitality, and the Politics of Encampment', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (2009), 27(4), 649-65.

with death is understood as the practice of (b)ordering surviving migrants also through their continuous strategic 'humanisation' and securitisation. If surviving migrants are those who are reduced to *(only)* survive, however, they are also those who, for this reason, are struggling to be recognized as people not only in need of humanitarian interventions or securitisation.

In order to better recognise these (b)ordering processes that take 'hold' of migrants' lives and shape it, in the thesis I introduce the theme of political border-lines. Referring to political border-lines allows us to look at boundaries in ways that are diffuse, (im)mobilised, and as a compromising point between securitised and 'humanised' bodies. While retaining the metaphor of the line and linking it to borders as political tools of division and contact, border-lines reflect the ambiguities of a process of (b)ordering that keeps migrants in-between. As such, political border-lines can be defined as the state of being in an intermediate position that is not still transcended, but in the process of being so. Migrants here are not treated as undifferentiated beings but considered to be *surviving* the conditions of their unequal relations with the distribution of life and death. Such distribution is always hierarchical and based on political constructions that differentiate among figures of migration. Once borders expand within society, the political potential of migrants who 'carry' them is (im)mobilised as their 'humanisation' and their securitisation cannot allow them to be fully seen as subjects of rights/care without being also considered as subjects that might represent a threat to individuals and communities more broadly.

The making of political border-lines through survival is discussed by focusing on the construction of migrants as people to rescue or un-rescue in the Mediterranean Sea; their channelling on land as lives to be recovered or abandoned, their neutering and demonization as 'abject' political presence in protest camps in Rome; their management through (b)ordering in Calais via politics of exhaustion and tolerance centred on allowing

solidarity to exist in the name of a policed form of humanitarianism. These specific sites take us to the physical borders of EU member states but also allow us to depart from those borders in order to rethink the more general effects of (b)ordering in EUrope. These effects reduce migrants to biophysical needs and life to an administrative task of politics. A commitment to rethinking, rather than simply explaining, ways of understanding the governance of migration as a measure of what the biopolitical governance of life has come to normalise has been central to my work. My aim, in fact, was not to produce rigorous empirical knowledge – and this aspect will be further clarified when discussing the value of 'living theory', and post-qualitative research when conducting fieldwork also in Chapter four, - but to engage with, and contribute to, political thinking (and to some extent political theory) more broadly.

In Search of Political Life

Starting from the assumption that the politics of control are always entrenched with the politics of migrants,[85] the analytical focus of the thesis will be on, on the one hand, interrogating survival as a strategy for governing migration and, on the other, on the politics of perseverance. The particular value assigned to biopolitical life through (b)orderings calls into question the more general idea of life that these processes specify. As Fassin has noted, in fact, there is very little about life or even politics within biopolitics which is more concerned with rationales and techniques for governing populations. Biopolitics does not provide substantial meaning to what life is:[86]arguably, in fact, biopolitics disallows certain lives so that they live *with* death in order to specify what life might be and become for them too, but not what it is. (B)ordering is core to governing through survival and to reducing migrants to their political (im)mobilisations. Forced to

[85] *See* Squire V. (2011) (ed) *The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity* (London: Routledge).
[86] Fassin D., *Life: A Critical User's Manual*.

operate in a condition of life *with* death, migrants are (im)mobilised not just in their configurations of movement, but also in their potential for exercising their own politics. If biopolitical governance voids the political of meaning through the imperative of managerial efficiency and ordering, a contestation of *mere* survival can be articulated by looking at how the politics of (b)ordering confront what, as we will see in chapter five, Asef Bayat calls *life as politics*.

Keeping the effects of (b)ordering at the centre of my inquiry but moving away from biopolitics and approximating *life as politics*, it is possible to re-centre the margins and give life a meaning which transcends effects of (b)ordering that preserve some lives *in* death. Once *mere* survival has been exposed as a strategy of governance, it is possible to see that, while biopolitics reduces and normalises life to its imperatives of ordering, migrants' engagements with it do not simply reproduce negative biopolitical ceasures. Any analysis about modes of confronting injustices is asymmetrical but it is nonetheless imperative to think of ways through which confrontation happens without happening, through "imperceptible politics", "nonmovements", "screams", and so on.[87] The politics of perseverance can be linked to the complex ways through which migrants attempt to reconstruct their social reality by continuously reasserting their political presence and in the acts of solidarity and support which I have seen activist aid workers in Rome and Calais perform every day. This is a politics of inverse excesses that will be also considered through the analytical lens of Autonomy of Migration and alternative contributions of solidarity networks and art.[88]

The work of humanitarian activists and art and artistic engagements are given centre stage in this process of rethinking biopolitical (b)ordering in the context of political responses engaged in the restitution of meaning to lives. Art is seen as a manifestation of

[87] I will better engage with these concepts in chapter 5 of the thesis.
[88] These politics are not produced by migrants' practices alone but also through 'transversal alliances' of solidarity and artistic re-representations. Also *see* Tazzioli M., Walters W., 'Migration, solidarity and the limits of Europe', *Global Discourse*, (2019), 9(1),175-90.

alternative framings of migration: murals, for instance, re-imagine the imaginary and function of borders as walls and give them new meaning and poignancy. Drawing on this, at the beginning of each chapter and in the conclusion of my thesis I highlight murals that engage with migration in various ways. These murals cover the walls of my hometown, Orgosolo: confined within an island (Sardinia) where 'there is no sea' it boasts more than two hundred fifty murals painted since the late 60s and describing political events --from Tiananmen Square to Gaza, from the oppression of Nazism to the destruction of the Twin Towers, from working class struggles to the hypocrisy of political and religious figures. Located a few hours away from the birthplace of Antonio Gramsci, these murals remind us that to be indifferent to life is always a possibility, but a possibility to hate. In the thesis, visual representations, which also include paintings and photographs, contribute together with the comprehensive approach of 'living theory', to enlarge my research methodology and processual rethinking.

'Living Theory': My Positionalities, Encounters and Visuals as 'Method'

Social research is always influenced by theories that interpret and represent the world we inhabit. What constitutes existing knowledge, in fact, is first theorised, and made manifest, as a possible valid way to frame issues. Theory is not only what gives knowledge 'authority' but also what motivates various research decisions, from the formulation of research questions to the choice of particular investigative methods. A widely held principle of social research is a normative understanding of how it should be conducted in order to produce 'valid' knowledge. This preliminary process is often subservient to research predictions that conform with research methods where 'knowing' and 'investigating' becomes addressing the 'expected'. According to this reading, social research appears to be a linear process where the 'questionable' and the 'feasible' intertwine with what is 'thinkable'. What can be thought within the spectrum of the (pre)-

empirical is often limited to what should be researched in the space of the field. This is furtherly complicated by shared assumptions that recommend researchers identify methods which determine how research should be conducted at the very beginning of their inquiry: a research topic is followed by research questions whereby the use of a cluster of research methods is made necessary to 'capture' social realities. While social research cannot be reduced to a static template, it can be argued that this is its prominent model. This model can be 'messy' at times, but contingencies and disruptions within this research template often tend to be indebted to an ordered 'sameness of thinking' which includes: the formulation of research objectives; the choice over research methods; the selection of research participants; the collection, analysis and interpretation of data; the dissemination of findings.[89]

Social research, however, operates within wider contexts that are not only normative or prescriptive but also personal and performative, or as I would suggest, within contexts that are above of all 'lived'. When I began thinking about my research, my PhD project was informed by the following research question: What are the kind of politics that are emerging in the context of the European Union management of migration? Politics was declined in two ways: the politics of control and containment exercised over migrants, and the politics of migration exercised by migrants themselves. The management of migration from 'above', from the State, and the articulation of migrants' struggles from 'below', gave content to my initial, abstract thoughts about what I was going to research: What was exactly the puzzle that I was attempting to solve? Was it even a puzzle to begin with? Thinking through what it had 'yet to happen' for me meant confronting theories about life, politics, migrants' agency and (b)ordering with research that 'could happen' in the field - not to test ideas - but to rethink what 'actually happened' *with* others.

[89] See Bryman A. (2012) *Social Research Methods* (Oxford University Press, 4th edition).

Theory, as the corpus of what has been already thought by others, comes to define what must be thought by us. Similarly to research methods which tell us how to channel our thinking, theory tells us what to think so that often repetition takes the place of what St. Pierre calls "the creation of the not yet".[90] St Pierre's engagements with the necessity to see the world through an ontology of immanence are extremely valuable to research processes in the field where "one becomes less interested in what is and more interested in what might be and what is coming into being".[91] What marks the post in a qualitative inquiry is the "not yet", "the yet to come", what is always becoming and never is. In other words, it is the "future to come"[92] that can be created, invented and learnt also through "people to come".[93] This 'image of thought'[94] takes shape through the refusal of prescribed procedures for doing research. For this reason, theory and research methods are both openly challenged once we embrace the necessity to reground thinking over the necessity to reproduce the conventional social research process itself. In an inquiry that is contingent, pre-empirical imperatives such as a clear research design, a specific choice of research methods and definitive research questions are all reverted moments that make thinking coherent to the process of research itself. Thus, my research has not just been motivated by the desire to 'repeat', but also to rethink responses to questions that I 'discovered'.

In the thesis, I refer to the idea of theory as a *modus vivendi* to epitomise the continuous flux of thoughts that has characterised my PhD research. Theory as *modus vivendi*, means "reading, thinking, writing and living with theory".[95] While theory regulates discovery by inscribing relationships to narratives with a fixed meaning, what

[90] St. Pierre E. A., 'Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence', *Qualitative Inquiry* (2019), (25)1, 3-16, 1.
[91] *Ibid*., 2.
[92] Derrida J. (1996). *Archive fever: A Freudian impression* (translated by E. Prenowitz), (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press) *qtd in* St. Pierre E. A., 'Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence', 4.
[93] *Ibid.*
[94] Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). *What is philosophy?* (translated by H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell) (New York: Columbia University Press) 168 *qtd in* St. Pierre E. A., 'Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence', 12.
[95] St. Pierre E. A., 'Writing Post Qualitative Inquiry', *Qualitative Inquiry* (2018), 24 (9), 603–08, 604.

theory as a *modus vivendi* aims to do is to allow the encountering of the real to be analytically problematised as a possibility for intensifying thinking. Approaching theory as *modus vivendi* means making manifest the idea of "living theory" as a relation that the researcher establishes with the subject and object of his/her research. Theory, therefore, is always a beginning and never an ending per se'. In the thesis, I approach well-established theories as a starting point for rethinking migrants' life: what their life should be *versus* what their life can be. My work of framing *through* and reframing *with* is the result of a process where theory and the "not yet" are co-constituted as interdependent *momentums.* As such, this is not a conventionally written thesis but a thesis that has been written reflecting the idea of rethinking contingent practices of (b)ordering (and their wider re-articulations as everyday struggles) through my experience in the space of the field, in Rome and Calais where I have been, and in the space of borders/migration studies and political theory more broadly.

It is within the interstices of these spaces that my research question(s) developed: Why it is crucial to consider (b)ordering practices in the study of migration? How does (b)ordering effect migrants' life? What does rethinking 'life' and 'politics' mean outside the State? How do migrants articulate a self-positioning towards life and politics? What does it mean to rethink the politics of migrants as relational? What is the role that aid grassroot organisations play within frames of 'resistance'? Why it is important to consider artistic endeavours as linked to the reframing of migrants' struggles? More importantly, why it is essential to reconsider the analytical depth of survival? Why do we need to re-appropriate the meaning of survival as affirmative struggle for *life as politics*? These questions intermingle with the role of 'living theory' *as* my research methodology. This approach entails considering three main elements of my 'lived' research process: my (relational) positionalities; encounters; artistic forms and images.

- *My positionalities: Who I am, Who I am Becoming*

In the double self-portrait *The Two Fridas* (fig. 2), Frida Kalho depicts two versions of herself seated together, holding hands with their hearts visible and a main vein that connects the two figures. Portrayed as identical twins, the two Fridas are differently dressed: the one on the left is shown wearing modern European clothes while the one on the right wears a traditional Tehuana Mexican dress. Both Fridas hold objects, the "European artist" on the left holds forceps while the "Mexican artist" on the right holds a small portrait of her then ex-husband Diego Rivera. Moving away from the particular symbolism of objects portrayed in the painting which refer to Frida's emotional pain, personal history and life,[96] what interests me to highlight is the engaged effort that the artist makes in expressing elements of her identity, her dual heritage and othering.[97] The two Fridas look identical but are conciliatorily different despite being *connected* under a stormy sky. In other words, the two figures are the same person, made visible through a dual representation.

Figure 2. Las Dos Fridas (The Two Fridas), Frida Kalho, 1939[98]

[96] Among other interpretations, *The Two Fridas* emblematises the artist's pain after divorcing Diego Rivera. The 'Mexican Frida' holds a portrait of Rivera while the 'European Frida' bleeds to symbolise Rivera's rejection of the artist European connection and his strong nationalism. It is also believed that the painting is a reference to Frida's childhood friend.
[97] Frida's father was of German descendance while her mother was Mexican.
[98] Kalho Frida, *Las Dos Fridas*, 1939, Museo de Arte Moderno, Mexico City.

Concomitantly, reflecting on, interrogating and fleshing out my dual positionality – like in Frida's painting of her double self – means to represent, this time through words, elements of my identity as a person and as a researcher, *who I am and who I am becoming*. How do my personal and intellectual positionalities cohere with and/or diverge from my research? In what ways do I reify, resist or even disrupt my positionality through my research project? How do my positionalities influence my research at a 'distance' and in proximity to the field?

Who I am: The way in which I see and interpret the world is highly motivated by my background and experiences.[99] As positionality is itself a research tool,[100] I recognise that some facets of my social identities have impacted my approach to the study of borders and migration. While sometimes positionality might appear intangible, I have always been aware of my position in relation to others due to intersectional factors such as my family working class background, my gender and the structural lack of opportunities that relate to it. Undoubtedly, my personal positionality has been crucial throughout my research especially when considering the double political meaning of survival not only as what migrants are allowed to do by political power but also what migrants reaffirm as political agents. Through my research, therefore, I have also attempted to disrupt my ordered and othered positionality as a person whose agency and ambitions should be limited to her class. By asking other possible questions and opening up to other possible answers, in the thesis I have attempted to consider how migrants can articulate a self-positioning, also in alliance with aid workers and indirectly artists. As there are many layers of complexity involved in positionality,[101] writing about who I am is not a

[99] Day S., "A Reflexive Lens: Exploring dilemmas of qualitative methodology through the concept of reflexivity", *Qualitative Sociology Review* (8)1, 61-85.
[100] Jacobson D., Mustafa N., "Social Identity Map: A Reflexivity for Practicing Explicit Positionality in Critical Qualitative Research", *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 18, 1-12, 2.
[101] Day S., "A Reflexive Lens".

straightforward task but a process that develops and changes over time as identities are multiple and always in flux.[102] Who I am, in fact, confronts who I am becoming through and because of my research.

Who I am becoming: Practicing positionality means to recognise how my personal and intellectual positionality intertwine in ways that are not linear. When conducting research in the field, but also at 'distance', understanding and accounting for my positions has been fundamental to recognise power relations imbued within my study. As a matter of fact, two questions in particular resonated throughout my work: How can I conduct my research without putting myself at the centre of it? How can I avoid personalising too much my intellect? Addressing these questions has been crucial to me, also considering the implicit desire of presence that constitutes qualitative research where the 'Other' is often reduced to categories of sameness.[103] Reproducing the sameness of the researcher in respect to the subject/object of study is problematic precisely because the alterity of the 'Other' can be erased.[104] In contrast to this, the researcher-as-author can attenuate his/her 'desire for presence', sameness and othering by focusing on an inquiry that is relational. A relational inquiry does not put the researcher at the centre but allows him/her to be in the middle, between research materials (the knowable) and research in the field (what has yet to come). Such attitude towards research involves a continuous re-evaluation of how we relate to others and *with* ourselves. 'Others' are considered as co-producers of knowledge that emerge through a politically engaged relational inquiry. Indeed, this approach underscores that researchers should embrace 'becoming' through the hybridity of their research and 'quasi-militant' engagements.

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[102] See Naples A. N., (2003) *Feminism and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and Activist Research* (Routledge: New York and London).
[103] De Freitas E., "Interrogating Reflexivity: Art, Research, and the Desire for Presence" in *Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative Research: Perspectives, Methodologies, Examples and Issues* (edited by Knowles G. J., Cole L. A.), (2012) (SAGE Publications), 470.
[104] *Ibid*., 472.

Preferring the idea of refraction or diffraction over that of reflexivity, Barad and Haraway argue that it is essential to show how we as researchers are embedded within thinking processes.[105] Our situatedness leads to critical reflection as we move away from a false dichotomy that perpetuates a sharp distinction between what researcher should do and what research subjects can say. There are not active or passive agents within research, but positions that interact together, "in which declinations between researchers, methods and others can become increasingly untenable, or at least open to change and differential distributions".[106] Translating this approach to my thesis, it means recognising the ways in which my position(s) developed by thinking *with* others.

Talking of moving methods, Büscher observes that making methods mobile reinforces the emergence of new analytical momentums where methodological assemblages can happen.[107] As such, moving with the subjects and objects of our research can generate important insights about our intellectual position which adds sensitivity to how reality becomes knowable. Thinking about how my approach to the study of the politics surrounding migration has been moved by others, implies appreciating the co-constitution of my thoughts through theory and my experience in the field. In point of fact, while in Rome and Calais my theoretical ideas moved alongside those of people who I encountered. This collaborative research encounter allowed 'live practices' to come into being so to re-orient theory towards its lived political connotations. As such, I conducted my research in the field relying on multiple methods: unstructured interviews to aid workers, informal notes, participating in the organisation daily activities and training sessions, representing visual encounters. In other words, volunteering at the warehouse in Calais, talking with aid workers, going out for food distribution in the field, visiting

[105] Lammes S., "Engaging and Distributing" in *Routledge Handbook of Interdisciplinary Methods* (edited by Lury C., Fensham R., Helles-Nicholas A., Lammes S., Last A., Michael M., Uprichard E.), (Routledge: London and New York), 145-51, 147.
[106] *Ibid*.
[107] Büscher N., "Moving Methods", in *Routledge Handbook of Interdisciplinary Methods*, 176-82, 177.

the camp of Piazzale Maslax in Rome, sharing thoughts with others involved in the everyday struggles of migration, has made my methods dependent on what and who I encountered.

- *Encounters*

Deleuze wrote that thought is "the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself. Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter…it can only be sensed".[108] The act of thinking in thought proceeds through encounters "that escape the dogmatic image of thought and its implicit assumptions about what thinking is, what the world is".[109] Encounters provoke what Siffrin calls an "ontological breach" where we attend real moments of disorientation.[110] I experienced those moments of disorientation in Rome and Calais over the summer of 2018 while conducting my fieldwork respectively in a makeshift camp located in the city hub and by engaging with networked solidarities in Northern France. When I reached Rome during the last two weeks of July 2018, I had already begun my research theoretically. I had previous conversations with the members of the aid grassroot organisation the Baobab Experience in Rome which initially were open for me to interview migrants in the makeshift camp of Piazzale Maslax. Once in Rome, the organisation seemed reluctant to grant me access to migrants as the aid workers felt they were not fully prepared to expose individuals to emotionally precarious journeys. In other words, there were not the conditions for me as a researcher to push boundaries rightly set by the organisation which was constantly monitoring the situation in the field. While the

[108] Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). *What is philosophy?* (translated by H. Tomlinson & G. Burchell) (New York: Columbia University Press), 139, *qtd in* St. Pierre E. A., 'Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence', 12.
[109] *Ibid*.
[110] Siffrin, N. (2017). *The untimely: Post-qualitative inquiry's machinic function* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). (University of Georgia, Athens) *qtd in* St. Pierre E. A., 'Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence', 12.

field managers for Help Refugees in Calais clarified to me this aspect before going to the field, in Rome I concretely encountered this problem of 'access'.

This moment of disorientation was tempered by the fact that I had begun my research, I was there and something else was already happening. In both sites, I 'discovered' that there was another valuable perspective to consider, that of grassroot aid workers who were themselves subjected to state (b)ordering. The contingent practices of (b)ordering that I explored there involved not only migrants' subjectivities but also their wider solidarity alliances. I was aware that this refocus implied investigating migration, also from the perspective of migrants' struggles and politics, without representing migrants direct voices. Migrants invoicing, in fact, has been considered in the thesis through the testimonies of aid workers and my experience in Piazzale Maslax in Rome, in various encampments in Calais and in the Calais Warehouse. While it is absolute crucial to think about who should/can speak on the behalf of those most vulnerable,[111] I did not conduct an inquiry with the aim of replacing migrants' voices with those of aid workers, but one that emphasises the complex relation between migrants and aid workers in contexts where (b)ordering is confronted with, and challenged by, a different idea of life and situated politics. In the field, I have elaborated concepts such as mere survival and affirmative survival, the politics of perseverance practiced by migrants and members of grassroot organisations, and the implications of alliances that come into being out of necessity. Rethinking theory as lived inquiry for me has meant re-centring discourses and practices that oppose migration as mere survival and merely surviving as the only possible political goal of migrants' politics. In the thesis, I also rely on artistic representations and

[111] See Krause U., "Researching forced migration: critical reflections on research ethics during fieldwork", *Refugee Studies Centre Oxford University*, Working Paper Series 123, August 2017. Among others, see Qasmiyeh, Y. M. and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2013), 'Refugee Camps and Cities in Conversation', in J. Garnett and A. Harris (eds.), *Rescripting Religion in the City. Migration and Religious Identity in the Modern Metropolis* (Farnham: Ashgate), 131-148. Here it is developed a participatory-approach to the position of refugees through the concept of 'third voice': it is not about speaking for or about refugees as what matters is to *speak with them.* The 'third voice' emerges by collaborating and sharing experiences *with* others.

images – paintings, murals and photographs – to visually signify what words alone cannot represent.

- *Artistic Forms and Images*

The contribution that art and visual images make to knowledge are multiple: visual images and artistic representations enlarge understandings of our shared human condition; they stimulate ways of discovering other representations of the possible; they generate emphatic feelings and address the qualitative nuances of a situation; modes of perceiving and interpreting the world are re-evaluated through art and images, helping us to connect with forms that are no longer only imagined, unshaped and/or always the same.[112] In the thesis, paintings, mural art and photographs that I have taken of the Calais' warehouse and the murals in my hometown, Orgosolo, are forms of knowledge that interact with the type and meaning of my research. Within my research design, these forms of representation are not simply ornamental or illustrative but articulate thinking by juxtaposing descriptive, evocative and participative moments.[113] Photographs taken by me in Calais, for instance, enable the reader to experience a situation, a place, a lived reality that I inhabited and mediated it to others visually. In addition to this, at the beginning of each of the five chapters which compose my thesis I present photographs of murals that I took in Orgosolo which make visible many 'angles' of migration. Overall, these photographs revisit the context in which they have been viewed by me and expose, through personal experience, what can be seen by others too. With this in mind, the thesis also accounts for already existing visual interventions produced by others: the images of murals located in Venice, Sielma, Sapri and Melilla and the images of two temporary art installations in London.

[112] Eisner E, "Art and Knowledge", in *Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative Research,* 1-3.
[113] *Ibid*.

Among these kinds of image sources, in this study I also attempt to convey my abstract and concrete thoughts through the symbolism, surrealism, and 'realistic precision' of four paintings: *Death and Life* by Gustav Klimt; *The Two Fridas* by Frida Kalho; *The Landscape with the Fall of Icarus* by Pieter Bruegel; *The Human Condition* by René Magritte. These paintings transcend the contexts in which they are created, and the specific meanings assigned by the artists, in order to complement thinking and shape instead new ideas. As such, my research process makes use of these artistic representations to connect new ways of seeing with ways of doing things differently. Art articulates difference where the gap between words and seeing is reconciled to include what we mean *with* what we see. John Berger argued that "the relation between what we see and what we know is never settled".[114] The distinctive potential of art to forge connections with ourselves gives rise to knowledge that contributes to discovery. Returning to the idea of theory as a living and relational inquiry, art encourages imagination revealing to us that there is much more to methodology than methods which do not include thinking *with* art itself.

This thesis is therefore intended to make a contribution to the study of borders, bordering and migration in the context of the European Union, by rethinking the theoretical grounding of politics as a matter of 'mere survival'. In this sense, this research not only aims to challenge the biopolitics of 'bare life', the well-established idea of 'survival migration'[115] and the consequences of (b)ordering migrants, but it also rethinks notions and concepts by engaging migrants with their everyday 'life' and 'politics'. In particular, by rethinking theory as a 'lived inquiry', I oppose debates which deny, mostly

[114] Berger J. (1972) *Ways of Seeing* (Penguin Classics, September 2008), 7.

[115] In taking issue with the idea of "survival migration', I do not aim to disqualify works, such as Alexander Bett's study where he highlights how people leave their country of birth out of necessity, that is because of deprivation and not just persecution, therefore engaging migration as survival. However, I believe that such framing of 'survival migration' – while critically separated from forced migration – expands general causes of mobility at the cost of migrants' own politics and radical agency. This framing, in fact, does not fully engages with the situated politics of migrants giving more attention instead to the failed governance of states. 'Survival migration' is a state-centric category and the effect of the absence of legal systems and protection regimes in host countries. See Bett A. (2013) *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement* (Cornell University Press).

through rigid theoretical constructs, migrants' agency. In the thesis I focus on rethinking the effects of (b)ordering in order to re-centre migrants' lived experience from a perspective that accounts for ways of *being-with-others*. I articulate these modes of living by engaging with the Autonomy of Migration approach and through the language of the politics of perseverance, affirmative survival and *life as politics*.

Chapters Outline

This thesis unfolds in three parts and five chapters. The first part situates the thesis within a broader framework that interrogate (b)ordering and the biopolitical reduction of lives to *mere* survival and focuses on the making of borders, (b)ordering and migration in EUrope in theoretical terms. The second part interrogates how these processes unfold, can be framed, and are gazed upon from the external borders of the European Union in the Southern Mediterranean, and the atrophic reality of Calais. This part also accounts for aid workers' engagement with and in support of migrants in Rome and Calais. The last part of the thesis shifts attention to the making of *life as politics* that is a wider reading of migrants' politics of perseverance. Survival, therefore, is not only approached in the thesis as an (im)mobilising outcome of governance that reduces people to *(only)* survive as a measure of biopolitical life, but it is also complemented by an 'affirmative' reframing of struggles of survival as struggles for *life as politics*.

Chapter one, *Between Life and Death: Mere Survival and (B)ordering,* sets out more broadly the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. Specifically, it starts by briefly looking at biopolitics as highlighted in Foucault's work but also at the relation between life and death through thanatopolitical and necropolitical forms of life, and then considers the figure of the "living-dead" and *surviving bodies* that exist outside the body politic. (B)ordering, understood as a processual relation with borders and migration, will be explored in the thesis by also discussing how discourses and practices about *security,* and

the *human* within it, create a tension that further qualifies (b)ordering. In this chapter, I argue that humanitarianism, and differential securitisation make life and death in need of minimal interventions that converge in a limbo of overlapping (b)orderings.

Chapter two, *The Making of Political Border-lines in EUrope: Negative Borders and Figures of Migration,* aims to explore the complex intertwining of borders with (b)ordering processes, starting with considering what borders are, how they are demarcated and why they matter in our political life. It introduces figures of migration and deals with the current management of uneven mobility and borders within the space of the EU. In order to revisit borders as geopolitical lines of demarcation and reconsider them according to their distributive capacity to create social division within society, the core argument of this chapter is that (b)ordering contributes to the production of lives in excess and uneven possibilities of life as functions of life *with* death. These excesses cannot be only framed as bare life, that is life *in* death, but also as lives whose survival depends on conditions where only minimal interventions are possible. By introducing the idea of political border-lines, we reveal the effects of (b)ordering on these lives. This more-than-kinetic surplus is the result of the functioning of the borders of the EU, giving rise to processes of (b)ordering that are never complete but always in the making so that 'dangerous' border crossers can be captured, relegated to camps and dispersed through circulations.

While in chapter two I explore the relation of borders with (b)ordering at a more theoretical level, in chapter three, *Floating Grounds: Scenes of Migration from the Mediterranean Sea to Rome*, the construction of migrants as people to rescue and made un-rescuable at sea, and their channelling on land, will be better assessed. By looking at the entanglements of securitisation and humanitarianism at work in border points, I explore how this double focus is maintained. At sea, for example, this takes shape through a re-ordering of forces that has militarised the Mediterranean and, at the same time, has

made it a space of privileged intervention for exercising the politics of rescue. As migrants are confronted with practices of security that (b)order them as lives to rescue or pushback, this chapter looks at the relation between two imperatives: rescuing lives and securing borders. I present the Mediterranean Sea as a space whose infrastructure is confronted with the making of a military-humanitarian border at sea. Further on, I shift attention to strategies of (b)ordering mobility on land by considering three spaces of (im)mobility: hotspots, islands, and encampments of camps. At the end of this chapter, I consider a specific typology of camp, an urban (protest) camp by focusing on an informal camp, *Piazzale Maslax*, that was dismantled in Rome in October 2018. This particular case will help us understand a different kind of political (im)mobility, one that is often silenced by the condition of transit to which many migrants are exposed to. Moreover, it will contribute to account for migrants' claims for political agency in alliance with aid workers, shifting attention from survival as a rationale for governing migrants to struggles that contest ways of living that delimit people's lives.

Chapter four, *Policing Humanitarianism: Everyday (B)ordering in Calais,* focuses on Calais after the dismantling of the main 'Jungle'. This chapter considers everyday (b)ordering in Calais by looking at the policing of humanitarian interventions conducted by aid workers and the interactions between the police, local administrations, aid organisations and migrants. By addressing the role that police forces play in limiting migrant's life to *mere* survival, this chapter highlights the paradoxes of a system of governing migration that tolerates and exhausts, rescues from and exposes people on the move to danger. I also consider infrastructures of solidarity, from the Warehouse to operational buses in Calais, the on-stages/off-stages of migration, and vital projects which engage migrants as being entitled to more than a bearable life. While the criminalization of migrants and aid workers contributes to the (b)ordering of a tolerated form of humanitarianism, these projects and the activities of many aid grassroot organisations

deserve a renewed attention as actively reject the idea of what is 'acceptable aid'. I conclude this chapter by introducing what I call the politics of perseverance which are expressed in the ways in which strategies of (b)ordering are being redefined on the ground by migrants who persevere beyond their criminalization.

In Chapter five, *Life as Politics: Survival, Migration, Art,* I discuss how *mere* survival is counteracted by the will to re-ontologise what life means for the many who have been cast as deserving to *(only)* live *with* death. Moving away from the reduced biopolitical notion of life attached to survival through (b)ordering, this chapter explores the making of *life as politics*. The idea of the politics of perseverance is here considered from an engaged theoretical perspective where the discussion shifts also to the potential of migration as a creative force of politics. I read migrants' excesses of sociability through the framework of Autonomy of Migration and reflect on what their lived experiences bring to borders. What I refer to as 'affirmative survival' is intended to open up a conversation about practices of security, resistances, strategies of escape, autonomy and dissent that are not articulated according to traditional framings of agency. In the last section of this chapter, I engage with borders and art. More precisely, I look at how migrants' struggles to life are given visibility through public installation artworks and murals. Focusing on the theatricality of borders as walls and on counter-spectacles of (b)ordering migration, I argue that art has the potential to highlight migrants' politics by disturbing the framing of their struggle to just survive as their only option, an option which does not entail their recognition as political life or their 'right' to make a life. As spectators we are forced to confront these daily injustices, and to confront ourselves and our omissions, namely the fact that we fail to recognise the multidimensionality of survival.

The conclusion summarises the argument and chapters of the thesis. It also adds two final observations, or 'cuts', about borders and migration.

CHAPTER 1

Between Life and Death: *Mere* Survival and (B)ordering

Figure 3. I have a station, hope; I have a city, hope; I have journeys of hope…
To the 'migrant'.
Orgosolo Mural (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Introduction

The entrance of life into the realm of politics, as Foucault reminds us, has transformed politics at its core.[1] Foucault identified two poles of a power over life: the anatomo-politics of the body and the biopolitics of populations, biopower and biopolitics. In

[1] *See* Foucault M. (translated by Graham Burchell) *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979* (Lectures at the College de France), (Picador, 2010).

Foucault's analysis, the ancient right over death has been transformed by the advent of a new power over life: while the right of sovereign power consists in *letting live and making die*, biopower is primarily concerned with *making live and letting die*.[2] Foucault's thesis is that the sovereign power to take life has been complemented by the advent of a new productive force that seeks to maintain, develop and manage life. Death has not been expelled from life but is considered as serving the interest of a life that needs to be actively promoted. The paradox of biopolitics here is clearly revealed: biopower lets die but does not 'kill', strictly speaking, but in doing so makes life live by converging to some degrees with death. This life intermingled with death is considered by Agamben as bare life, a political and philosophical category that seems to be insufficient to understand configurations of life *with* death as far as the figure of the migrant is concerned. Agamben operates on the assumption that biopolitics is above all thanatopolitics, and that biopower cannot be affirmative; his analysis of biopolitical life, seen through the logic of sovereignty, will be visited in this chapter next to Mbembe's conceptualization of necropolitics. The intertwining between forms of life and death, I argue, are better recognised if we pay more attention to the notion of survival in all its facets and dimension.

The object of this chapter will be to explore how survivalist power mechanisms locate life *with* death as a part of a wider understanding of how life is made disposable and (im)mobilised in its political qualification. Today, the governance of life *with* death has become an almost a normalised way to contain complex problems, to the point that politics needs to increasingly appeal to its biopolitical roots to function and adopt exclusionary mechanisms.[3] For the purpose of understanding the role of (b)ordering in

[2] *See* Foucault M., 'Right of Death and Power over Life', in *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, Vol. I (1978) (London: Random House, 1990), Part V.
[3] For a more detailed accounts of the multiple ways of governing through life and death, *see* Clough P. T., Willse C. (ed.) (2011) *Beyond Biopolitics: Essays on the Governance of Life and Death* (Duke University Press: Durham – London).

strategies of governance, survival needs to be given centre stage as a tool in biopolitical assemblages of power. This reading views biopolitics as a technology of power for managing human life that reduces migrants' lives but also aims to preserve their lives contracting governance with forms of *mere* survival. This framing allow a more complex reading of governance which casts migrants as disposable and not fully disposable at the same time. More than focusing on biology versus politics, I explore practices that, ultimately, are justified by the need of 'negative' biopolitical power that is that of reducing some forms of life to *mere* survival. While biopower, and biopolitics more in general, have been deployed as a means for decentring sovereign explanations of power, together they shape wider meanings of life by making available multiple ways of living and ways of dying. Biopolitical rationales will be considered as fundamentally enacted though processes of (b)ordering. This draws on the idea that life specified by sovereign power and biopower, and biopolitics more broadly, derives from entangled ways through which social order happens. (B)ordering will also be discussed at the intersection between practices and discourses about securitisation and humanisation of certain lives.

Securitisation, as the embodied process of threat construction, and *humanisation*, as the process that accounts for the making of the human as political status, will be situated within the context of life as excess of neoliberal value. I will look in this chapter at the (b)ordering of surviving bodies, as people made to live *with* death. Surviving bodies are understood here as those who are helped and supported to continue living but also (b)ordered as threatening and as such in need to *mere* survive. I finally argue that survival interrogates the unsuccessful desecuritisation of the human which, reversing security processes puts into question more profound biopolitical categories of governance. On this understanding of biopolitical governance stand the foundations for a wider discussion about survival as a political effect of (b)ordering strategies that aim to reduce migrants' lives.

Giving Form(s) to Political Life

Arguably, state sovereignty has been long considered the most fundamental idea through which authority manifested in the modern era.[4] Understanding sovereignty as a distinctive configuration of state apparatuses means to conceive authority, and the power that derives from it, "as a property of [the] already constituted entity" that is the State.[5] However, sovereignty is not a given form of life, but one specific manifestation (albeit not the only one) of political life. Through state sovereignty political life becomes (b)ordered, juridical principles subdivide territorialities into jurisdictions and differently organise belongings. As Arendt noticed, such divisions are ideologically grounded and rely on a specific idea of what constitutes a nation.[6] In line with traditional modernist thoughts, in fact, exclusive sovereignty is not only exercised over a determined territory, but also over a specific and permanent population, the citizens inside a delimited nation-state. These citizens are entitled to rights, and their political and juridical dimension is defined through their belonging to a particular system that provides them with identity, security and ensures their existence as qualified beings. As Walker highlights, when answering the question whether 'we' are citizens, humans, or somehow both, state sovereignty affirms an identity that is particular, while retaining a connection with 'humanity' as an aspiring concept.[7]

It is through the application of law, that safety is institutionalised as a particular duty and as a particular right: "sovereign power is understood as a reciprocal relation between sovereign [institutions] and [citizens] regulated by one legal code".[8] Such relation is grounded on a power that is "legislative, prohibitive and censoring"[9] when exercised in the name of sovereignty. For instance, as Foucault explained in *The History*

[4] Jackson R. (2007) *Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea* (Polity Press: Cambridge).
[5] Chowdhury A., Duvall R., 'Sovereignty and Sovereign power', *International Theory* (2014), 6(2), 191-223, 191.
[6] Arendt A., *The Origin of Totalitarianism*.
[7] Walker R. B. J. (1993) *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),154
[8] *Ibid.*, 219.
[9] Lilja M., Vinthagen S., 'Sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower: resisting what power with what resistance?', *Journal of Political Power* (2014), 7(1), 107-26, 110.

of Madness, societies are constructed though exclusionary systems that normalise in order to legitimately divide and oppose the "abnormal".[10] Sovereignty shares a common historical trajectory in the sense that functions as a mechanism that regularises social constructed concepts such as the idea of the nation and that of exclusive belonging. Nation states, citizens and a defined political space are the tenants of sovereign power and the main elements that give authority to our politically "imagined communities".[11] The nation is always imagined as limited community where an "immemorial past" and a "limitless future" converge to give contingency and change an eternal comforting feature of topological belonging.[12] The possibility of exercising power to protect a territory and its citizen is today being increasingly displaced by new processes that rely on biopolitical strategies of (b)ordering that control the body of individuals and the productivity of populations.

In a series of ground-breaking lectures delivered at the *Collège de France*, Foucault expands the idea of power by identifying, besides sovereign power, two new kind of powers: disciplinary power and biopower.[13] Of these three, Foucault asserts, it is the distinguishable "productive character" of biopower, recognisable since the modern era, that makes it "the pragmatic force that liberal rule assumes".[14] Sovereign power and biopower differ by their respective meaning and scope: "while sovereign power is deployed through means of repression, prohibition, punishment and ultimately death, biopower is essentially life enhancing. It is concerned with the generation of life, rather than its disablement or negation".[15] By liberating power from its sovereign constraints, Foucault transforms our understanding of power, its location, its referent object and scope. While it is noteworthy to emphasise that multiple and competing definitions of

[10] Foucault M. (1961) *The History of Madness* (Routledge, 2009).
[11] Anderson B., *Imagined Communities.*
[12] *Ibid.*, 50.
[13] *See* Coleman M., Grove K., 'Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty'.
[14] Reid J., 'War, liberalism, and modernity: the biopolitical provocations of 'Empire', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2004), 17(1), 63-79, 71.
[15] *Ibidem,* 70.

biopolitics have since been deployed,[16] the biopolitics of biopower is preoccupied with the fructification of life by "tak[ing] species life as their referent objects".[17] In other words, biopower is a form of power whose vocation is to "make life live"[18] through its circulation, regulation and modulation.

Since the 18th century, "the fundamental biological fact that human beings are species", Foucault reminds us, has become the object of a political strategy.[19] As a measure of how politics is invested in life, however, biopolitics also reduces some forms of life that need to be excluded. This power to 'make live' does not promote all forms of life, by only the life that is not a 'threat' to populations while other lives need to be marginalised and segregated. In other words, these lives are 'let to die'. These exclusions are always legitimised in the name of the general health of a population understood as "a sort of technical-political object of management and government".[20] Under these conditions, it seems important to remark Foucault's classical statement on the transition from sovereign territorial power that works by *making die and letting live* to biopower, that functions by *making live and letting die*.[21] In shifting from traditional power to biopower, from sovereign territorial power to biopolitics, governance becomes an exercise of power-over-life: life is both abstracted and practically reduced to imperatives of biopolitical control.

Within the system of *making live and letting die*, the political body needs to be transformed first and foremost into a biological *datum* that has a demographic relevance

[16] Coleman M., Grove K., 'Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty', 489.
[17] Dillon M., Lobo-Guerrero L., 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st century: An Introduction', *Review of International Studies* 2008, 34, 265-92, 265.
[18] *Idem*.
[19] Foucault M. (translated by Burchell G.) *Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France,1977-78* (Palgrave Macmillan), 16.
[20] Foucault M., *Security, Territory, Population qtd in* Grondin D. (2012) *War Beyond the Battlefield* (Routledge: Abingdon), 30. Population as object of government is understood by Foucault by coupling it with the ubiquitous apparatus of security that rely on mechanisms of distribution and control. According to him, security becomes dispersed by mechanisms of security that are governmentalised in the sense that capacities of power to affect the population increasingly depend on what can be called "administrative security".
[21] *See* Rabinow P., Rose N., 'Thoughts on the concept of biopower today', *Biosocieties* (2006) 1, 195-217.

and "whose birth and death, health and illness, must then be regulated".[22] A hierarchy of belongings is created and people as bodies are differentially embraced by politics. The paradox of biopolitics becomes even more complex once we provide an answer to the question of how this power-over life is asserted. Mechanisms of security and power maximisation, racism, gender discrimination, biotechnologies of control and dissipation are deployed to manage sectors of the populations otherwise deemed as inherently inimical. Life, therefore, needs to be expanded but also reduced so that it can function biopolitically. A biopolitics of the human race needs technologies of power to control knowledge and use the same knowledge to qualify death.[23] Here death, which comes in many forms of discouragement of life, is made an object of governance that assumes state racism (but of course this is also applicable to other forms of discrimination) at its core by "fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls".[24] Racism establishes a functional relationship of war -"if you want to live you must take lives, you must be able to kill" – so that biological caesuras separate the good from the bad. [25] This separation serves to substantiate the very fact that if you let more people die, you will live more.[26] Generalised and normalised racism distributes death: functions of death shift to degrees of death, as degrees of racism inspire degrees of political belonging.

With his analysis on biopolitics and (bio)power Foucault did not try to develop a theory of biopolitics, strictly speaking, but to reveal mechanisms and rationales of power that relate to various phenomena, developments and discourses.[27] Foucault's lectures,

[22] *Ibid.*, 84.
[23] On biopolitics and race *see* Yeng S. (2013) *The Biopolitics of Race: State Racism and U.S. Immigration* (Lexington Books); Macey D., 'Rethinking Biopolitics, Race and Power in the wake of Foucault', *Theory, Culture & Society*, 26(6), 186-205; Giroux A. H., 'Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability', *College Literature* (Summer 2006), 33(3), 171-196; Fassin D., 'The Biopolitics of Otherness: Undocumented Foreigners and Racial Discriminations in French Public Debate', *Anthropology Today* (February 2001), 17(1), 3-7.
[24] Foucault M., *Society must be defended*, 254-55.
[25] *Ibid.*, 255.
[26] *Idem.*
[27] Ansems de Vries L., *Re-imagining a Politics of Life,* 57.

biopower, and the political significance of life and death, in fact, have been widely explored in a wide range of disciplines.[28] As Lemke reads it:

> "biopolitics [that takes life at its referent object] stands for a constellation in which modern human and natural sciences, and the normative concepts that emerge from them, structure political action and determine the goal of politics […] biopolitics stands for a fundamental transformation in the order of politics".[29]

Ultimately, this order is political because it makes life the object of calculations on which rely modes of politics that biopolitics represents.[30] These modes of politics have given rise to very important debates about how bodies and populations are being managed in the context of neoliberal economy.[31]. Many authors have attempted to grasp how life could be rescued *from* and *for* biopolitics,[32] and more attention has been given to how life functions *through death* as a measure of how biopolitics works today. What is interesting to note is that such works seem to have polarised the debate between vital and negative accounts of biopolitics, without qualifying life through the idea of survival.[33] In the context of the Nazi camps, survival has been defined by essential works which often highlighted survival as the production of *mere* survival[34] or as a specific experience of 'overcoming'[35] (a concept that briefly resonates with the argument of chapter 5). I am proposing, in fact, here that the idea of survival needs to be explored outside the absolute

[28] Lebovic N., 'Review Essay: Biopolitics among the disciplines', *History & Theory, Studies in the Philosophy of History* (June 2019), 58(2), 284-92; Liesen L. T., Walsh M. B., 'The competing meanings of 'biopolitics' in political science: Biological and postmodern approaches to politics', *Politics and the Life Sciences* (Spring/Fall 2012), 31(1/2), 2-15.
[29] Lemke T. *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction*, 33.
[30] Lemke T., 'From state biology to the government of life: historical dimensions and contemporary perspectives of 'biopolitics', *Journal of Classical Sociology* (2010), 10(4), 421-38.
[31] Mavelli L., 'Governing the resilience of neoliberalism through biopolitics', *European Journal of International Relations* (2017), 23(3), 489-512; Willse G., 'Surplus Life: Biopower and Neoliberalism', *Gender, Justice and Neoliberal Transformations* (Fall 2012/Spring 2013), Barnard Center for Research on Women Issue, 11(1)-11(2). Available at: http://sfonline.barnard.edu/gender-justice-and-neoliberal-transformations/surplus-life-biopower-and-neoliberalism/ [accessed 10 March 2020].
[32] Levinson B., 'Biopolitics in Balance: Esposito's Response to Foucault', *The New Centennial Review, Michigan State University Press* (Fall 2010), 10(2), 239-61. For a deeper understanding of biopolitics through the paradigm of immunisation, *see* Esposito R. (2017) *Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life* (Polity Press).
[33] Redfield P., 'Doctors, Borders, and Life in Crisis'.
[34] Bettelheim B., *Surviving and other essays.*
[35] Des Pres T., *The Survivor.*

conditions of existence in extremity, such as those of the Holocaust, in order to put into focus the more generalised biopolitical border that it creates.[36]

What I refer to as *mere* survival serves to recognise ways of governing life without letting people die as they are 'allowed' to *(only)* survive. Moving away from Foucault's binary formula *making live and letting die*, I consider a series of mechanisms that regulate life and intertwine it with more complex modes of governance that aim to reduce certain lives to a matter of *mere* survival. In other words, all these readings help us to put into focus an idea of survival in the context of (b)ordering politics which ensure that a lower threshold of life can be established and normalised as such. Survival is understood in this thesis in two ways: it is a (b)ordering strategy where life and death are made to coexist in the management of migrants and as an 'affirmative' process of 'overcoming' which resides with migrants themselves and their alliances (in the thesis I consider alliances with aid workers and, indirectly, with artists). This framing allows us to reframe survival as not only what the migrants is 'allowed' to do by power structures (to live on), a way of surviving death which cannot be called fully living. While experiences of keeping-on-living-making-life will be better considered later in this work in terms of politics of perseverance, developing also a different analytic of survival serves to bring to the fore lives who are considered unworthy and, as such, relegated to 'limbo spaces'. In these spaces, migrants are reduced to *(only)* survive by making a diminished way of 'living' acceptable, 'living' by parading 'dying' as a possibility.

For the aim of rethinking what *mere* survival means and does for the many who are subjected to it, we need to first engage with the idea of (b)ordering. In *Bordering* Yuval-Davis and others look at the de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of borders in order to diagnose the growing centrality of bordering dynamics operating today.[37]

[36] Vaughan-Williams N., 'The generalised biopolitical border? Re-conceptualising the limits of sovereign power', *Review of International Relations* (October 2009), 35(4), 729-49.
[37] Yuval-Davis N., Wemyss G. and Cassidy K., *Bordering.*

Located at the intersection between the political and the sociocultural, bordering, or rather, (b)ordering, is a process that is continuously happening by maintaining social order connected with notions of material borders and migration.[38] In particular, the authors insist, bordering matters because it runs across everyday discourses and practices of intersectional differentiation.[39] As such, "crossing borders […] is only one way in which bordering has come to play a major part in people's everyday lives".[40] Most of the time, in fact, these borders are 'lived'. (B)ordering, therefore, does not only regard the effects of the implementation of state policies, but it also concerns the complex ways in which these boundaries are embodied so that people themselves are made to carry borders within society. Yuval-Davis and others emphasise four major complementary arguments about bordering:

> "1) contemporary borderings are central and constitutive of a myriad of political, economic and social processes; 2) different and contesting political projects of governance and belonging make up bordering; 3) these processes produce and are produced by intersectional inequalities; 4) differently situated social agents make bordering relevant to a wide range of bordering scapes".[41]

(B)ordering as a power technology makes social relations that are continuously extended to practices of governing bodies by giving them precise identities and value.[42] The governing of bodies is closely related to re-territorialised processes that aim not only at maintaining sovereignty but also at preserving regulation through space.[43] As territory is itself a power technology,[44] the distribution of fears and unfears through bodies is mapped through markers that are bordered in the everyday political arrangements of governance.[45] (B)ordering is then a medium that expands geographies of border-making, and the body represents the limit of new possibilities of life *with* death. It is the body that

[38] *Ibid.*, 22.
[39] *Ibid.*, 24.
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*, 160.
[42] *See* Elden S. (2017) *Foucault: The Birth of Power* (Polity Press).
[43] Jones R., Johnson C. (2014) *Placing the Border in Everyday Life* (Ashgate), 141.
[44] Elden S., 'Land, terrain, territory', *Progress in Human Geography* (2010), 34(6), 799-817.
[45] Jones R., Johnson C., *Placing the Border in Everyday Life*.

carries the border, and this embodiment is situated within territories that serve to govern life in society. Drawing on this, (b)ordering is understood as a key aspect for thinking how people on the move are kept (im)mobile, securitised and 'humanised' by maintaining crucial relations with linear borders. These relations are political and spatial at the same time. Aspects of life and death intersect with survival so that both are maintained as possible, and (b)ordering is the mean for grounding this political project. With reference to people on the move in the context of the European Union, we are faced with new ways of targeting both '*their* safety' and '*our* security' so that borders are now being managed by reducing migrants to *(only)* survive. It is not just about othering and ordering people but also making these processes of (b)ordering coincide with the territorial limits of nation states so that people can continue to exist in excess within them. When biopolitics is understood as thanatopolitics as in Agamben's view, or death is considered as a necropower, as in Membe's view, people can exist (in excess) respectively giving rise to the figure of "bare life" and that of the "living-dead".

Thanatopolitics, Necropolitics and the Body Politic

The lethal dimension that biopolitical life takes has been the object of contention for many authors who aimed to rethink biopolitics as biopower that serves to intensify death. Death comes in the form of expulsion, abandonment, denigration or even "killing without committing homicide".[46] Foucault did not develop the relationship between the two dimensions of biopower, its vitality and its negation, as he also avoided to ontologise life as he conceived it at the service of technologies of power. Agamben, instead, has extensively considered death as a mechanism of biopolitical power. For Agamben biopolitics is above all thanatopolitics that is politics as the work of death. While Foucault

[46] This is represented by the figure of the Homo Sacer understood as a sacred figure whose killing is permitted without celebrating a sacrifice. *See* Agamben G., *Homo Sacer.*

highlights how life as an object of government has to become productive by disallowing some forms of life, it is Agamben who maximises a lethal dimension of biopolitics by positing the production of bare life and death at the centre of operations of power. On the account that "politics is always a matter of the body, and the body is always already a biopolitical body",[47] Agamben sustains that sovereign rule and biopolitical exception are inherently instrumental to the political functionality of power that works through the negation of some strata of human existence. According to this, thanatopolitics is not only an integral part of biopolitics, but is its dominant expression.

Agamben disputes Foucault's claim that biopolitics emerges since the modern era arguing instead that it is the very essence of politics, and as such, it finds its manifestation through the "structure of exception".[48] As he puts it: "the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power", and the politicisation of bare life, "mere life",[49] which is evident if one considers how sovereign power expands itself in the form of exception. Here, law is suspended but not transgressed. Bare life comes into the domain of sovereign power, therefore "putting the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis".[50] It is through the idea of the camp as a paradigm of the state of exception that Agamben highlights the perpetual complicity of political and natural life: "the state of exception ceases to be referred to as an external and provisional state of actual danger and comes to be confused with juridical rule itself".[51] By governing through emergency, sovereignty has internalised the exception as a constitutive part of its way of ruling. In

[47] Agamben G. (1997) *Homo Sacer*, 178 *qtd in* Norris A., 'Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead', *Diacritics* (Winter 2000), 30(4), 38-58, 53.
[48] According to Agamben, sovereignty poses the naked life of the individual as a presupposition of its governability. "Vita nuda" – bare life – is posed as a form of life that is without appeal once the human is de-humanised as a biological entity. The human within biopolitics, is opposed to its own humanity that can only be promoted through the biological existence of others. While Agamben considers disposed lives as irreducible to their biopolitical condition, more attention seems to be needed to understand how thresholds are crossed and movement is created in this field of the political. For more on the idea of humanity thanatopolitics promotes. *See* Agamben G. (1997) *Homo SacerIbid.*, 8.
[49] *Idem*.
[50] *Ibid.*, 126.
[51] *Ibid.*, 134.

these (bio)political spaces, political and natural life are made indistinguishable as bare life that exists *in* death.

However, death can be also considered a more general mechanism of power that, according to Mbembe, now functions as necropower. This form of power:

> "account[s] for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds – new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of *living dead*".[52]

Understood as "the subjugation of life to the power of death", necropolitics not only constitutes the limits of sovereignty but also puts into question the limits of categories of the political itself.[53] Mbembe presents a reading of politics as the work of death that moves away from death as an exclusive field of biopower, through a concatenation of politics as a state of exception and as a state of siege.[54] In particular, Mbembe takes as a starting point of analysis the racial practices that are at play in the biopolitical fragmentation of life: a set of differential mechanisms are deployed as determinant condition for the management of life. Moving away from the absolute materialisation of negative power exemplified by the Nazi camp, Mbembe refers to the slaves' colony and to the contemporary colonial occupation of Palestine as the spatialization of the state of exception/siege.[55] These two examples are of particular importance as biopower here only partially accounts for the political and juridical arrangements of space and life. These are defined, instead, by the manifestation of a different kind of power. While biopower is another "domain of life over which power has taken control",[56] 'murder' is made relative to political power in the sense that what makes the murder of the enemy its absolute

[52] Mbembe A., 'Necropolitics', 40.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] In this essay, Mbembe refers to what it calls "topographies of cruelty", from the plantation to the colony. The idea is that under conditions of necropower, death is elevated to a point that conceptual boundaries and practical forms of existence blurry to accommodate various ways in which life is lived *in* death. In particular, he examines the plantation system by stressing how ramifications of power work at the service of subjugating slaves through a state of unconditional immobility. This power over the life of the slave is described as a crucial concatenation of race, biopower, state of siege and terror. *Ibid.*, 22.
[55] *Idem*.
[56] *Ibid.*, 12.

objective is the sovereign 'right to kill' that not only comes from a biopolitical necessity.[57] Mortality is not only part of a biopolitical fraction of the insurability of the life of 'all', but also a problem for political ontology that has elevated death to its inconclusive negation. In other words, death has become the condition of possibility of contemporary political life, a condition that is not only determined by its probabilistic presence, but also, and more importantly, by the intensity through which it operates.

Under necropolitics, death is operationalised by a combination of interventions that deny life: the conceptual validity of the figure of the "living-dead" lies precisely in its ability to represent different degrees of political mortality that are the equivalent of the sovereign capacity for governing biopolitical and other forms of life. Moreover, this figure facilitates our way of thinking about our very political coexistence: we are made to live, let to die, made to die, and let to live according to an imperfect analogy that sustains itself not by promoting a purity of life versus an impurity of death (and vice versa), but by stabilising both. Life and death are now a matter of degree and not an ending per se. The "living-dead" represents the correlation of what natural and political life cannot exhaust and for this reason needs to be made (im)mobile for the time necessary to its reconsideration.

From this perspective, more layers are added to the legitimate life of the body politic that is always already the residual manifestation of proper stratifications. In this respect, a focus on the body politic is of explanatory value for our understanding on how bodies are produced, reproduced, vilified and stretched according to mechanisms of power that are also mechanisms that suspend life and death, and differently appeal on their discretional utility. Thinking about the body politic unavoidably involves positing these so-called layers of legitimacy into a frame of reference where bodies are differently qualified. Order within life is exemplified by the figure of the citizen and its political right

[57] *Idem*.

to belong to a polis. While the Greek idea of *polis as community* is today more diversified than ever, the core principle of including by means of exclusion persists in ways that are relevant for the expression of an order that is more than ideological. In our contemporary world, this involves thinking about what Arendt refers to as the old trinity of state-people-territory and their exclusionary political relevance.[58] It is worth reflecting on the composition of the body politic at this stage as it contributes to the materialisation of *in-between* bodies. Complementing the idea of the subject understood as a derivative of sovereign power whose individuality and equalising difference is legally recognised and promoted, with what Arendt calls the "production of corpses", [59] one should note that between these two extremes, between the 'living' and the 'dead', the juridical liveable body and the disposable one, lays the surviving body. What it is interesting about this body is not its life subjugated to its (absolute) biological form but its life as politicised biopolitics. Especially since Foucault's analysis on how species being come into the focus of political power with the emergence of the population as a biological datum, the body has been, and it is being, re-politicised and de-politicised. As Wilcox remarks, it is power that always produces the subject that purports to regulate, a power that is not simply reflective of pre-existing subjects but that expands and extends subjectivities making them more or less vulnerable.[60] Thought in terms of security or humanitarianism, as we will see, the body also becomes a problem with a double-focus.

***Surviving Bodies*: "Life as Surplus" and Bioeconomy of Life**

In *A Zombie Manifesto: The NonHuman Condition in the Era of Advanced Capitalism*, Lauro and Embry propose a passionate reading of the zombie as a Derridian entity that is

[58] Arendt A., 'The decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man', Chapter 9, 268-332 in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.
[59] For Arendt the "fabrication of corpses" is at the centre of totalitarian domination. In *The Origin of Totalitarianism*, she refers to the "insane mass manufacture of corpses". The arbitrariness of mass death in the camp produces bodies that are the intelligible manifestation of absolute destruction. *Ibid.*
[60] Wilcox B. L. (2015) *Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations* (OUP USA).

neither a being nor a non-being. The zombie reveals a general crisis in subjective embodiment that is mainly anti-subjective.[61] The disability of human embodiment is what allows the zombie to be seen "as a body without a mind" and as a "boundary marker" that enacts the negative dialects of life: the zombie does not strive for self-affirmation but is rather the very actualisation of its denial.[62] Inspired by Horkheimer and Adorno, Lauro and Embry analyse how under capitalism the illusion of the self is made ineffectual to the point that our subjectivity is merely a fiction that allows ideological control. While we are made to believe that we count for the simple fact that we exist as such, the zombie's body is there to remind us that the corpse can only negate itself. The two authors go so far as to affirm that "even the zombie's survival of death is anti-celebratory, for it remains trapped in a corpse body".[63] The monstrosity of the zombie is sanctioned by the fact that "it has not life to end" and its enslavement to the market expands according to strategies of annihilation.[64] Under advanced capitalism, we might be aware of not-being but we have no other choice than stage ourselves into a vain survival. The vision of humanity that emerges from thinking boundaries between life and death in terms of the emergent figure of the zombie takes us to a new terrain that is not just, strictly speaking, that of post-humanity, thanatopolitics or necropolitics. The zombie is not simply the negation of humanity but an embodied reminder that life can cease to exist. As such, the zombie can be dead while living or can live while being dead. In both circumstances, the zombie is survives as a variant of a biopoliticised body.

Moving away from the radical embodiment of death that the zombie represents, it can be argued that today life also engages with death in ways that maintain survival possible as a measure of biopolitical rationales of containment. Focusing only on the

[61] Lauro S. J., Embry K., 'A Zombie Manifesto: The Nonhuman Condition in the Era of Advanced Capitalism', *Boundary 2* (Spring 2008), 35(1), 85-108.
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] *Ibid.*, 97.
[64] Here, the two authors are quoting a line for Max Brook's piece on *The Zombie Survival Guide: Complete Protection from the Living Dead*. This is a humoristic piece that provides some guidelines for defending in the occurrence of a zombie attack. *Ibid.*, 88.

theorizations of bodies as natural organisms, as bodies who can be already dead in their political potential, as lives which humanity can only be denied, fails to consider how bodies are politicised and how they confront limitations through decisions taken upon their 'utility'.[65] In this respect, a body has a functionality that is not only, and merely, recognisable as a form of biopolitical objectification but more importantly is inserted into a bioeconomy of life that connects the commercialisation of life sciences with that of capital, goods, services and people. As Cooper, who investigates neoliberal biopolitics by providing an account of the commodification of bio-life, argues, we are embedded in the era of biotechnology, a time where life and neoliberalism have coupled to create an emergent economy of life sciences organised around the principle of the market.[66] As Cooper remarks, "neoliberalism and the biotech industry share a common ambition to overcome the ecological and economic limits to growth associated with the end of industrial production, through a speculative reinvention of the future".[67] This speculation about the future means that what has yet to come is pre-emptively made knowable in the present thanks to a bio-economic control over life.

A new culture of the *living* is being fashioned that no longer looks at the right-to-live as a legalist right-to-be but replaces it with a bio-determined dimension that charges life with its very biological intelligibility. Bodies are being transformed into a process of expenditure and "life as a surplus" emerges by re-emerging from the re-adaptive capacities of market production. This "surplus", that is both an addition and a subtraction of utilitarian values, is the result of scientific interpretations of problems that are part of a broader economy where life science, people, technologies and capital intersect. As Rifkin highlights, the relationships among "elements of life are today made classifiable

[65] *See* Bauman Z. (2003) *Wasted Lives: Modernity and its Outcasts* (Polity Press); Moira G. (1996) *Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality* (Routledge: New York).
[66] Cooper M. (2008) *Life as Surplus: Biotechnology & Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era* (University of Washington Press: Seattle and London).
[67] *Ibid.*, 11.

through biotechnologies that target biological systems" as systems of reality.[68] The union of computer technology and genetic engineering, is the starting point for thinking the kind of reality that can be constructed and promoted. This is not, in fact, a reality expressed as a value-free projection of biological bodies, but an expansion and extension of constraints that are creative in the sense that biotechnologies enable "increments of power, a way to exercise an advantage over the forces of nature and each other".[69] Biotechnologies intervene directly into frames of reality redesigning the production and circulation of death by subjugating life to a political and economic currency of controllability. Technologies are making visible the effects of certain dynamics that reconfigure existence, namely life and death,[70] creating excesses about how the human is projected into economic life as a form of techno-politicised existence. Scientific, technological and economic interventions, therefore, aim to further border humanity where the rhetorical and practical gap between natural and political life are co-opted into mechanisms of power that securitise life and death accordingly. In the same way, survival can therefore be understood as a strategy for (b)ordering subjects who are valued as far as they can be inscribed in a world of value exchange.

The governance of life *with* death understood as a practice of (b)ordering surviving bodies, intertwines survival with biopolitical governance whose subjects are thought to be not just natural lives but as subjects who are caught between more complex relationships with ontological and epistemological articulations of the 'human' and practices and discourses that securitise them. Analytically, this thesis does not deploy the category of survivors understood as those who overcame death;[71] it refers to surviving migrants as those who are condemned to be victims to be saved or threats to be securitised,

[68] Rifkin J. (1998) *The Biotech Century: Harnessing the Gene and Remaking the World* (Penguin Putman Inc: New York).
[69] *Ibid.*, 230.
[70] In order to better understand Rifkin's argument, *see* Chapter 4, 'Eugenic Civilisation', 116-47.
[71] Particularly interesting in this discussion is the difference between the language of 'victim' vs 'survivor'. *See* Gupta R., 'Victim' vs 'Survivor': feminism and language', *Open Democracy* 16 June 2014. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/victim-vs-survivor-feminism-and-language/ [accessed 10 January 2019].

but also to those who are struggling to be recognized as people not only in need of humanitarian interventions or securitisation. The effort that this work attempts to make, therefore, is that of considering the ways in which the lives of people on the move interrogate processes of survival as a strategy of governance. Surviving bodies, in fact, are not survivors who have defeated death, but they are always in the process of overcoming life *with* death. Strictly speaking, survival, therefore, is not understood to be simply an 'achievement' but a condition that, however, from the perspective of governance makes *mere* life coexist *with* death. This is how bare life is distinguished from the making of surviving subjects who are in need of interventions in order to preserve their *mere* survival. The in-between of life and death is survival in the sense that people are 'allowed' to survive only if their engagements with life are reduced. Surviving subjects are not only those who are rescued and tolerated while also being criminalised and conceived as a threat. Surviving subjects, in fact, always exist in excess, but also refuse to be bordered between the necessity to care for them and that of controlling them.

Throughout this work it is argued that relationships of (b)ordering are maintained by modes of governance that take 'hold' of migrants' lives 'allowing' them to *mere* live *with* death. Migrants strive to survive due to the injustice and violence of borders but are also caught between processes of (b)ordering that reduce their engagements with life: on the one hand, migrants are framed as humans in need of protection; on the other hand, they are deemed as subjects of security concern. In both cases, migrants are bordered, othered and ordered through polices, practical arrangements and discourses that not only create a gap within the reality/rhetoric of border management but drive on such ambiguity to ensure acceptable (to the State) modes of survival. While these aspects will be widely explored in the thesis, we need to first engage with framings of *security as securitisation* and *humanitarianism as humanisation* to set the foundation for rethinking the effects and contestations to (b)ordering more broadly.

Lost in Translation: Humanitarianism and Security

For long, security seemed to be an easy concept to grasp. Security was mainly about protecting territories, remodelling a state of nature, insuring and guarantying safety. This is not to say that security has never been an "uncontested concept",[72] but that its meaning possessed some sort of univocal stand. Classical theorizations of security were based on an idea of fixity: the fixity of a territory (the nation); the fixity of an apparatus (the state); the fixity of a purpose, namely the protection of the state from external threats (defence). In addition to this, the fixity of these traditional elements of security was complemented by a modernist idea of emancipation: security was also a mean for empowerment insofar as its full state of safety was idealised as the enabling defensive measure of a state of freedom from fear.[73] In contemporary life, climate change,[74] poverty,[75] health,[76] territorial integrity[77] and human suffering,[78] have all become part of legitimate concerns that frame security through a concatenation of different approaches. Everything is a matter of security but not all can be considered a priority for security. Nowadays security has become many things, none of which is univocal. The potential for security is today constantly being redrawn by new ideas of what matters for security, in particular in terms

[72] *See* Buzan B. (2007) *People, State and Fear* (ECPR Press) (second edition).
[73] Specifically, the key aspect of 'freedom from fear' is at the heart of contemporary developments in human security as it focuses "on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance". The security of individuals and communities is expressed through humanitarian interventions understood as defensive measures from existential crimes. Since the 1990s, this concept has shifted towards the idea that states have a codified and moral responsibility to protect their citizens. If they fail to do so, the international community has a duty to intervene. For instance, *see* the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001, 15. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001, 15. Available at: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [accessed 30 May 2017].
[74] To better understand the relationship between climate change and security *see* The Centre for Climate & Security: Exploring the Security Risks of Climate Change. Available at: https://climateandsecurity.org/ [accessed 5 May 2017].
[75] *See* Sen A. (1981) *Poverty and Famine: an Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Clarendon Press: Oxford); Young O. R., 'Institutional dynamics: Resilience, vulnerability and adaptation in environmental and resource regimes', *Global Environmental Change* (August 2010), (20)3, 378-85; Corry O., 'From Defence to Resilience: Environmental Security Beyond Neo-liberalism', *International Political Sociology* (2014) 8, 256–74.
[76] *See* The Centre for Global Health Security, *Chatham House- The Royal Institute for International Affairs.* Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/global-health-security [accessed 5 May 2017].
[77] *See* Albert M., 'From defending borders towards managing geographical risks? Security in a globalised world', *Geopolitics* (2000), 5(1), 57-80; Larner W., 'C-change? Geographies of crisis', *Dialogues in Human Geography* (2011), 1, 319–35.
[78] On security and human development, *see* United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994), 1-226, 34. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf [accessed 30 May 2017].

of what constitutes a security threat, which is its referent object and what interconnects human suffering and states national interests. The relevance of security is a matter of political understanding, a matter that is increasingly being re-directed towards its biopoliticisation. In this scenario, the humanity of security, or alternatively the need to target humans within security, intersects with securitising discourses that socially construct and stage threats. In order to locate life within a biopolitical paradigm of survival, humanitarianism and securitisation need to be shown for what they create: a political and moral impasse. It is within this insurmountable deadlock that survival is presented as the acceptable and necessary synthesis of life *with* death.

Security as securitisation

Since the 1990s, Critical Security Studies challenged mainstream security theories calling for a rethinking of traditional analysis of what constitutes security and its privileged referent object. Wæver's idea of securitisation can be considered as part of such rethinking. First outlined in 1995, it is with the publishing of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* in 1998 that the concept has received wider attention.[79] By proposing different conceptual developments to the study and framing of security,[80] the book, which sees also the contribution of Buzan and de Wilde, is mostly important as it stresses the need to look at security processually. In particular, is Wæver's argument that security needs to be seen as a securitising measure that deserves more attention. Generally associated with what will be later named as the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, the concept of securitisation refers to social constructivist ideas of how security is not

[79] Buzan B., Wæver O. and de Wilde J. (1998) *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers).
[80] For instance, in this book is advanced the idea of sectorial analysis of security. The authors adopt a wider and sectorial agenda for security by expanding the concept of security to include, besides its traditional military and political stands, issues of the economical, societal and environmental.

simply a matter of objective reality, but a reality that matters through its construction.[81] According to this, security is no longer about 'real' problems that concern 'safety' or a differentiation of issues, but the validation of threats that are always socially constructed. As Wæver highlights, security is a discursive performance: "[it is] by labelling something as a security issue that it become[s] one".[82] The main argument is then that security is a speech act that stages threats and makes some of these threats more relevant than others according to a securitisation process that includes three main steps: the identification of a threat; its framing as emergency; the operationalization of what is constructed as pressing and legitimate breaking of rules.[83]

Nevertheless, security calls for emergency measures that stretch beyond an 'illocutionary' composition of the problems of reality. Securitisation as a political method informs the politics of security in ways that are processual in the sense that no stable formulas can be deployed to sustain security claims.[84] As a matter of fact, these claims are politically significant once security works to politicise and depoliticise issues that become hyper-dramatized as life-threatening priorities that call for action. In other words, securitisation works to subvert legally democratic practices in order to function outside their normal framing once exceptional circumstances are elevated to unconditional necessity. Despite some analytical ambiguities that characterise the concept,[85] the way *security justifies more security* can be inserted into a general framework of securitisation that is heavily reliant on discursive dynamics that stress the necessity for some sort of political intervention. Such framework is sustained by a political construction of a threat

[81] *See* Balzacq T., Guzzini S., 'What kind of theory – if any – is securitisation?', *International Relations* (March 2015), 29(1), 97-102; Balzaq T. (2010) *Securitisation Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (Routledge); Debrix F. (ed.) (2003) *Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe).
[82] Wæver O., 'Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New 'schools' in security theory and their origins between core and periphery'. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal (2004), 17–20 March, 13.
[83] *Idem*.
[84] Laustsen B. C. and Wæver O., 'In defense of religion: Sacred referent objects of securitisation', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (2000), 29(3), 705-39, 739.
[85] McDonald M., 'Securitisation and the Construction of Security', *European Journal of International Relations* (December 2008), 14(4), 563-87.

and the consequent need for political answers that are limited only by what security calls for. The contents of security become the unlimited limits of any security measure that needs to be taken to fulfil the claims made at the beginning of any securitisation process. For instance, it can be said that political discourses based on abstract notions of national interest strictly depend on this volatile notion of security that is shuffled from the level of threats to matters of life.

This mattering of security turns out to be a biosecurity problem that adds to the securitisation of bodies. As we will see when looking at the biopoliticization of borders, biosecurity works by keeping bodies in motion, controlled through the predisposition of making their possibility to be securitised a rationale exercise of politics. In particular, biosecurity attaches to the migrant a higher possibility to carry threats that are not only reducible to the (b)ordering of its identity or behaviour, but also pathologizes bodies as biologically dangerous.[86] Migrants are not only securitised as potential criminals but also considered to be dangerous for public health in general. Through narratives that articulate the body of the migrant as carrying diseases, pervasive discourses that medicalise people on the move contribute to the making of bodies whose conditions of life are de-politicised and re-biologized.[87] Systemic attempts to establish connections between insecurity and objectivity of threats through medicalised frames fail to engage with migrants as subjects, making them exist solely as security objects.[88] Biosecurity, therefore, further qualifies migrants by adding reasons for (b)ordering them. On the one hand, securitisation imposes control over the care of people deemed to be, in various ways, *a risk*. On the other hand, humanisation calls for care over people who are *at risk*, and because of this, controlled.

[86] Lagios T., Lekka V., Panoutsopoulos G. (2018) *Borders, Bodies and Narratives of Crisis in Europe* (Palgrave Pivot), 55-6.
[87] *Idem*.
[88] For instance, *see* Mason A. M., 'Mobile Migrants, Mobile Germs: Migration, Contagion, and Boundary-Building in Shenzhen, China after SARS', *Medical Anthropology* (2012), 31(2), 113-31.

It seems clear, therefore, that securitising moves tend to expand ideas about what constitutes security for the time necessary to their political assessment. Securitising frameworks totalises security attaching to it a significance that goes well beyond the need to respond to a threat per se, giving to it instead a wider normative qualification. In other words, securitisation actualises insecurity. Securitisation turns out to be a self-referential governmental apparatus of ideas, carefully conceived and politically synthetized. This is not to say that objective threats do not exist. Rather than dismissing dangers or perils as social construct, practices of securitisation reveal that the degrees by which objective threats are capitalised by security – or are not capitalised by security – are directly correlated to the kind of politics that are pursuable in the name of security. The different ways in which speech acts create security is what matters for the diversification of modes of security.[89] While McDonald reminds us that the complexity of the construction of security in today's world cannot be reduced to a series of determined acts,[90] the importance of the analysis of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and its followers lies precisely in the will to reveal logics of security that would be otherwise naturalised and normalised. Once security is inserted into a discursive container of emergency, where national interest and life-threatening issues collude, we are in the position of losing sight of what security has to be about beyond its construction. The main argument is then that responding to threats is often equated to how that threat has been priory constructed and intentions previously legitimised.

Humanitarianism as *humanisation*

The making of security as securitised rationale is in perpetual tension with the making of the human within humanitarian rationales. Today, we think of the human according to its

[89] Balzaq T., *Securitisation Theory.*
[90] McDonald M., 'Securitisation and the Construction of Security'.

many variants: as an object at the service of the production of life,[91] a liberating cyborg that promises a new life to come,[92] a victim of anthropocentric circumstances,[93] a bordered individuality whose value is politically defined,[94] and so on. Despite such a conceptual fog, what seems clear is that the human is never, and not exclusively, the result of its imminent humanity but a category that always needs to be qualified. Contestations over what constitutes the human itself revolve around the value of the human and its making. If we consider being human a political status, we must consider that the human is constantly politically qualified from 'above' so that hierarchies of (b)ordering can be established.[95]

In principle, the doctrine of humanitarianism is what informs discretional universal ethics and contributes to define what constitutes the human that selectively needs to be saved, to be empowered and to be protected. Behind humanitarianism, lay moral imperatives and some sort of shared ethics that are the dominant foundational essentials that are supposed to transcend ideology, identity, belonging and cultural beliefs more in general. Humanitarianism is often thought as having the intermediating function of re-framing issues towards their empathic, compassionate and more humane purpose. The need to uphold the principle of humanitarianism is inextricably bound to the need to

[91] For a better understanding of the human as a target of commodification, *see* Sharp A. L., 'The Commodification of the Body and Its Parts', *Annual Review Anthropology* (2000), 29, 287-328.
[92] Haraway J. D. (1991) *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (Routledge: New York). In particular, *see* Chapter 18, 'A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, technology and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century', 291-324.
[93] For a wider view in the debate about the Anthropocene and the idea of the human that forges *see* Chernilo D., 'The question of the human in the Anthropocene debate', *European journal of Social Theory* (2017), 20(1), 44-60.
[94] This individuality is politically defined by the discursive and practical borders of any particular nation-state. States determine identities that have a value in their uniformity to the main identity prescribed by the state. The figure of the citizen represents a political qualified identity that is subsumed to others in the form of its given legitimacy. In so doing, order is premised on the idea of limitations and differences in being and belonging. The idea of the human within such an order is consistent with categories of the political both in terms of rights and mutual responsibilities. As Agnew remarks, one of the most territorial political ideologies is that of nationalism. Common history and common geography create a sense of community of belonging that relies on a conventional wisdom forged by the State. The existence of boundaries between people is what determines our collective existence. In this framework, as Agnew highlights, "a national identity (or a sense of belonging) should win out over other possible political identities". In this sense, individualities are a-priory limited by their innate geography, history and national/cultural beliefs. *See* Agnew J., 'Nationalism', *in* Duncan J., Johnson N. and Schein R. (2004) *A Companion to Cultural Geography* (Blackwell Publishing), 223-37.
95 Fassin D., 'Inequality of lives, hierarchies of humanity: moral commitments and ethical dilemmas of humanitarian', *in* Feldman I., Ticktin M. I. (eds.) *In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care* (Duke University Press, 2010).

mobilise to bring justice and 'save lives'.[96] The question of state responsibility is extremely important to understand how humanitarian principles inform humanitarian politics today in ways that are always discursively sustained. Humanitarianism is a doctrine, a guiding principle, an "act of charity" or an "act of duty" which might be better understood when considered through its rhetorical potential.[97] The analytical importance of looking at how the human appears and disappears from political discourses is directly correlated with the intentionality of making it relevant to its own humanity. In so doing, humanitarianism that relies on its own definition and 'making' of the human.

The conduct of humanitarianism, therefore, constructs subjects and delimits their relations towards political power. When thinking about humanitarianism at the border, for instance, Ticktin reminds us that "it provides little room to feel and recognise the value of particular lives (versus life in general), or to mourn particular deaths (versus suffering in general); and little impetus to animate political change".[98] As a form of politics, humanitarianism takes the category of the human and makes it self-evident to pre-political ideas that naturalise action in the name of moral interventions. The rhetorical practices of humanitarianism aim not only at the activation of grand emotions but aspire to create consensus for the subsequent legitimisation of strategic emotional suffering.[99] All these elements together provide the full expression of humanitarian politics that are always premised on an "emergency imaginary" that justifies interventions as necessary.[100] As a generalised mode of governing, humanitarianism claims the universal

[96] Wheeler N. J. (2003) *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford University Press).
[97] Walzer M., 'On Humanitarianism: Is Helping Others Charity, or Duty, or Both?', *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2011). Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-07-01/humanitarianism [accessed 10 May 2017].
[98] Ticktin M. 'Thinking beyond humanitarian borders', *Social Research: An International Quarterly* (Summer 2016), 83(2), 255-71, 256.
[99] *See* Chouliaraki L., 'Post-humanitarianism: humanitarian communication beyond a politics of pity', *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, (2010), 13(2), 107-26.
[100] Calhoun C., 'The Idea of emergency: Humanitarian Action and Global (Dis)Order', in Fassin D., Pandolfi M. (ed.) (2010) *In Contemporary States of Emergency: The Policies of Military and Humanitarian Interventions* (New York: Zone Books), 29-58.

through discourses of human rights, but it perpetuates the particular by differentiating rights to lives in particular.[101]

Humanitarianism reveals that the human is bounded to politics of instrumental necessity whose discursive ethos is ideal for the production of more or less strong narratives for the security of all. It is noteworthy to emphasise that quests for security on humanitarian grounds are always premised on a political rhetoric that aims to transcend the political for the sake of the human so that feelings become more important than rights.[102] This aporia within humanitarianism often functions to legitimise unequal lives as more or less human lives in need of intervention. The moral takes hold of the legal and, as Feldman and Ticktin remind us, the 'making' of humanity dilutes the meaning of humanity so that humanitarianism can become an empty signifier.[103] Humanitarianism concerns the human insofar as the human is at risk due to its own condition of suffering. The threat to the 'human,' instead, is recast as 'inhuman' and in this process differences are justified in the name of the governance of the whole humanity.[104] The defence of humanity, therefore, becomes the reason for perpetuating an idea of humanity that is secured only though the de-humanisation of some of its components. Humanitarianism is no longer the promotion of human welfare per se, but the process through which the making of the human within securitised discourses takes place.

The managerial orientation of humanitarianism today is what makes the human part of a process whereby reducing suffering is a general act of power, but also an act of 'saving' the human from its own limitations. The autonomy of the modern subject as a human, in fact, is also re-problematised as a threat to life itself. The 'autonomous subject', 'the man of rights' of modernity, is differently conceptualised in biopolitical framings:

[101] Fassin D., 'Another Politics of Life is Possible', *Theory, Culture & Society* (2009), 26(5), 44-60, 50.
[102] Ticktin M. 'Thinking beyond humanitarian borders', 264.
[103] Feldman I., Ticktin M. I., 'Government and Humanity' *in* Feldman I., Ticktin M. I. (2010) (eds.) *In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care* (Duke University Press).
[104] *Ibid.*

subjectivities are organised according to the domain of life itself and their biological features. Under the imperative of guaranteeing biological order, the biohuman is not 'saved' as bare life but securitised as a life that struggles to self-secure itself.[105] In biopolitical terms, therefore, what it means to be human is tied to notions of species life that promote humanitarianism and practices that encourage "adaptation, learning, co-evolution and information sharing".[106] These ways of conceiving politics transform humanitarianism in ways that transcend the division between the rule of law/territory and the rule of life towards the imperative to equip the human with what is needed to carry on living.

Humanitarianism, therefore, aims to capture all these complex rationales for governing bodies who are deemed to be in need of interventions which concomitantly redefine (and reduce) their human needs. It is not just about identifying who counts as human in need of protection, but also about making processes of (b)ordering necessary because of it. (Nevertheless, and this will be made more explicit in the last chapters of the thesis, I also argue that exist forms of humanitarian activism and grassroot initiatives that are redefying on the ground the terms of these interventions both politically but also challenging the kind of aid that should be (only) provided to migrants to survive as such.) At this point of the discussion, therefore, this more theoretical engagement with constructions of the 'human' and articulations of security helps us to put into focus modes of governing that are in perpetual tension and that contribute to (b)ordering: how people should deserve to live and why they should not deserve more. Besides stressing the importance of how such framings of *securitisation* and *humanisation* legitimise political actions of different kinds, it is their construction that is more relevant to explaining how threats are embedded into the very idea of individual humanity. Migrants are securitised

[105] Dillon M, Reid J. (2009) *The liberal way of war. Killing to make life live* (Routledge: New York).
[106] *Ibid.*, 146.

but also 'humanised', yet they cannot be fully 'humanised' if they are securitised. What lies in between?

Desecuritising the Human, Compromising Survivability

In this scenario, some have suggested that a more useful way to look at securitisation is through desecuritisation --the unmaking of the process through which threats are identified or constructed-- which has been considered by some as a better attempt to look at security politically rather than analytically.[107] Politically speaking, in fact, it is how a threat is constructed that matters: as Huysmans remarks, while threat perception "is a perception of something externally given, a speech act only refers to itself, that is, the very act of uttering 'security'".[108] What is interesting to consider is that securitised security is not only a performative modality of sorting out threats but also a prescriptive way to reinforce degrees of ideological risk. This is remarked by Huysmans who suggests that securitisation leads to the pragmatic re-proposition of elements of political realism and a resurgence of the politics of enmity as theorised by Schmitt.[109] This political re-ordering, Huysmans insists, becomes a "technique of government which retrieves the ordering force of fear of violent death by a mythical replay of variations of the Hobbesian state of nature".[110] In other words, securitisation creates the place for democracy to delegitimise itself without being seen as doing this. In particular, Huysmans problematises the securitising of societal issues through discursively constructed narratives that reinforce othering: racialized threatening classifications of insecurity are

[107] Aradau C., 'Security and the democratic scene: desecuritisation and emancipation', *Journal of International Relations and Development (*2004), 7(4), 388-413; Huysmans J., 'Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe', *European Journal of International Studies* (1998), 4(4), 479-505.
[108] Huysmans J., 'Revisiting Copenhagen'.
[109] In *The Concept of the Political* Schmitt makes the distinction between friend and enemy as a distinctive marker of the political. In this sense, Schmitt claims that this distinction substantiates the political determining which form of life is functional to their respective belonging. *See* Schmitt C. (1932) (translated by Schwab G.) *The Concept of the Political* (Expanded Edition) (University of Chicago Press, 2007).
[110] Huysmans J., 'Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1998), 27(3), 569-89, 571

made more acceptable.[111] Security reinstates exclusionary politics giving them a new face that is effective both discursively and managerially. What it lacks is then a political validity which is something that differs from its political validation. By also spelling it out, security is performed and perceptions about it are operationalised taking security beyond its idealistic and indistinguishable necessity. It is in this framework that various attempts to deconstruct security, and articulation of humans within it, have been made.

Strategies of desecuritisation are reflective of a process of deconstruction that aims to re-normalise what has been deemed as exceptional. While securitisation sustains performative acts of security also through its illocutionary filters, in order to shift politics towards its necessary legal and moral crossings, desecuritisation faces the limits of political realism once these bounds are set to stretch fields of intervention. Constructivist securitisation is opposed to deconstructivist desecuritisation. Because "securitisation is not simply a speech act [but an] enactment of exceptionalism in political life",[112] re-doing security means reversing its exclusionary logic by re-making political processes. The ambiguity of normalisation is tempered here by the fact that what is re-normalised is a state of affair that does not rely, strictly speaking, on deviation from a given normative reality, but one that has the ambition to put into question ideas of stabilised order. According to this, desecuritisation could be emancipatory insofar as it enacts processes of re-appropriation. As Aradau points out, the potential of desecuritisation is made clear once it allows us to aspire to different politics to come where principles are universalised in a process of dis-identification.[113] While emancipation and reconstructing security are not necessarily reconcilable,[114] approaching security backward might be important even

[111] *See* Huysmans J., 'Migrants as a security problem: dangers of "securitising social issues"', 53-72, 57-8 *in* Miles R. and Dietric T. (1995) *Migration and European Integration: the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion* (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press).
[112] Aradau C., 'Security and the democratic scene', 392.
[113] *Idem.*
[114] Benhke A., 'No way out: desecuritisation, emancipation and the eternal return of the political', *Journal of International Relations and Development* (March 2006), 9(1), 62-9, 66.

if it its emancipatory potential in not capitalised upon but for the simple fact that it reveals the false premises upon which security is predicated upon.

In this framework, discourses about the human and discourses about security do not simply converge in discourses about human security. In today's world, humanitarianism and securitisation have become increasingly indistinguishable narratives to the point that the human who needs to be protected and the human who threatens us often collude. This is evident if one considers how often societal issues such as migration and borders are securitised to the point that security becomes a mean and an end to itself. More worryingly, humanitarianism and securitisation prove to be mutually exclusive once governing life *with* death becomes normalised as the only way to bring security to society and the migrants themselves. The inherent tension between these two narratives materialise by functioning almost as a vector. Borrowing from biology, the analogy between vectors and the tension between security and humanitarianism is made clear in negative terms. While a vector in biology is an organism that carries a parasite or an agent of disease - and spreads it from one host to another - humanitarianism and security mimic these problematic patterns of transmission. Caught up between their self-referential potential, the human within security and the construction of security as 'humanly' insecure, become the one the exclusionary content of the other. In so doing, human articulations of security that tends to normalise life *with* death, ensure interventions that can only be kept to the minimum.

The fact that the politics surrounding death are being regularised - normalised as such – find their conjectural synthesis in making acceptable forms of *mere* survival. Here, survival is grounded in narratives of humanitarianism and security and becomes their normalising constant. Security is about identifying risks, and humans subjected to risks must have their political reality (im)mobilised. Overwhelmed by complexities, politics is (im)mobilising what it cannot contain. In biopolitical terms, survival has come to

substantiate the limits of desecuritisation: reversing securitised identities means re-humanising them and this cannot but put into question political rationales that are assumed as settled for the biopolitical ordering that is sought to be maintained.

Conclusion

This chapter has set the theoretical foundations of the thesis in an attempt of rethinking the relationship between life and death according to (b)ordering processes of survival. While the governance of life has been mainly explored through the uses of death as a mechanism of power, from thanatopolitics to necropolitics, I argued that more attention needs to be paid to the intertwining of life and death in survival. By looking at survival as a technology of (b)ordering that maintains crucial relations with borders, the analytical goal of this chapter has been that of bringing to the fore the concept of survival as one of fundamental importance for exploring not only (b)ordering conditions, but also for revealing how visions of humanity and visions of security make a reduced form of survival acceptable. Survival as a strategy for governing "troubling mobilities",[115] was considered as a political, philosophical and methodological category for grounding our thinking about modes of (b)ordering. I have acknowledged that this strategy operates in the background of a bioeconomy of life where value has become instrumental to the production of exploitable bodies. Biopolitically, these are surviving bodies who are reduced to *(only)* survive as a measure of a less fully formed life also through discourses and practices which rely on specific justifications for securitisation and humanitarian 'rescuing'. Survival, however, needs to be considered the point at which death and life can coexist within, but also in response to, the processes of (b)ordering and this will be investigated in what follows. In the next chapter, I will complement my theoretical

[115] Tazzioli M., 'Troubling Mobilities: Foucault and the Hold Over 'Unruly' Movements and Life-Time' *in* Fuggle S., Lanci Y., Tazzioli M. (eds) *Foucault and the History of Our Present* (Palgrave Macmillan, London),159-75.

underpinning with a reading of borders and the processes of (b)ordering as far as migration in EUrope is concerned.

CHAPTER 2

The Making of Political Border-lines in EUrope: Negative Borders and Figures of Migration

Figure 4. Name: Jesus; Nationality: Palestinian; Religion: Jewish; Illegal Migrant. Orgosolo Mural. (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Introduction

This chapter aims to explore the theme of mobility, bordered realities and biopolitical (b)orderings in context, beginning with identifying the shift from a methodological understanding of borders as bounded to nation states, to borders understood, in the words of Mezzadra and Neilson, as "method". I briefly consider what borders are, in which way they are demarcated and why they matter in our political life. In order to re-frame borders

from geopolitical lines of demarcation to their distributive capacity of (b)ordering, the core argument is that different processes of (b)ordering unevenly distribute life and death and, ultimately, reduce life to its biopolitical form, as *mere*. These possibilities are the result of a calculative way to govern mobility that relies upon the making of expendable lives and a particular understanding of survival. Moving beyond a dialectical discussion between inside and outside, the main frame of reference will be understanding (b)ordering processes by paying attention to how inequalities in security create inequalities of life *with* death. Such inequalities give form to what political power considers to be in excess to legitimate life by dispersing borders and creating zones of stratified existence. As we will see, because the inside and the outside become blurred within such zones, political power generates excesses that are the product of the *uneven* governance of mobility in EUrope. Referring to the effects of the management of current migratory dynamics in terms of a crisis of uneven mobility, instead of refugee, migration or border crisis, has important implications for understanding the kind of politics that are emerging in EUrope. By creating different kinds of illegality, biopolitical borders are being redrawn not just in terms of space and time, but also by generating more pervasive asymmetrical realities of life *with* death.

On the assumption that security and migration are two side of the same coin,[1] Migration Studies and Security Studies have offered substantial explanations of the ways through which political power securitises mobility by reducing, and expanding it, according to the needs of governability. With this in mind, the aim of this chapter is also that of retracing such steps by understanding how migrants can be securitised and differently 'humanised' through distributive (im)mobilisations. While migration has always been in excess to the need to contain it, what is important to consider is how such excesses are also the result of a way of administering political life. Incapable of capturing

[1] *See* Guild E. (2009) *Security and Migration in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

a multiplicity of complexities, political power increasing relies on the same "human waste" that it produces, as a way to justify measures that are taken for the security of all.

In order to better situate this, in this chapter I draw on the work of Thomas Nail in order to discuss how borders constitute society itself. Nail's work provides a springboard for moving beyond classical theories on borders towards social processes that happen on spaces of (b)ordering. I also consider the in-between of borders to highlight their kinetic functions as more than states' limits but as ways in which they re-distribute lives in excess that are kept in circulation. This move is made visible when highlighting how a biopolitical reconfiguration of borders is othering and virtualising subjects of mobility. These subjects, 'generic humans' who become migrants and therefore less human through an inverse process of humanisation, are thought to be carrying borders within society making survival a matter of political border-lines. Political border-lines capture the securitised and 'humanised' project of making people whose life *in* death, bare life, is now framed as life *with* death, that is *surviving migrants* whose life is delimited to *(only)* survive. By rereading camps as "liminal porocratic institutions" and as "speed boxes" in the governance of migratory fluxes, this chapter will end by considering the figure of the migrant through the different categories that are used to qualify people on the move.

From Methodological Borders to "Borders as Method"

In an article published in 2007 entitled 'The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails', Ulrich Beck looks at social science's failure to understand the complex problems once it confronts due to its methodological limits. These limits, he sustains, refer to the fact that the study of society is irreducible to that of the nation state, confining disciplines of study to a pre-determined view. In particular, Beck argues that most of classical contemporary sociology focuses on society, politics,

law, justice, and history and considers them as nationally bounded entities.[2] Unavoidably, this state-centric outlook informs the methodological approach through which we try to understand society as a fundamental geopolitical category in which events are already structured. As Beck remarks, equating societies to nation-states has detrimental consequences for the study of phenomena that are rooted in the sociological imagination. This equation, in fact, functions more as organising technique rather than as "cosmopolitan medium"[3] for reading political life. What methodological nationalism assumes, therefore, is that "humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which on the inside, organise themselves as nation-states, and on the outside, set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states".[4] According to this, nation-states are not only the condition for normalising possibilities of being but are also the only widely validated technology through which borders are given methodological importance. "Methodological nationalism" traps our thinking about borders, failing to recognise that humanity cannot be naturally divided into nations. Nations, in fact, exist to concretely separate our humanity from the world.[5]

How can we then think borders beyond and besides the exclusive methodology that makes them exist in the first place? This is the object of a re-focusing of borders that Mezzadra and Neilson present by investigating "borders as method". As the two authors remark:

> "We understand method to emerge precisely from the material circumstances at hand, which, in the case of borders, are ones of tension and conflict, partition and connection, traversing and barricading, life and death. Borders as method thus entails not only an epistemic viewpoint from which a whole series of strategic concepts as well as their relation can be recast. It also requires a research process that continuously accounts for and reacts to the

[2] Beck U., 'The Cosmopolitan Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails', *Theory, Culture & Society* (2007), 24(7–8), 286–90.
[3] *Idem*.
[4] *Ibid.*, 287.
[5] As Deranty eloquently explains, by examining the philosophical thought of Agamben and Merleau-Ponty, for long individuals and communities have relied on the inhumanity of the other. The general thesis is that inhumanity works "by creating abstract separations between themselves and the world, the world of other human subjects, of animals, and of nature itself." This inhumanity functions as regeneration for the reorganisation of life through the rights of some to participate to life "in one's own flesh". *See* Deranty J-P, 'Witnessing the Inhuman: Agamben or Merleau-Ponty', *South Atlantic Quarterly* (Winter 2008) 107(1), 165-186.

> multifarious battles and negotiations, not least those concerning race, that constitute the border both as an institution and a set of social relationships".[6]

While methodology serves to justify the use of a particular research method, the very idea of border that this method makes thinkable is reversed by positing the border at the centre of any investigation prior to accounting for it through specific research tools. In this context, method is not understood as a particular procedure for channelling our thinking about borders, but as a way to adapt thought to the materiality and immateriality of physical, emergent, and ubiquitous borders: in other words, a *border is itself a method*. Most importantly, it is conceiving "borders as method" that allows us to explore what cannot be contained by national borders. As essential devices for the management of circulation, geopolitical borders are proliferating in terms of their heterogeneity. Borders are an ambivalent force of containment, circulation, and repression that are being constantly recalibrated according to transformations of modes of power and governance. This idea that the reading of borders is univocal to those of nation states is internally contested once such boundaries function as a national demarcating point, but also evade their inner limits that make them coincide with a territorial space as "borders establish multiple points of control along key lines and geographies of power […] in a continuum with exclusion".[7] Power, within these geographies, extends to the hierarchical capacity that borders possess to stratify and regulate relationships of belonging. These relationships are unequal as are organised around biopolitical caesuras and the uneven distribution of life and death.

In line with this, accounts of 'flat' lines on the map intersect with the dynamism of borders increasingly taking migration outside the space of border installations. "Border

[6] Mezzadra S. and Neilson B., "Border as Method, or, The Multiplication of Labor", (2008), *European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies*. Available at: http://eipcp.net/transversal/0608/mezzadraneilson/en [accessed 10 January 2019].
[7] Mezzadra S. and Neilson B., *Border as Method,* 7.

elements"[8] are dispersed throughout society and help us to further understand how power cannot be exclusively conceptualised by making geopolitical borders the main frame of reference of political life. While it is important to acknowledge the political realism of boundaries, it is also significant to think of how spatialities in migration politics have become extensively important – bringing routes and journeys to the centre of border-making. As Walter points out, shifting attention to routes allows us to reflect on the ways in which the state, the idea of illegality, and that of resistance converge with a network of stances where movement is differently made legible and illegible.[9] What then is important to consider is that those who experience life *with* death as a measure of their bordered existence are the central focus for recognising that national borders are always crossed by "borders as method". This framing considers borders as method as a technology for reframing the relation between the two poles of borders and migration. The rendering of borders as a technology for filtering what should be in excess to political life cannot be understood if the social relationships that people establish with borders is not taken into account.

Which Borders? *Kinetic Surplus* and the Redistribution of (In)Security

As already discussed, sovereignty and borders are often considered prominent in discussions of political life. If we rethink "borders as method" we cannot rely solely on sovereignty, national borders, and forms of (b)ordering that delimit political life but we also need to consider the borders of the nation-state as inescapable reality of living in a world that is dominated by nation-states. The concept of sovereignty, in fact, is strictly related to that of territoriality, making nation-states the ultimate authority of power that also guarantees the orderly existence of other nation-states in the international system. A

[8] Walters W., 'Reflections on Migration and Governmentality', *Movements: Journal der Kritischen Migrations- und Grenzeregimeforschung* (2015), 1(1), 1-30, 6.
[9] *Ibid.*, 9-10.

common historical trajectory of the nation-state is the idea that sovereignty is exclusive, and it always entitles a specificity of configurations in the deployment of power. According to Weber, states assert their power by claiming a monopoly of the use of physical violence in a given territory.[10] Such territory is not only a geographical reality but also the starting point for understanding the ideological configuration of the nation-state. From this, it comes the idea of nationalism which, according to Agnew, is:

> "the most territorial of political ideologies based on cultural beliefs about a shared space occupied by a kin-like, ethnic, or affinity group who face common dangers and bring to these a social bond forged through the trials and tribulations of a common history brought about by a common geography".[11]

As a program of political action, nationalism sees the nation and the state through popular sentiments of belonging rooted in the expression of a dominant national identity. The political landscape of the nation-state is geopolitical and cultural. Such categories are furtherly delimited by boundaries that are physical and juridical, but also moral: they delimit our political materiality and come to define means for keeping some people out the main community of an imagined nation. Political communities construct places in ways that are then reinforced by the physical presence of borders. This activity of collective imagining is initiated by a relationship that the State establishes with its citizens based on a Hobbesian contractual politics of mutual responsibility.[12] Borders mark the limits of contractual politics.

In *Theory of the Border,* Thomas Nail provides a rich account of the ways through which social motion is today divided by borders. Through an analysis of the many

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[10] Weber M., 'Politics as Vocation', published as "Politik als Beruf," *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* (Muenchen, 1921), 396-450. A speech delivered at Munich University, 1918. From Gerth H.H., Wright Mills C. (Translated and edited) (1946) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128, (New York: Oxford University Press). Available at: http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/foundation/documents/03Weber1918.pdf [accessed 15 December 2017], 1-14, 1-2. "Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence. Hence, 'politics' for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state".

[11] Agnew, J. 'Nationalism', 224.

[12] See Hobbes T., *Leviathan* (Penguins Classics, 2017).

significations of borders, Nail explores a series of phenomena in social history that led to different significations of political boundaries. The fence, the wall, the checkpoint, and the frontier, are all precise concepts that answer the more elusive question of what the border is.[13] According to Nail, the border is the commonality that all these limiting representations assume: borders introduce a division or bifurcation of some sort – and while it can be represented in many ways - what the border produces has always something to do with social division.[14] For this reason, Nail continues, while an exhaustive study of the border needs to take into account the multiplicity of its representations – territorial, juridical, economic, moral and political – more attention needs to be paid to the ways borders exceed these significations. The way the border has been made relevant, both historically and in our present times, needs to be understood as a more than a necessary condition for the governance of space. The border is not reducible to the fact that it connects with other states, or it is in-between other states, as nowadays' realities put into question the ways through which the border is constitutive and constituted by society itself.[15]

Following Nail's analysis, a traditional understanding of the border is today being broadened by a more inclusive study of boundaries that emphasises the importance of looking at liminal points of division through the social forces that borders enable and disable. A border theory that prioritises social processes of division over space considers the border to be *in-between* not just states, but social realities: "the 'in-betweeness' of the border is not lack or absence […] the border is an absolutely positive and continuous process of multiplication by division – the more it divides social space the more it multiplies it".[16] Intensive and extensive divisions discontinue place creating change on the whole system of societal order. Such bifurcations produce continuity and

[13] Nail T., *Theory of the Border.*
[14] *Ibid.*, 2.
[15] *Idem*.
[16] *Idem*.

discontinuity of experiences that redirect mobility elsewhere. On the assumption that "society is first and foremost a product of the borders that defines it, and the material conditions under which it is divisible/dividable", the border is also in motion: it moves itself and is also moved by others.[17] The binary categories of inclusion and exclusion are now reconfigured by processes of circulation that aim to sort, manage and maintain new re-articulations of movement. By looking at the history of the border as a history of movement, what he calls a kinopolitical analysis of borders, Nail focuses on the social function of motion by identifying the ways through which modern borders function to redistribute mobility. More precisely, he individuates four functions of the border: the border marks a bifurcation point in a continual flow; it sets a limit; it compels part of the outside to the inside; it gives rise to the frontier, a clear delimitation where social flows are expelled or disjoined.[18] Taken together, these four functions of the border produce a different history that is not simply that of the state. Undoubtedly, borders in our political life capture the essence of nation-state politics but they are more than a function of the state. Understood as geopolitical devices:

> "borders produce territories (countries) by delimiting and securing spaces and their contents/populations […] they produce an inside and an outside, insiders and outsiders, and establish a system of control whose movement is accepted and whose is not. They create categories (the migrant worker, the skilled migrant worker, the asylum seeker, the refugee…) and through the process of categorization, create a group of people who carry a label of non-status (the illegal immigrant)".[19]

Understood as more than a function of the state, biopolitical borders circulate divisions that exceed the linear manageability for the scope of their containment.

While according to traditional realist accounts borders mark the limits of sovereign jurisdiction and represent the manifestation of intelligibility of power, therefore

[17] *Ibid.*, 6.
[18] On the assumption that society and space do not pre-exist the limits of mobile flows, through the methodology of 'critical limnology' Nail shows that states and societies are the product of (b)ordering. Such process gives rise to different functions of the border that are complex, in movement and touch many domains of life.
[19] King N. (2016) *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance* (London: Zed Books), 2.

separating what is inside from the outside,[20] in biopolitical understandings borders would not have meaning unless the frontier encountered the human and its activities.[21] Borders transcend sovereign power in a way that the regulation of the flows of life becomes more important than the legal limitations related to their demarcation. It is in the name of life that borders are now made to work with functions of death: matters of life are operationalised by more than lines of divisions that exclude per se, to a matter of perpetual re-balancing of security and humanitarian interventions that produce inequalities. Borders are now understood as redistributing a life that is always in surplus to its containment. When such a *kinetic surplus*, namely a surplus of mobility, cannot be expanded, borders are made to stretch to their (im)mobilising counterpart. As Nail remarks, in fact, "as long as society is capable of producing and mobilising its surplus and deficits, it will be able to achieve an elastic equilibrium or expansion".[22] The modern border takes a shape that is not only the result of mechanisms of security deployed for the control of populations, as Foucault would suggest, but it is also the outcome of a more pervasive logic of power that confronts its fabric of excesses in terms of necessities of life *with* death. Borders transcend the limits of their function once their 'cherished fiction', that grounds their existence, is contested from within. In this scenario, security as a technology of control is complemented by its engendering ambitions to capitalise on different lives. It is then possible to see how the distribution of (in)security within society proceeds through borders of unequal social and political mobility. Indeed, problematisations of the function of contemporary borders need to take into consideration both movements that decelerate and accelerate but also 'humanise' and securitise migrants, giving rise to new (b)ordering needs. These movements can be recognised among the strategies for governing migration and borders in the context of EUrope.

[20] Singer C. L. B., Weir L., 'Politics and Sovereign Power: Consideration on Foucault', *European Journal of Social Theory* (2006), 9(4), 443-65, 443.
[21] Evans B. (2013) *Liberal Terror* (Cambridge: Polity Press), 152.
[22] Nail T., *Theory of the Border*, 112.

Negative Borders: The EUropean's Crisis of Uneven Mobility

The fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to give rise to a new era of globalisation. In the early 1990s, the main narrative shifted from protecting borders to how take advantage of the gains that an interconnected world was bringing. It was under this rationale of necessary interdependence and unity that in 1995 the Schengen Agreement became effective, signed a decade before by five of the then ten members of the European Union. This treaty was constitutive of the European's Schengen Area that now counts 26 countries, including EU non-members states.[23] The main implication for the creation of such an area for human mobility has been the removal of internal border checks among European countries: a visa-free system of movement was introduced that seemed also to carry a symbolic connotation of political and cultural integration. The priority given to mobility, by liberalising space, has had complex effects on the way migration coexists with control of circulations and exchange, both within and outside EUrope.

The necessity for the European Union to constitute a more cohesive economic and political block, however, did not signify that domestic borders were simply abolished. As a matter of fact, rigid borders exist at the external frontiers of the European Union.[24] As Jones highlights, we need to keep in mind that at that point internal borders were not removed from Europe but were merely moved to the perimeter of the European territory.[25] This is important as it explains the extension of contemporary borders' jurisdictions that go beyond the territorial states of EUrope. This is also remarked by Vaughan-Williams who notices that contemporary border management practices are putting into question the very idea of what borders are, where they are located and why their securitisation matters also through their sovereign exposure to external projections of containment.[26] In

[23] This includes 22 EU member States and 4 Non-EU. Those four are Iceland and Norway (since 2001), Switzerland (since 2008) and Liechtenstein (since 2011). *See* 'Schengen: EU controversial free movement deal explained', *BBC News*, 24 April 2016. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13194723 [accessed 20 December 2017].
[24] *See* Vaughan-Williams N., *Europe's Border Crisis*.
[25] Jones R., *Violent Border,* Chapter 1.
[26] Vaughan-Williams N., *Europe's Border Crisis*.

particular, Vaughan-Williams refers to the current practices of spatial and temporal displacement that make borders spectral and pervasive. The offshoring and outsourcing of the borders of the European Union, which involve the transferral of governance from the EU to states in the North Africa,[27] amplifies this paradoxical reality of borders that are limited but also stretched to their shared (geo)political dimension. While border enforcement is still a prerogative of the nation-state, security across EU borders is carried out by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders – Frontex – created in 2005.[28]

Since 2015, more than a million and a half migrants reached EUrope. According to the UNHRC, the Mediterranean Sea arrivals increased to 216,054 in 2014 to 1,015,078 in 2015, giving rise to the biggest mass migration since WWII.[29] In 2016 such arrivals dropped to 362,753. Despite this, 5,096 migrants were counted dead or missing in 2016, a superior number than 2014 – 3,771 – and 2015 - 3,538.[30] On the 3 October 2013, a vessel capsized direct to Italy carrying migrants from Libya. Of the 500 migrants on the boat, more than 130 people were reported dead while an increasingly number of migrants went unaccounted for.[31] Such event, and many other 'tragedies' that followed with the progression of arrivals, were given centre stage in public debates rebalancing discourses of security, identity, and national interest with the need to uphold humanitarian and solidarity values that flagged the European Union since its birth as more than geographically integrated entity. The Mediterranean Sea, now referred to as "the graveyard" and the "watery tomb" of EUrope, has come to mark the maritime limits of 'humanitarian disasters' that are not to be seen as accidental to the governance of

[27] On the territorialisation and de-territorialisation of borders in Europe, *see* Bialasewicz L., 'Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and EU Border work in the Mediterranean', *Geopolitics* (2012*)*, 17(4), 843-66.
[28] For a more detailed account on Frontex genesis and activities consult: Frontex – European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Available at: http://frontex.europa.eu [accessed 22 December 2017].
[29] *Operational Portal Refugee Situation in the Mediterranean*, UNHCR, data available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean [accessed 23 December 2017].
[30] *Idem*.
[31] Italy boat sinking: Hundreds feared dead off Lampedusa', *BBC News*, 3 October 2013. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24380247 [accessed 26 December 2017].

migration.[32] The sea and the land, water and ground, are the repository of a violence that traps death but does not lock it up in the history of today's border and migration management. Borders qualify life and initiate the very reason of their spatial, temporal and deadly requalification.

As Jones emphasises, in fact, borders need to be seen as producing the very violence that they attempt to deter.[33] By disputing the idea that borders are inherently natural to the human world, Jones stresses the fact that borders are structurally violent and their potential for conflict is reinforced by the role that death plays in their policing. More precisely, Jones refers to the borders of the EU as being the deadliest in the world.[34] As a consequence of the problematic framing of a crisis of excessive mobility that peaked in EUrope in 2015, the borders of the EU have been militarised through new practices of security that have revealed the decade-long issue of deaths at its borders.[35] The hardening of borders, the closing down of migration routes and the re-introduction of checkpoints among European member states has made movement difficult and dangerous for the many who embarked themselves on desperate journeys towards safety.[36] This paradoxical search for alternative paths for security that migrants put in place through their journeys colludes with new deadly insecurities that this very search entitles. Borders are negative as they function by exposing many migratory figures to death. The entry of death within the biopolitical field, in fact, needs to be understood within the shifting re-territorialisation of nation states.[37] As EUrope shifts its borders beyond territory, it

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[32] Lucht H., 'The Watery Tomb Europe Tolerates', *The New York Times*, 7 October 2013. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/opinion/the-graveyard-at-europes-doorstep.html [accessed 26 December 2017]; Piet R., 'The Mediterranean: Graveyard of European Values', *Al Jazeera*, 23 April 2015. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/04/mediterranean-graveyard-european-values-150422050428476.html [accessed 26 December 2017].

[33] Jones R., *Violent Borders*.

[34] *Ibid.,* Chapter 1.

[35] *Idem.*

[36] 'Refugee Crisis: Six Countries in Schengen now have border checks in place', *Independent*, 4 January 2016. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-six-countries-in-schengen-now-have-border-checks-in-place-a6796296.html [accessed 28 December 2017]; 'Balkan countries shut borders as attention turns to new refugee routes', *The Guardian*, 9 March 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/09/balkans-refugee-route-closed-say-european-leaders [accessed 28 December 2017].

[37] *See* Rabinow P., Rose N., 'Biopower Today', *Biosocieties* (2006), 1, 195-217.

biopolitically re-territorialises them by making mobility also a matter of survival. Biopower expands the liminal points of sovereignty making visible a life that is neither fully 'secured' nor fully 'protected' but treating it as being in excess to what (material) borders can do.

In this regard, understanding the systemic conditions that reduce migrants to *(only)* survive, means looking at the ways in which their life is primarily rendered biopolitical.[38] Foucault's analysis of the different ways in which the function of life and death change in modern time is now revisited by recasting survival as the new political limit of mobility; while death can kill, survival is facilitated to create zones of political (im)mobility. Survival is not the limiting point of life but the exemplification of what life turns to be about when people are merely 'allowed' to survive. This different problematising of the politics of life *with* death is the synthesis point between securitisation and humanitarianism. These two aspects, as already discussed, stabilise the discourse about what Vaughan-Williams calls the "gap" between the humanitarian "rhetoric" and the "reality" of 'irregular' migration that represents, above all, migrants' movements and bodies as issues to securitise.[39]

In the context of European migration management, push-backs, acts of omission and abandonment in hostile environments are forms of (b)ordering practices that exemplify not only operations of the 'sovereign ban'.[40] The ways in which political power mobilises rhetoric *versus* reality to create different kinds of (im)mobility is not simply *letting die* or a matter of the government of life, as Rose would suggest.[41] What has become a priority for the governance of 'fortress Europe' is neither making live nor letting die, but 'allowing' people's *mere* survival (which, as we will see, inadvertently create

[38] Foucault M., *Society Must be Defended*, 256.
[39] Vaughan- Williams N., *Europe's Border Crisis.*
[40] Vaughan- Williams N., *Europe's Border Crisis.*
[41] Rose N. (2007) *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton University Press: Oxfordshire), 70.

zones of different political potentiality). This is not to deny death as such. Death as expression of a finitude of life is recognised by the fact that what is not made to die is not necessarily made to live either. What figures of migration now come to embody is a nexus of spaces and temporalities of survivability that transcend rigid thresholds of exclusive mobility. Such mobility is exclusive in the sense that only some are legitimised in their movements, the trusted citizen-traveller for instance, while the rest is inclusively (im)mobilised through negative borders.[42] These (im)mobilisations are managed through a modulatory sorting that relies on temporalities and spaces of aleatory containment. Insecurities are being redistributed within society as a measure of excesses of control of a new kind of disposable life, that is a life whose temporality and spatiality of existence is being rewritten by reducing both life and death to survival. *Mere* survival is (b)ordered and normalised as necessary for the containment of migrants.

The Biopolitical Reconfiguration of Borders: Virtual Security and Mobile Threats

Biopolitical understandings of security differ from traditional geopolitical discourses to the point that its conventional protective and preservative character is re-problematised in terms of promotion and regulation of life. Life takes centre stage and becomes the referent object of security practices, therefore determining the emergence of new rationales of security. Ontological and epistemological 'truths' of the past are reinterpreted from a biopolitical perspective in terms of unpredictability of threats, emergencies and contingency. This changing character of life in the 21st century impacts security discourses to the point that their regulation and monitoring requires a shift of attention from the territorial sovereignty of states to characteristics concerning

[42] *See* Guild E., Carrera S. (2013) 'EU Borders and their Control? Preventing unwanted movement of people in Europe?', *CEPS Essay*, 6(14), November 2013, 1-14. Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/No%206%20EU%20Borders%20and%20their%20Controls%20revised.pdf [accessed 30 December 2017].

populations: demographic, molecular, organic, digital and virtual aspects of life in their biological form.[43]

Bigo emphasises the importance of looking at mobilities and networks instead of frontiers and isolation.[44] Through (b)ordering, therefore, borders are progressively being reconceived as biopolitical mediums for managing life. While according to traditional realist accounts borders mark the limits of sovereign jurisdiction, therefore separating what is inside from the outside,[45] in biopolitical understandings "borders would not have meaning unless the frontier encountered the human and its activities".[46] Borders transcend sovereign power in such a way that the regulation of the flows of life becomes more important than the legal limitations related to their demarcation. Through circulation and exchange, life is promoted and power "as an ideology of right" expands in form of networks.[47] From this perspective, borders represent a vital point of intersection where life is regulated "by allowing certain types of entry while denying the passage of others".[48] Movements and flows are ordered in accordance to national affiliations but also on the basis of lives who are considered insurable and not, in order to optimise everybody's biological existence.[49] For instance, the governmentalisation of racialized techniques of discrimination, data information gathering, profiling and morphing are all part of bio-strategies of security where life is made governable through its reduction into information and biological codes.[50] Biopolitical order is constructed through biometric classifications of populations in a never-ending system of modulation where through circulation life changes.

[43] Dillon M., Lobo-Guerrero L., 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st century', 269.
[44] Bigo D., 'Security: A Field Left Fallow' *in* Michael Dillon & Andrew W. Neal (eds.) (2008), *Foucault on Politics, Security and War* (Palgrave Macmillan).
[45] Singer C. L. B., Weir L., 'Politics and Sovereign Power', 443.
[46] Evans B., *Liberal Terror*, 152.
[47] Foucault M., *Society must be defended*, 36.
[48] Evans B., *Liberal Terror*, 55.
[49] *Idem.*
[50] Chandler D., 'Review article: Risk and the biopolitics of global insecurity', *Conflict, Security & Development* (2010), 10(2), 287-97.

This harmonious activity of filtering and sorting lives through borders seem to be challenged by contemporary migration flows. While migration is an integral part of the biopolitical constitution of society, it is only through its regulation that becomes a productive feature of life. As Lilja and Vinthagen remind us, biopower is threatened when its ability to direct, organise and cultivate population behaviour in general is jeopardised.[51] In order to optimise the welfare of populations, also in its anatomo-political form, biopolitics has to be able to make life governable by deciding which lives are worth and which are not. Hence, to reduce the possibility for migrants to question and resist their own (b)ordering, their agency needs to be delimited as "any activity that diminishes the ability for governance [represents] a problem to biopower".[52] Biopower, in fact:

> "creates a binary categorization between 'us' and 'them', or between the 'normal' (e.g., legitimate citizens) and the 'abnormal' (e.g., illegal immigrants, un-qualified refugees or bogus asylum seekers). The former deserves to live, while the latter are expendable".[53]

These biopolitical re-(b)orderings function through the complicity of sovereign power re-territorialisation: borders are being patrolled, fences and walls are being raised all around EUrope and nation-states are increasingly defending their frontiers and denying access to many. The politics of borders have entered into the realm of biopower, not subordinating sovereign power to its needs, but complementing it as a more complex version of biopolitics. While relationships of domination and subordination between the two are often contingent, sovereign power and biopower function to totalise governance so that control and care over migrants' life can guarantee *(only)* survival.

Accounts about biopolitics of security are revisited by contemporary bio-moves that make apparatuses of security more sophisticated and determinant tools within governmental politics. Such apparatuses have changed in accordance with new specifications of life. According to Dillon we have shifted from the biopolitics of

[51] Lilja M., Vinthagen S., 'Sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower', 121.
[52] *Idem*.
[53] Zembylas M., 'Agamben's Theory of Biopower and Immigrants/Refugees/Asylum Seekers', *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (2010), 26(2), 31-45, 35.

population of the 20th century to the recombinant biopolitics of security of the molecular age, to the virtualisation of many aspects of security concern.[54] By attempting to develop a theorization of biopolitics "with Foucault and beyond Foucault", Dillon looks at a different logic of formation of life where its empirical referent changes from "population to heterogenesis".[55] In the past traditional security discourses were related to the capitalisation of certainty, establishing causal laws of effect; the epistemologies associated with contemporary biopolitics are now concerned with surveillance and big data: sets of power/knowledge make reality known by "establishing profiles, patterns and probabilities".[56] From prophylactic measures of containment to the proliferation of biotechnologies of security, emergent life is made knowable through complex mechanisms of digitalisation and virtualisation.

What we are to understand for security in our times, therefore, is a rather morphogenesis of control that promotes at its core regeneration, contingency and change.[57] For this purpose, Dillon remarks that virtuality becomes more important than actuality as mode of governing life, that is the biopoliticised reduction of life to the scopes of governmentality. We can then see that biopolitical rationalizations of life reduce it to technological governance. This produces the virtual as the yardstick of the real. This politics of security takes life and digitalises it by making it furtherly (in)tangible as "informational code".[58] In the age of digital security, everything becomes a potential threat. Even the way in which we think about politics has been entirely appropriated by imperatives to secure.[59] The virtual now divides people among an infinity of dangerous being-becoming-dangerous that have to be secured differently:

[54] Dillon M. (2015) *Biopolitics of Security: A Political Analytic of Security* (New York: Routledge), 45.
[55] *Idem*.
[56] *Ibid.,* 47.
[57] *Ibid.*, 67.
[58] Dillon M., 'Virtual Security: A Life Science of (Dis)order', 534.
[59] Dillon M. (1996) *Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought* (London: Routledge).

> "as the subject of virtual security is the post-vital subject of inscription and code, rather than the vital subject of rational self-interested will and consciousness, the virtual science of security aspires towards pre-inscription rather than pre-cognition".[60]

The digital virtualises the real by introducing different significations of lives whose security and insecurity is differently problematised. Biopolitics is the contextual political driver that enables us to see how virtual security targets subjects of mobility through their movement. From demographics to biometrics, mechanisms of differentiation are now pre-inscribed in the circulation of life making migrants the biopolitical device of algorithmic equations that distribute fear and safety.

It seems clear, therefore, that in the context of migratory movements the biopolitical control of mobility is strongly influenced by what virtual apparatuses of surveillance pre-inscribe as dangerous. According to Rose, contemporary forms of governance operate on a binary division where identity is securitised by inserting some people within "circuits of security" while others are located within "circuits of insecurity".[61] From protection to abandonment, such circuits perpetuate the inclusion and exclusion of individuals assumed to be worthy or unworthy of these qualifications. As Topal notes when analysing the case of immigrants from Turkey to Germany, surveillance over migrants "concerns the production and control, through registration and checking procedures, of knowledge pertaining to individuals and groups".[62] By referring to it as necropolitical surveillance, Topal argues that the identity of the excluded is now reduced to an assemblage of risky conditions. Both life and death are defined within a "complex institutional network"[63] that regulates the distribution of the (un)safe. The attempts to secure the spatial and temporal borders within communities, and at the gates of a sovereign territory, rely on a

[60] *Ibid.*, 542.
[61] Rose N. (1999) *Powers of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 253.
[62] Topal C., 'Necro-political Surveillance: Immigrants from Turkey in Germany' *in* Clough P. T. and Willse C. (ed.) (2011) *Beyond Biopolitics: Essays on the Governance of Life and Death* (Duke University Press: Durham – London), 238-57.
[63] *Ibid*.

biopolitical bifurcation that is marked a-priori by the assignment of different values to lives. Since security is obsessed with the survival of the sovereign order,[64] the rights of citizenship and the non-rights of the non-citizens are now increasingly inserted within a different ontology of code that abstracts the real to make differences substantial within the virtual. These differences are then made relevant in the daily (b)ordering of migration. This is strictly related to the fact that biometric re-(b)ordering reinstates a "differential treatment of migrants according to their positionality in socio-political power relations of class, race, gender, age and sexual orientation".[65]

The specific technology of biometrics "refers to the technology of measuring, analysing and processing unique biological characteristics such as fingerprints, eye retinas, irises, facial patterns, hand geometry and body odours".[66] Biometric technologies furtherly validate the identity of an individual through its digital representation stored in a database.[67] This is visible at physical borders, such as airports, where those travellers classified as risky undergo deep screening processes of validation while the "trusted-citizen-traveller" trades his/her speed for privileged mobility: "by sorting individuals into fast-moving, low risk 'kinetic elites' and slow-moving, high risk 'kinetic underclasses,' biometric borders actively produce mobile subjectivities".[68] More importantly, such technologies render migrants hyper-controllable as their body is transformed into data. As Amoore calls them, these "digital alter egos" alter the power relations and encounters between migrants and border security apparatuses bringing security closer to the realm of the virtual.[69]

[64] Debrix F. (2015) 'Katechontic Sovereignty: Security Politics and the Overcoming of Time', *International Political Sociology* (June 2015), 9(2), 143-57.
[65] Scheel S., 'Autonomy of Migration Despite its Securitisation? Facing the Terms and Conditions of Biometric Re(b)ordering', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (June 2013), 41(3), 575-600, 583.
[66] Ayana B. (2013) *Governing through Biometrics: The Biopolitics of Identity* (PALGRAVE MACMILLAN), 3.
[67] *Idem*.
[68] Amoore L., 'Lines of sight: on the visualization of unknown features', *Citizenship Studies* (2009), 13(1), 17-30, 18.
[69] *Ibid.*

The process of migration itself is nowadays made more visible than in the past thanks to the advent of biosecurity where borders are not simply patrolled but have also become points of identification where migrants are profiled according to their biometrics. Efforts to secure borders draw a (blurred) line between the virtual and the real, for the sake of the selective security borders perpetuate. Such a line makes us see the negative effects of border control as a necessary precondition for the containment of disruptive identities. As Amoore notices, the "visualization of unknown features" is datified in terms of what has not been seen yet but will be visualized as coming risk for the many.[70] In analyzing contemporary forms of attentiveness, Amoore recognizes that the screen has now come to assist sovereign maneuvers of power. The identification, localization, naming, and depiction of mobile targets is othered and pre-othered by the actualization of the possible.[71]

The implications of deploying a projected picture of an unseen reality as a measure of a 'real' risky life, impacts subjects to the point of questioning their agency and status. Now techno-scientific visualizations make reality knowable but also pre-conceals to prevent its contestation. The increased technological sophistication of security produces continuous performances dividing practices that rely on pre-calculated algorithms. Under such conditions, it is the "potential of the virtual" that functions as a model for the risk management of people deemed as "dangerous".[72] Smart borders, predictive policing and data knowledge are now what allows algorithmic security to reconfigure borders in terms of their biopolitical engagement with circulation.[73] These technologies of the border are the technologies of diffuse sorting that make the body a "readable text" of generalized mobile concern: this body "cannot exist independently

[70] *Idem*.
[71] *Idem*.
[72] *See* Amoore L., Raley R., 'Securing with algorithms: Knowledge, decision, sovereignty', *Security Dialogue* (2017), 48(1), 3-10.
[73] On the theme of security and circulation *see* Bigo D., 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease', *Alternatives* (2002), 27, 63-92.

from the technology that reads it".[74] The way in which migrants are governed and managed is deeply influenced by the emergence of these biotechnologies of surveillance. It is not only material borders that are changing shape, through border patrol drones and mediatizations, but it is also the mode of selective security that is shifting toward the abstraction and diffusion of mobile threats. This biopolitical reconfiguration of borders means that now borders logics run throughout society and can change the way through which the subjects of mobility experience their condition of movement. Specifically, biometric identification strategies are what links the body of the migrant with that of his/her projected digital biography, that includes an approximation of algorithmic risk.[75] This "corporeal turn"[76] within geopolitics and security studies, posits biometrics at the core of a programme of governance that verifies identities and makes them a securitised issue of controlled circulation.

This process of linking bodies and identities is stored in form of data. For instance, the European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC) is the European Union fingerprint database that allows the identification of asylum seekers and registers illegal border-crossing. Such data becomes a cartography of people's movement and allows member states to take decisions on the legal jurisdiction of a case-by-case procedure, while retracing whether an asylum application has been already previously filed in another member state.[77] The problem with such a mechanism lies in the fact that the overflow of biometrics never serves a univocal purpose, often expanding into a different mapping of inequalities of security. This is well exemplified by the way migrants are registered at hotspots and often abandoned to their circumstances of survival, becoming a mobile controlled threat: what matters is that their bio-graphical features are stored and with them their unique digital

[74] Rygiel K. (2010) *Globalising Citizenship* (UBC Press), 147.
[75] Amoore L., Raley R., 'Securing with algorithms'.
[76] Salter M. B., 'The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self'.
[77] EURODAC. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-of-applicants_en [accessed 5 January 2018].

identity. The targeting of the mobility and behaviour of migrants, in fact, aims to typify their biopolitical calculative chance of being a risk to the urge to optimize 'life'. In relation to the diffusion of political borders within society, the biopolitical reconfiguration of measurements of life and death are the inductive 'truth' of an algorithmic reality of datified mobility. The consequence of mediating personal narratives of words in terms of digital and extractable subjects of auto-referential 'truth' has become itself a political datum that orders and filters bodies without necessarily pledging any commitment to listening to other narratives of the possible.[78] This causes a fundamental difference of recognition between what the law and politics say what a data is and what the data tells us about the subject. As Agamben writes "law is not directed toward the establishment of justice", neither is it directed towards the verification of truth, "law is solely directed toward judgment, independent of truth and justice".[79] In line with this, besides being physical, imaginary, material, and fragmentary, borders are biopolitical tools of deterrent truth that reduce the human to a form of irregularity that is pre-given virtually. This contributes to the making of different constructions of the migrant as a subject to be governed both humanly and securely.

Carrying Borders Within Society: Dispersing Political Border-lines

We now need to shift our attention from digitalization and virtual borders to biopolitical declinations of borders with the aim of reconsidering and understanding how certain types of circulations, exchange and security are bound up with the question of political border-lines as (b)ordering. The theme of political border-lines change the terms of our analysis as it broadens our analytical imagination at play in the study of boundaries. Rather than imagining borders as fixed or resembling a cartographic space, border-lines liken them to

[78] On the idea that the management of refugees has now become a matter of policing truth – without necessarily committing to the assertion of rights and law, *see* Fassin D., 'From Right to Favour'.
[79] Agamben G. *Remnants of Auschwitz,* 18.

dispersed thresholds within society. Referring to political border-lines allows us to look at the abstract imaginary of boundaries in ways that are diffuse, (im)mobilised and as a compromising point between securitised and 'humanised' bodies. While retaining the metaphor of the line and linking it to borders that connect and separate at the same time, border-lines ensure the existence of borders that are 'in-between'. Political border-lines can be defined as the state of being in an intermediate (or borderline) position that is not still transcended, but in the process to. The (b)ordering of *surviving migrants* happens at the edge of classifications that reduce their lives to what can be considered acceptable ways of living. Once borders expand within society, the position of migrants who 'carry' them is (im)mobilised as their humanisation and their securitisation cannot allow them to fully be seen only as subjects of rights/care but also as subjects that might represent a threat to individuals and communities more broadly. Humanitarian interventions and securitisation compromise in survival and bring political borders closer to the verges of our everyday lives.

As Balibar convincingly notes, "borders have a polysemic nature" and are "dispersed a little everywhere […] wherever the movement of information, people and things is happening and is controlled".[80] Border areas, in fact, have become central to the constitution of the public space. The fact that borders can be of many forms, and operate across different groups, means that their mode of inclusion and exclusion is no simply one that divides but also one that connects conditions of survival. While we have to be cautious in treating borders as an 'everywhere' reality that easily falls into an 'anywhere of everything', it seems indispensable to consider how (b)ordering is nonetheless enacted through devolution strategies that maintain complex relationships with circulation. What is in excess to what has been previously filtered or not captured at the borders of nation states, becomes a matter for (b)ordering to deal with.

[80] Balibar E., *Politics and the Other Scene*.

Projecting the effects of geographical borders inside countries means to create what Vaughan-William calls a "security continuum" where everywhere is turned into a border site.[81] This striation of space gives rise to new borders that reinforce the way through which life is regulated by power. Such a power no longer only disciplines life but regularises it in order to achieve "an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers".[82] While discipline works by isolating and segregating threats, biopolitical apparatuses of security work now through expansive space that encourages the circulation of the 'good' and exhausts the movement of what it deems to be 'bad.' Under conditions whereby migrants are securitised throughout society, people are not just made to circulate per se, but are first of all qualified through their political disqualifications.[83] Such a decision is prior to circulation, it is not circumscribed to the 'exception' and constitutes what now can be seen as generalised biopolitical borders. Situating the exception beyond the rule helps us to escape from "the totalising vision of sovereign space"[84] that Agamben proposes.

On this reading, the ways in which security produces not just bare life, but reduces migrants to *(only)* survive, needs to be connected with the ways in which migrants who carry borders and are othered as political border-lines exceed and interact with decisions for their containment. Here we can clearly see the biopolitical nature of the political border-lines in question that emerge in the public space. The dispersal of borders traced by Balibar helps us to understand how different types of (b)ordering practices spread within society and produce different kinds of inequalities. Taking borders out of their comfort zone allows us to look at key dimensions of (b)ordering processes that would otherwise be minimised. A multiperspectival study of borders, that takes borders from

[81] Vaughan-Williams N. (2010), 'The UK Security Continuum: Virtual Biopolitics and the Simulation of the Sovereign Ban', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (December 2010), 28(6), 1071-83.
[82] Foucault M., *Society Must Be Defended*, 249.
[83] This can be grasped if we think of the already biopolitical essence of politics that Agamben recognises by identifying the figure of the *Homo Sacer*. Agamben G. (1997) *Homo Sacer.*
[84] Coleman M., Grove K., 'Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of Sovereignty'.

the periphery to the centre (and vice versa), is what Rumford refers to as a better way to challenge some core assumptions that border studies still retain, such as the idea "that (state) borders require mutual recognition (consensus) in order to exist and function".[85] In particular, Rumford stresses the fact that borders are beyond consensus because they do not necessarily work to enhance national security, identity or material gains.[86] Freeing borders from a natural relation with territories takes us away from thinking that such limits are natural to the world. This is the reason why consensus (wider recognition) and institutionalised visibility (capturable/simplified life) restrict our thinking on political border-lines.

In this regard, political boundaries are now seen as disaggregated divisions that spread what is in "surplus" within society. Such "surplus", namely migrants whose *mere* survival is promoted, is redistributed as (in)security and actualised as "dangerous' by decentring borders and re-escalating them to their biopolitical classifications. This is evident if we consider the ways in which the EU border regime manages lives that are considered to be worthy of basic interventions. Based on a politics of excesses, the governance of migration is today reorganising the border regime through a politics of dispersal that expands the border within spatialities and temporalities of manageable movement.[87] Such politics aims to rebalance the barometer of security and mobility within a category of redistribution that works through speed. The construction of this normative order, where mobility is controlled through keeping things moving at a differential speed, is based on techniques that criminalise solidarity,[88] discourage

[85] Rumford C., 'Towards a Multiperspectival Theory of Borders', *Geopolitics* (2012), 17(4), 887-902, 888.
[86] *Idem.*
[87] To better understand how containment is now maintained through mobility, *see* Tazzioli M., 'Containment through Mobility at the Internal Frontiers of Europe', *Border Criminologies Blog*, 15 March 2017. Available at: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2017/03/containment [accessed 18 January 2018].
[88] This is not only something that regards the way citizens of a host country are often being accused of smuggling migrants – while helping them – but it also relates to current attacks on the work of NGOs in the Mediterranean Sea. NGOs rescue ships have been accused of acting as a 'pull factor' and 'colluding with smugglers'. For this reason, on July 2017 Italian Authorities have asked the NGOs involved in the rescue of migrants to sign a code of conduct for saving lives in the Mediterranean. This move has been criticised by many as furtherly putting a risk the lives of

associationism[89] and abandon life to an ontological destiny of necessity. In other words, it relies on the creation of hostile environments for the precarization of migrants.[90]

Despite the fact that interstate borders are regaining large attention in our lives, we need to avoid what Agnew calls the "border trap" [91] of territorial thinking if we want to account for the political dispersal of lives that are reduced to survival. This is not to deny that these lives are not mapped within a territory, rather to affirm that territory is itself a power technology[92] that relegates migrants not only in camps. Hospital parking spaces, airports, train stations and other places of policing now represent the ungated reality of political border-lines. The creation of graded forms of life *with* death is what is at stake within these biopolitical assemblages of movement. As Tazzioli has argued, the transitivity of migration is not contemplated in the European legal system where people have to be qualified and unqualified, that is they should be objectively determined in their movement.[93] She looks into the dynamics that lead to the dismantling of the so called 'Calais jungle', a migrant camp close to Calais which was shut in October 2016, to show how migrants evicted from the camp were subjected to two complementary and somehow inverse spatial strategies of control:

> "The first is a *politics of dispersal* deployed to prevent and neutralise the formation of autonomous migrant camps, dividing up and separating migrants from one another. The second *contains, constrains, and directs* the mobility of those migrants accepting to stay within the asylum system, and that of those excluded from it".[94]

migrants. The text of the document written in English is available at: http://www.euronews.com/2017/08/03/text-of-italys-code-of-conduct-for-ngos-involved-in-migrant-rescue [accessed 18 January 2018].

[89] This is exemplified by the actualisation of what Tazzioli calls "the politics of dispersal". *See* Tazzioli M. (2017) 'Calais after the jungle: migrant dispersal and the expulsion of humanitarianism', *Open Democracy*, 20 July 2017. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/martina-tazzioli/calais-after-jungle-migrant-dispersal-and-expulsion-of-humanitarianis [accessed 10 January 2018].

[90] On the topic of hostile environment, and how this is fuelled by migrant's new arrivals and media representations *see* Robinson D. and Reeve K. (2006) *Neighbourhood Experiences of New Immigration: Reflections from the Evidence Base* (York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation).

[91] Agnew J., 'The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations theory', *Review of International Political Theory* (1994), 1(1), 53-80.

[92] Elden S., *Foucault: The Birth of Power.*

[93] Tazzioli M., 'Calais after the jungle: migrant dispersal and the expulsion of humanitarianism'.

[94] *Ibid.*

A politics of dispersal and division is giving rise to new thresholds of life *with* death. Such thresholds become the substance of what the subject of mobility comes to represent: a life that needs to be rescued and from which we need to protect ourselves from. The lives of migrants come to represent the manifestation of what survival constitutes according to biopolitical governance as migrants are made to live *with* death, always shadowed by the possibility of the camp.

From Camps to the 'Smooth' Reality of Political Boundaries

The logic of sovereignty, homo sacer and the camp are central to the analysis of Giorgio Agamben. The link between bare life and politics, according to him, can be found in the biopolitical production of lives that are reduced to their bare. The inclusion of such lives through means of exception guarantee their exclusion from the polity and come to determine the nucleus of sovereign power. This "bestialization of man achieved through the more sophisticated political techniques"[95] is for Agamben based on the natural reduction of western politics to a fundamental structure of exclusion that brings bare life and political existence into the realm of the politics of life. Homo sacer – a sacred man "who might be killed and yet not sacrificed" – is a figure of the roman law that Agamben deploys to explain the ways in which human life has always been included in the juridical order through its very exclusion.[96] The peculiarity of our contemporary times, Agamben continues, is that "the realm of bare life – which is originally situated at the margins of the political order – gradually begins to coincide with the political realm – and exclusion/inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction".[97] This is a zone of inclusive exclusion that operates through the logic of the ban, that is the suspension of the law by the conservation of its power. Who has been

[95] Foucault M. *qtd in* Agamben G., *Homo Sacer*, 3.
[96] *Ibid.*, 8.
[97] *Ibid.*, 9.

banned from the law maintains a relation to it that is legally binding as a rule for the preservation of political life. In so doing, those who fall into the structure of the ban are abandoned and exposed to the consequences of their biopoliticisation. Their naturalised life is made intelligible by a series of displacements. As Agamben remarks:

> "If there is a line in every modern state marking the point at which the decision on life becomes a decision on death, and biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics, this line appears today as no longer dividing two stable orders/zones. This line is in motion and moving into areas other than that of political life".[98]

The contiguity between natural life and political life is then not settled at once: in the age of biopolitics the control and care over lives is never assumed as a constant. While the exercise of sovereignty runs through borders, such borders are now being made relative to *topos*, *corpus* and *nomos*. What remains absolute is the potential for disallowing lives through the relative presence of the camp. Agamben sustains that while the Nazi camp embodies the totalising nature of such a power, many other places are coming into being where life is contained as bare. As Agamben argues, life is now contained through a "dislocating localization" to the point that we "must learn to recognise in all its metamorphoses".[99] The materialization of bare life is the relative form of an authentic politics over life that cannot be reduced to the space of the camp.

More than two decades have passed since Agamben's analysis on the fundamental activity of sovereign power and the biopolitical production of bare life, and yet political space seems more fragmented. As Lemke reads it, Agamben comprehends camps in the form of a line that differentiates bare life and political existence.[100] This seems to be problematic as Agamben cannot analytically engage with forms of bare life beyond the materialisation of this line. Agamben establishes a border that is structural to the

[98] *Ibid.*, 122.
[99] As Agamben puts it, "The state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the juridico-political order, now becomes a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by the bare life that more and more can no longer be inscribed in that order. The growing dissociation of birth (bare life) and the nation-state is the new fact of politics in our days, and what we call camp is its disjunction. […]. The political system no longer orders forms of life and juridical rules in a determinate space, but instead contains at its very centre a dislocating localization that exceeds it and which every form of life and rule can be virtually taken". *Ibid.*, 175.
[100] Lemke T., 'A Zone of Indistinction', 3.

impossibility of its trespassing.[101] More importantly, Lemke continues, bare life today is not simply subjected to death and it cannot be reduced to the rule of law or sovereign decisions.[102] The very possibility of differentiating political border-lines from camps, therefore, needs a different emphasis that recognises the distribution of life and death not only through the camp but through circulations that manifest themselves not only as the camp. As Evans puts it, nomological order does not help us to fully understand the extension of current biopolitical logics that expand within forms of planetary circulation.[103] This is also observed by Dillon who argues that we have passed from a geopolitical reality of distribution to a biopolitical security of circulation.[104] From this perspective, it can be argued that the very idea and functions of the camp have changed with it. Under the inscription of life as managerial activity, camps are not only the permanent space of an 'everywhere exception' but also the spatiality and temporality of circulation. Political border-lines make the subject of mobility to live *with* death, and camps are coming to be understood as more than containers of this dispersed circulation.

Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos discuss the political constitution of the present and look at the current regime of mobility control in Europe pointing out that movement has extended beyond policy. What the authors call "liminal porocratic institutions" have now come to extend transnational governance to include the protection of the space of the European nations.[105] More precisely, these institutions:

> "lie and operate beyond public negotiations and beyond norms and rules instituted through governance. […] [as such,] can be understood as a flexible regime of control which attempts to regulate mobility flows by forging contingent border zones wherever the routes of migration make the existing regime porous".[106]

[101] *Idem.*
[102] *Ibid.*, 10.
[103] Evans B., *Liberal Terror*, 156.
[104] Dillon M., 'Virtual Security'.
[105] Papadopoulos D. et al., *Escape Routes*, *Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century* (London: Pluto Press), 173-74.
[106] *Idem*.

On this account, the aim of this migration regime is to re-direct people flows by making excessive movement a matter of a new expansive and transitory politics of sorting. While the implications of the creation of these zones of graded sovereignty will be better assessed later in the thesis when discussing circuits of (im)mobility, it is the meaning of the camp that needs first to be explored, in accordance with the emergence of porous governance.

To discuss camps nowadays is to understand that Agamben's vision of them - as a "catalytic converter" of an order based on a lawful exclusion can no be longer be upheld as the most important measure for governing life. This legalistic understanding of the function of the camp is rearticulated by Papadopoulos and others in terms of "timescapes" that connect mobile subjectivities with the regulation of migrant's time.[107] Camps as a function of time work to recalibrate space by making mobility relevant to the temporality of migration. The 'temporary' and the 'permanent' are now differently conceived. Rather than looking at camps solely as a legalised space in which life is rendered unproductive for the aims of regularised governance, camps now represent the *locus* of temporary movement. It is in camps that migratory movements are temporalized by dynamics that are mobile and immobile. Drawing from Virilio, Papadopoulos and others question how people are included differently in camps by using the notion of "decelerated circulation of mobility" to explain how camps now "appear as the spaces which more drastically attempt to regulate the speed of this circulation".[108] In a nutshell, camps decentre mobility and reinsert it to society through time. In these conditions, decelerated migration manages mobility by controlling it through speed. As the authors eloquently show by looking at the Schengen process of temporally regulated movement, the camps of "liminal

[107] *Ibid.*, Section III, 'Life and Experience', 85-137.
[108] *Ibid.*, 219. Also *see* Virilio P. (translated by Marc Polizzotti) (1977) *Speed and Politics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press).

porocratic institutions" are now understood as "speed boxes".[109] This shift from considering camps as the markers of spatial and legal regulation of mobility to their temporal centrality in today's life posits a different set of problems for the governance of migration.

The precarious conditions of life in camps are now to be seen as the synthesis of a time-managed mobility that reinserts productivity into "a global temporal regime of labour".[110] Such mechanisms are further reinforced by institutionalising fluxes to create differences between "sanctioned, cross-border labour migration on the one hand, and asylum law and juridical protection measures on the other".[111] Linking this to the politics of dispersal that is taking place in the contemporary governance of migration in EUrope, we can see that Agamben's idea of camps as spaces outside the law, while being within it, tells us little about the porosity of camps themselves. Moreover, Agamben's reading of the function of camps is restricted to the suspension of the law but is not problematised next to the speed of absorption that is required to make the labour market, and the system of rights claimers, converge under the same rationale of productivity.[112]

The camp as a tool to govern mobility, otherwise inaccessible, is now seen as a compression machine that re-directs speed to the need to equalise it to the containment of people deemed to be in excess. Borrowing from Hardt and Negri's idea of the smooth space of the Empire, camps come now to be understood as an everywhere and nowhere of circulation where space and time converge through modulations of entry.[113] In fact, different modalities of entry are now sorted in camps where migrant labour, asylum

[109] Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., 'After citizenship: autonomy of migration, organisational ontology and mobile commons', *Citizenship Studies* (2013), 17(2), 178-96, 180.
[110] *Idem*.
[111] *Idem.*
[112] *Idem.*
[113] Hardt and Negri refer to the smooth space of the Empire as a space where power in imperial sovereignty is deterritorialised to its capacity of being everywhere and nowhere. Borrowing from the authors notion of "smooth space", the space of the camp can now be seen as a temporal utopia or as a non-place that is dispersed within the economy of speed. Hardt and Negri description of smooth space can be found in Hardt M., Negri A. (2000) *Empire* (Harvard University Press), 190.

seekers, and their securitised and required mobility come to inform the politics of excesses. Understanding camps as "speed boxes" is an important step in understanding survival as biopolitical strategy of governance. Migrants in camps are now made to *(only)* survive a condition that is *in-between*, both contingent to speed and time and are kept circulating because of that.

Departing from Agamben's thought of the biopolitical production of "zones of indistinction", but also more broadly about his idea of bare life *in* death, camps are not only the space of a bare life produced by a state of exception sanctioned by law. Camps are now the places where the (b)ordering of surviving migrants takes place. Agamben's notion of bare life, in fact, fails to account for the stratification of lives: not all disallowed lives are subjected to the same level of violence, or even serve the same purpose.[114] Human hierarchies are established in camps based on a principle of biopolitical schism. This schism justifies the exposition of certain populations to danger political death, expulsion, or deportation.[115] Based upon racism, border regime produce lives that exist at the margin of what can be 'let' to survive. As borders are essential for the administration of the life of the many - the population - the regulation of life maintains a relation with boundaries that is uneven. Such relation between the Global North and the Global South operates in Europe through a migratory regime of disqualifications.

As Balibar argues, with the birth of the European Union and the making of the category of "European citizen", reserved to those who already possess a nationality of a member state that is "the immigrant population permanently residing in Europe",[116] more divisions have been established. As result of this, "the population contained in the EU territory is [today] assembled in a stratified manner, according to the rights outlined in

[114] Lemke T., 'A Zone of Indistinction'.
[115] Buckle S., Wissel J., 'State Project Europe: The Transformation of the European Border Regime and the Production of Bare Life', *International Political Sociology* (2010), 4, 33-49, 38.
[116] Balibar E. (translated by James Swedson) (2004) *We, the People of Europe: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton University Press), 122.

the EU border regime".[117] These divisions predicated upon the right to exclude have given rise to a "global apartheid regime" sustained by class, gender and ethnicity as broader markers of belonging.[118] Those who are excluded from the benefits of this system live in "death zones" that are characterised not only by the total disregard of human rights, but also by the full disposability of the utility of the lives that it contains. Refugees, asylum-seekers and migrant workers – among others – are institutionally disempowered and made to live only in the wait. Close to the "death zones" lie the "life zones" that are moreover stratified through further qualifications.[119] New forms of power emerge that no longer operate simply through violence per se, but also through the distribution of people whose life is deemed to be superfluous in zones of graded governance. The survival of subjects of mobility is now a matter of modulatory sorting within society. As borders are layers as well as lines,[120] layer upon layer, migrants' lives are shaped by political (im)mobilisations that promote people's *mere* survival as a measure of how their life should be lived politically. These circumstances impact different migrants differently.

The Border Crossing of 'Dangerous' Beings

Migrants have mainly been understood from the perspective of states, and it is from this perspective that we should start to explore the ways in which these figures have been conceptualised. According to Nail, the 'migrant' is less a person than a "political concept that identifies the common points where people are socially expelled or dispossessed as a result, or as the cause, of their mobility".[121] Mobility is not only to be understood through the linearity of migrants' extensive movement, from point A to point B, but also

[117] Buckle S., Wissel J., 'State Project Europe', 38.
[118] Balibar E., *We, the People of Europe,* 124.
[119] *Ibid.*, 126.
[120] Shuddhabrata S., 'Borders: Walking across, as opposed to Flying Above'. Available at: http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors2/senguptatext.html [accessed 20 January 2018].
[121] Nail T. (2015) *The Figure of the Migrant* (Stanford University Press), Chapter 1.

for the intensive and qualitative transformation that they bring to society as whole.[122] The migrant changes place and status as he/she encounters "points of exclusion" that are territorial, political, juridical and economic. These 'barriers' give rise respectively to the nomad, the barbarian, the vagabond and the proletariat.[123] Such figures are the result of what the history of social motion has made relative to the crossing of national borders. In this respect, as Nail remarks, there is not only one figure of the migrant, but many and they are the correlative of different degrees of mobility that are, therefore, the product of different forces of expulsion.[124] Every society produces migrants, but their position is never empirically fixed as it is the condition of their mobility that define changes in their status. Such conditions are not predictable and stable, and while different figures of the migrant emerge in social history, contemporary figures need to be explored in relation to their mobility. As political power embraces these figures otherwise, it is their juridical construction that sanctions how a regime of mobility re-orders lives unequally.

One of the most substantial distinctions that is made is the one that distinguishes the migrant from the refugee. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) refugees are persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution on grounds of race, religion, political views and other affiliations, and cross national-borders in the hope of finding a safe sanctuary. The recognition of the status of refugees is defined by international law, in particular by the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, that sets out the legal principle that inform the protection of refugees and its many aspects.[125]As they are forced to leave their country of origin, they need protection from individual states and countries of reception are bound to accept asylum claims, conduct hearings and verify the legitimacy of the demand of the asylum seekers according to what is known as the

[122] *Idem*.
[123] *Ibid.*
[124] *Idem*.
[125] Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugee, *UNHCR*. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html [accessed 13 January 2018].

principle of non-refoulement.[126] In the context of the European Union, the Dublin Regulation compels member states to examine asylum seekers applications according to the principle of the first country of arrival. Applicants seeking protection under the Geneva Convention, and other EU laws, are not allowed to choose the state where to present their asylum request but have to apply for asylum in the first European country that they reach. Such a system has proven to be particularly problematic in the case of contemporary migratory fluxes as the volume and concentrations of arrivals has further stretched extra-legal criteria for allowing claims to be filed.

Broader figures of migration and their mobility are being differently qualified, almost contingently, politically rather than legalistically. Migrants are those who choose voluntarily to leave their country of origin mainly to improve their conditions of life, finding work, reunite with their family etc. Unlike refugees, the protection of their country is not denied to migrants in case they decide to go home.[127] This distinction is important as the commitment required by the protection of refugees is not the same as that for migrants who are managed according to a discretionary processes and migration laws of nation-states. Put differently, the protection of refugees is a matter of international law and global concern, while that of migrants is a domestic issue of sovereign states relevance.[128] Beside these legal and jurisdictional markers, both categories have undergone significant change, conceptually and empirically, becoming part of the same assemblage of risk. This is evident when considering how the legal definition of refugees and the more general idea of migrants have come to be conflated under the language of emergence and security.[129] The sizable number of people arriving in EUrope in recent years has had the paradoxical effect of blurring the difference between these two figures,

[126] 'UNHCR viewpoint: 'Refugee' or 'Migrant' – Which is Right?', *UNHCR,* 11 July 2016. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html [accessed 20 January 2018].
[127] *Idem*.
[128] *Idem*.
[129] *See* Guild E., *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*.

refugees and migrants, while at the same time appealing on their very distinction. Facilitated by a massifying and statist language that promotes flows over individuals,[130] the construction of a precise migratory experience pre-qualifies these figures of migration who are both associated with situations of 'irregularity'.

The use of different categories to describe people on the move, especially in the context of the most recent migratory 'emergency' in EUrope, is reflective of a migration-asylum nexus problem. The politicisation of migration, in fact, has led to the naturalisation of categories of mobility that position some experiences as real, therefore in need of international protection, and some others as fake, that is when detention and deportation become a responsibility of the state. As Crawley and Skeplaris have widely shown in their study on migrants crossing the Mediterranean to Greece in 2015, there are complex drivers to migration, none of which is reducible to forced or voluntary movement per se.[131] The pre-legitimisation of these drivers reduces figure(s) of migration to what the two authors call "categorical fetishism" that differentiate between migrants and refugees.[132] Hence, drawing lines between those who could be refugees and those who should be migrants pre-inscribe legitimacies of movement that are in constant change. On the other hand, such distinction is essential as the risk could be that of failing to recognise the specific reasons from which international protection needs to be granted: if every refugee is a migrant, and vice versa, no distinction on their priority and channelling of claims could be recognised, reducing their right to claim rights. As any use of categories has limits, so the use of 'refugee' and 'migrant' as singular or interchangeable terms pose some problems as these are not neutral ordering classifications.

This considered, there seems to be the need to move beyond opposing binaries and acknowledge the fact that people cross categories, renegotiating their status across

[130] *Idem*.
[131] Crawley H., Skleparis D., 'Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both: categorical fetishism and the politics of bounding in Europe's 'migration crisis', *Journal of Ethic and Migration Studies* (2018), 44(1), 48-64.
[132] *Idem*.

different spectrums and territories. While policy pre-identifies who deserves more and who is entitled to less, challenging the boundaries between these categories can be very difficult. However, in thinking of migration in terms of movement it can be argued that as migrants include also yet to be recognised refugees, it is implied in the use of the term that drivers of migration include those of international humanitarian protection. By privileging the use of migrants to describe people who cross borders and negotiate borderscapes, in this thesis and beyond it, the reasons of their mobility are not pre-empted: instead, the term acknowledges that we cannot, a priori, disqualify mobility at large. Referring to migrants, therefore, does not mean reducing the rights of refugees. On the contrary, it aims to confront policies, discourses, and state practices which are rooted in constructing fine lines between regular and irregular mobility, between 'universal humans' and 'particular migrants', between international protection and illegalisation.

As the movement of migrants puts in question the given order of nation-states, a hierarchy of figures of migration makes such a movement conflate into an heterarchy of undeserved mobility. The political question raised by refugees in EUrope has shifted moral hierarchies of reception into their very negation, to the point that 'economic migrants', 'asylum seekers' and 'refugees' are all potentially redundant to the legal value that they possess. As their value is prescribed in their securitisation, their humanity is` differently stratified beyond a legal paradigm of protection from risk. We can see then that the paradox of bestowing juridical and political qualifications by granting rights of asylum does not soothe the inner tension between the necessity of protecting human lives within what is a securitised framework. As Fassin notes, the current management of refugees in EUrope tells us more than we can initially grasp on the "moral crisis" that we are facing. What emerged at the end of WWII as a right of international protection is now being treated as a favour, to the point that morality is being increasingly obscured by a

political economy of migratory redundancy.[133] Such hypocrisy is revealed in the EU-Turkey joint-statement of the 18th of March 2016. This deal prescribes that for one Syrian Refugee relocated from the Greek Islands to Turkey, one Syrian asylum seeker in Turkey will be found a home in EUrope. Such resettlement cannot exceed 72,000 people, which is the equivalent of one fifth of the total of Syrians who have applied for asylum in EUrope in 2015.[134] This demographic redistribution, or even the more exasperated discourses on refugees' quotas, do not tackle the moral imperative of protection but rather expand the exceptionality of their legal disqualifications.[135]

As we can see then, political and moral priorities are not given to the possibility to assert the 'truth' on the claims that refugees make, but they serve the purpose of discouraging people from speaking their 'own truth'. The deadly journey that migrants need to make before claiming their rights is symptomatic of this systematic attempt to filter stories that do not 'need to be told'. The hierarchical necessity of producing different kinds of "human waste" create heterarchical structures of meaning that shadow wider political significations of lives. The policy of securitisation is what allows such a controversial meaning to persist, leading to what Bauman refers to as "adiaphorization", that is "exempting [migrants] and what is done to them from moral valuation".[136] What such a "moral blindness" creates is the product of the arrival of "strangers at our doors" in numbers that outbid their previous securitisation.[137] We are now confronted with all kinds of 'undesirable' bodies, bodies that transcend the figures of migration in which they are inserted.[138] As a rights-based approach to the management of migration in EUrope is

[133] Fassin D., 'From Right to Favour'.
[134] *Idem*.
[135] To better understand the controversy surrounding the deal between the EU and Turkey, *see* Collett E., 'The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal', *MPI- Migration Policy Institute*, 16 March 2016. Available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal [accessed 21 January 2018]. At the time of writing this thesis, Turkey's president Erdoğan threatened the EU has 'opened' the Turkish side of the border shared with Greece. While more migrants find themselves trapped before reaching Greece, the failure to agree to a common migration policy has further worsened the conditions of migrant in transit at the borders of Southern Europe.
[136] Bauman Z. (2016) *Strangers at Our Door* (Cambridge: Polity Press), 35.
[137] *Idem*.
[138] *See* Agier M. (2011) *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government* (Polity Press).

being dismantled by a culture of excesses and security, the presence of 'irregular' remnants is now the political consequence of what their visibility can no longer hide.

Conclusion

Political border-lines, the virtualisation of security, and the dispersal of migrants within society are all components of a broader process that biopoliticises, securitises, delimits and differently 'humanises' figures of migration by strategizing their existence in terms of survival. In this chapter, I have considered the complex intertwining of borders and (b)ordering processes from the virtualisation of identities to categories of migration, and how these affect migrants' mobility. I also focused on places of (b)ordering such as camps in order to highlight how they contribute to the management of migration more broadly. When considering figures of the migrant we have seen that it is through the construction of categories that make and remake migrants as 'humans' with different needs that migrants can become 'dangerous' figures of crossing that need to be feared at the same time in which they are in need of protection. Migrants are made to exist and forced to circulate whilst being disempowered and subjected to (b)ordering.

(B)ordering processes exist to redistribute people who are deemed to be in excess so that the kinetic functions of borders can be maintained. It is possible to confront these excess once we recognise how biopolitical configurations of borders give rise to more complex processes of (b)ordering. Borders are more than material and juridical boundaries. Rethinking borders in terms of political border-lines, dispersed thresholds of life *with* death, involves gaining a deeper understanding of qualitative complex changes. Here, (b)ordering is revisited by positing the negative management of the borders of the European Union as a centre of inquiry. From borders to social processes of (b)ordering, this negative management is maintained by dispersing those who carry borders within themselves throughout society. In the next chapter, I will discuss ways these forms of

management and ways of governing migration delimit new (b)orderings from the Mediterranean Sea to Rome and, further on, Calais.

CHAPTER 3

Floating Grounds: Scenes of Migration from the Mediterranean Sea to Rome

Figure 5. 'We are all Illegal Migrants'. Italians migrating to the U.S. after WWII. Orgosolo Mural. (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the governance of migration through the construction of migrants as people to rescue and made un-rescuable in the Mediterranean Sea, and their channelling within the need to create new forms of survival on land. Starting this journey *at the border* between sea and land and then follow fragmented routes on land enables us to ponder on a collective imaginary that is institutionally imposed due to the geopolitics

of EUrope where fragmentary journeys are less visible.[1] We need to stress the fact that migration routes are changing continuously, that journeys are fractured and complex, and never linear.[2] Therefore, the intention here is not that of reducing migrants' journeys to EUrope from point A to point B, but to follow movement in places and spaces that reveal how political technologies operate by exposing actors and rationales of containment. Rather than simply reproducing the inconsistent 'linearity' of travellers' routes, I want to start from an acknowledgement that linear routes are always already disrupted by migrants' mobility and the difficulties in tracing it.

By looking at the entanglements of security and humanitarianism at work in border points, from the Mediterranean Sea to what I call circuits of (im)mobility where migrants are contained, I reveal how (b)ordering works to delimit migrants' lives under the imperative of rescuing, channel them on land and secure borders more broadly. At sea, for example, this takes shape by a re-ordering of forces that has militarised the Mediterranean and, at the same time, has made it a space of privileged intervention for the exercising of the politics of rescue. In this chapter, I argue that migrants are confronted with practices of security that (b)order their lives so that rescue becomes a possibility for some while others are barred from putting themselves in the condition to be rescued. I start the chapter by looking at the relation between two intertwined imperatives: rescuing lives and securing borders. I present the Mediterranean Sea as a space whose infrastructure is confronted with the making of a military-humanitarian border differently perceived at sea. I then shift attention to strategies of (b)ordering mobility on land by considering three places of (im)mobility: hotspots, islands, and encampments of camps. At the end of this chapter, I discuss a specific typology of camp, urban (protest) camps, focusing on a specific informal camp that was dismantled in Rome in October 2018. This

[1] Collyer M., 'Stranded Migrants and the Fragmentary Journey', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, (2010), 23(3), 273-91.
[2] *See* Ansems de Vries L., Carrera S., Guild E., 'Documenting the Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean'.

particular case will help us understand a different kind of political (im)mobility, often silenced by the condition of transit to which many migrants are reduced. At the same time, this camp represented a very important space of political activism where migrants struggles to life were recognised by the aid workers who appreciated the need to politicise their demands. Survival will be here concretely revisited and rather than being seen only as a broad strategy of (b)ordering that accounts for modes of governing migration, it is recast as a shared experience of politically engaged life.

Rescuing Lives/Securing Borders: Crafting "Shipwrecked Lives"

Rescuing lives and securing borders, reducing suffering and enhancing border controls are mechanisms that call into question individual safety and the collective existence of states that can only protect their frontiers through 'ways of war'. The field of security and that of humanitarianism have undergone a spatial, moral and strategic rethinking. We are faced with a blurring of their respective constitutive conceptual boundaries but also of their intrinsic values of abstract universality and practical separations. In particular, it is the securitisation of humanitarianism, and the abandonment of politics to its managerial ratio, that have reconfigured discourses, practices and embodiments of mobility. While acknowledging the importance of considering humanitarianism as historically conceived interventions made in the name of alleviating suffering,[3] I focus in this chapter on a different kind of spectre that is haunting the immediate present of EUrope, one that sees the justified displacement of humanitarian reason for the aim of securing borders and protecting migrants at once.

According to Fassin, "humanitarian government can be defined, in the widest sense, as the introduction of moral sentiments in the political sphere".[4] Government here

[3] On humanitarian justifications deployed to justify armed interventions, *see* Wheeler N. J., *Saving Stranger.*
[4] Fassin D., 'The moral economy of humanitarian intervention', *in* Fassin D., Pandolfi M. (2010) *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions* (Zone Books – MIT), 269.

is understood in terms of governmentality where humanitarian acts are a technology for governing an ensemble of institutions, actors, practices, agents and rationalities. Such technologies intertwine with political asymmetries that aim to govern precarious lives by both caring for and controlling them and their mobility. This entails both "compassion" and "repression".[5] At the core of humanitarian government, in fact, lies a tension between humanity and security that manifests around the figure of the migrant/refugee and the governance of migration more in general.[6] Humanitarian care and security concerns situate interventions no longer along the limits of state jurisdiction but across all those categories that are deemed as vulnerable and threatening. Paradoxically, vulnerability, in its broader terms, also represents a threat.

The treatment of migrants, therefore, moves from the margins of national frontiers to the reasonable and moral heart of humanitarian actions. As Fassin convincingly investigates, the politics of compassion as politics of inequality and solidarity rely on a condition of universality that can only be translated in terms of assistance.[7] Assistance is rooted in a discourse of rights, such as the right of asylum and protection, that is always a discourse of domination insofar as those who are incorporated among human beings without rights need to be separated from those who cannot claim any. In so doing, "suffering" is both inclusive and exclusive when read through the lens of rights. Humanitarian reason is not underpinned by a discourse of rights, strictly speaking, but by a discourse of reasoning about rights that activates a moral order where care and control, both as security and humanitarian discourses and practices, become *means with ends*.

The humanitarian politics of European border policing, as Pallister-Wilkins writes, are bounded to the increase in human justifications for addressing the movement

[5] Fassin D., 'Compassion and Repression: The Moral Economy of Immigration Polices in France', *Cultural Anthropology* (August 2005), 20(3), 'Ethnographies of the Biopolitical', 362-87.
[6] Fassin D. (2012) *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (University of California Press: Berkeley), 135.
[7] *Ibid.*, 3.

of 'illegalised' migrants and saving people.[8] The duality of care and control within humanitarianism, while being historically intrinsic to forms of power,[9] has become a revitalised feature for governing unruly mobilities within the moral jurisdiction of EUrope. As the paradox of protection intersects with the policing of bodies as borders,[10] bodies as biopoliticised others,[11] and borders as a security continuum,[12] rescuing the lives of the 'undesirables' of the world cannot be emancipatory.[13] Here survival becomes the key for understanding why the kind of interventions on migrants lives allowed by humanitarianism and securitisation can only result in disempowering forms of governance if they do not factor in migrants' struggles, forms of activism and their alliances within these struggles. As epitomisers of the impossibility of life and possibilities of death, security and humanitarianism are being articulated as 'relative irreducibles', separated in scope only abstractedly but deployed in conjunction exactly because they work better together. In a preliminary attempt to unpack the multifaceted elements that contribute to the making of securitised borders and bodies as merging practises where 'aid' and 'rejection' are both enabled, "the war of words that surrounds the issue of immigration"[14] deserves our attention.

When discussing displacement and people who seek refuge, understood as a political relation initiated by (unwanted) mobility, the pure fact of being human, Hannah Arendt reminds us, is not enough.[15] The reality of the *in-betweeners*, those who cross borders without permission, comes into being through a language that places people into categories before even starting their journeys. As explored in the previous chapter,

[8] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros', *International Political Sociology* (2015), 9, 53-69, 54.
[9] *See* Foucault M., *Security, Territory, Population.*
[10] Mbembe A., 'Bodies as Borders', *From the European South* (2019), 5-18. Available at: http://europeansouth.postcolonialitalia.it/journal/2019-4/2.Mbembe.pdf [accessed 15 October 2019].
[11] Fassin D., 'The Biopolitics of Otherness: Undocumented Foreigners and Racial Discrimination in French Public Debate', *Anthropology Today* (February 2001), 17(1), 3-7.
[12] Vaughan-Williams N., 'The UK Security Continuum'.
[13] Agier M., *Managing the Undesirables,* 4-5.
[14] Fassin D., 'Compassion and Repression', 378.
[15] Arendt A., 'The decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man'.

figure(s) of the migrant are often subjected to what Crawley and Skleparis call "categorical fetishism" that differentiate between migrants and refugees.[16] This need to categorise, to simplify, belongs also to those who attempt to challenge the boundaries between categories. People shift among categories subverting roles and rights attached and denied to them.[17] Failing to recognise this would mean to perpetuate a state-centric myopic outlook based on pre-emptive and fixed sorting. As these categories are entitled to different treatments, the very system of classification established to protect the most vulnerable somehow already classifies them as deserving or undeserving, therefore charitable/legit and/or deportable/disposable.[18] On the basis of nationality-based categories, dominant representations of migration as a crisis[19] and the politics of indifference towards 'illegalised' migrants,[20] a diversification of migrant profiles is serving the scope not of capturing the complexity of their movement but that of reducing it to pre-established reasons of voluntary/forced crossings.

Such interventions can also be located within the spectacle of migration management in the Mediterranean Sea. Approaching humanitarianism/'humanisation' and security/securitisation of migration in the Mediterranean allows us to see how human relief is being conceived in terms of emergent measures where human life is framed in terms of protecting life through rescue or push-backs: the lives of migrants are protected by rescuing them from the sea but also by deterring them from reaching EUrope. The same lives are also risked in the Mediterranean, this time this responsibility is assigned to migrants themselves who cross it by boat. Between protection and risk, migrants' lives can also become un-rescuable in the sense that their survival depends on the humanitarian

[16] Crawley H., Skleparis D., 'Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both'.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] On the legal production of 'illegal' migrants and the logic of 'deportability'. *See* De Genova N., 'Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life', *Annual Review of Anthropology* (2002), 31, 419–47.
[19] *See* De Genova N., Garelli G. and Tazzioli M., 'Autonomy of Asylum? The Autonomy of Migration Undoing the Refugee Crisis Script', *The South Atlantic Quarterly* (April 2018), 17(2), 239-65.
[20] *See* Basaran T., 'The saved and the drowned: Governing indifference in the name of security', *Security Dialogue* (2015), 46(3), 205-20.

assistance of agents, from the sea to the land. Here the signifier of humanitarian government is assistance both understood as a duty of rescue and a norm of solidarity. By translating the very notion of human into a "life to be rescued", the scene of rescue brings attention to moments at sea where migrants are 'saved', and because of that, in need to have their mobility re-channelled. As Tazzioli convincingly notes, saving and capturing movement is a two-sided function of humanitarian government where migrants become both objects of detection and border surveillance.[21]

It is possible then to recognise a double engagement with humanitarian techniques as they reinforce border activities and make migrants safe by taking 'hold' of their life.[22] It is the moment of rescue that informs wider aspects about the very identity and needs of migrants at sea: "from being asylum seekers they turn out to be shipwrecked lives, i.e. from being subjects who should benefit from protection [they] become people to rescue".[23] The crafting of "shipwrecked lives" as Tazzioli calls them,[24] responds to the need of making the unauthorised crossing of borders, understood as "artefacts on the ground,"[25] more affective and effective only temporarily.[26] The temporary humanitarian protection that is devoted to rescuing people in distress at sea hides extratemporal interventions where those who are governed through a logic of rescue are still put at risk once rescue fails to be considered 'salvific'.[27] The depiction of migrants as lives to be rescued contributes to their becoming 'rescuable' or/and 'un-rescuable'. This leads to the blurring of the line between interceptions and rescue operations as humanitarian and

[21] Tazzioli M., 'Border displacements. Challenging the politics of rescue between Mare Nostrum and Triton', *Migration Studies* (2016), 4(1), 1-19, 6.
[22] Lemke T., (translated by Trump E. F.) (2011) *Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction* (New York University Press: NY-London).
[23] Tazzioli M., 'Border displacements', 8.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] Agnew J., 'Borders on the mind', 1.
[26] On politics of affect, *see* Massumi B. (2015) *The Politics of Affect* (Polity Press).
[27] The idea of saving draws on a pastoral power to redeem through individual knowledge about people's life. This power produces particular subjects who are object of care through, for instance, the act of confession. Here saving is commisurated to an act of correction that is based on individual conduct. This individual attention to people's life is massified in the case of rescue where subjects are produced not in order to be 'saved' but in order to be channelled within their uneven mobility, rights and legal status. As such, in the immediate activity of rescue people are not cared for because of their life biography but more because of their biology.

securitarian tasks are made to belong to the same terrain of intervention.[28] Rescuing lives and stopping boats will both secure subjects and borders. Lost in a sea of words, policies and practices, become enmeshed with power and privilege.

"The Sea is History": From Abstractions to Legacies in the Mediterranean

> "Where are your monuments, your battles, martyrs? Where is your troubled memories? Sirs, in that gray vault. The sea. The sea has locked them up. The sea is History"
> Derek Walcott[29]

In the first lines of the poem *The Sea is History,* the poet and playwright Derek Walcott tells us of a sea that holds memory, and questions how history exists only in the wake of monuments and events that make it matter. These lines are printed on the walls of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, London. In this museum dedicated to the sea, memories are made to live by navigating a maritime world in which artefacts, manuscripts, portraits, ship models and nautical equipment merge with accounts and representations about 'discoveries,' trade routes and journeys. While walking around the galleries and rooms of the Museum, the boundless vastity of the sea is perceived in terms of the many interconnections that it has created with land and people. The potential for memorializing the sea and its histories is ensured here by looking at the *museum as monument*, powered by the waves of what water brought to its shores and settled as a common space of remembrance. However, the display of events at sea is quite different compared to the liquidity of its continuous flowing waves. The flowing waves of the Mediterranean Sea, like those of any other sea, are in continuous movement becoming spectacularised and visible especially trough migratory movements. While the links between racial capitalism, imperialism and colonialism in the Black Mediterranean have

[28] Tazzioli M., 'Border displacements', 7.
[29] Walcott D. (2014) *The Poetry of Derek Walcott 1948 – 2013* (Farrar Strauss Giroux), 253-6.

been widely exposed,[30] the history of today still renders populations in surplus and disposable through and because their movement (by boat). Without graves to mourn "ungrievable lives",[31] death in the Mediterranean is often framed as a peculiar humanitarian emergency, a crisis that is the result of fatalistic and tragic experiences of crossing.

Borders, both historically and in the present, are in the making: they follow the movement of migrants through the enactment of controls in different routes;[32] they are sites of identification through the implementation of hotspots dispersed in islands;[33] they are externalised as pre-emptive frontiers in Africa;[34] they are conceived as spaces of governmentality where unequal mobility needs to be diverted.[35] More importantly, borders are being fabricated as abstract sites of law enforcement where authorities confront enemies whose 'histories' are not recognised. In such a scenario, the European project[36] brings to the surface its own history as a time beyond place in which the colonial North-South relationship is reduced to a logic of exception. The mattering of lives is disconnected from border imperialism, or connected to it otherwise, in ways that reinforce the policing of bodies reduced to races that do not matter.[37] The exception here renders invisible the drawing of the global colour line[38] that reproduces EUrope as a benevolent power that cannot do more because too many strangers are knocking at its doors. Such discourses are encoded within a Visa border regime and policies that make very hard for

[30] For an exhaustive analysis of these themes, *see* Danewid I., *Race, Capital, and the Politics of Solidarity. Radical Internationalism in the 21st Century*, PhD thesis, LSE, August 2018, *in particular* Chapter 5 "The Drowned and the Saved: Circuits of Resistance in the Black Mediterranean". Available at: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3848/1/Danewid__race-capital-and-the-politics.pdf [accessed 16 October 2019].
[31] Butler J. (2010) *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* (Verso Books).
[32] Papadopoulos D. et al., *Escape Routes*.
[33] *See* Tazzioli M., Garelli G., 'Containment beyond detention: The hotspot system and disrupted migration movements across Europe', *Society and Space* (2018), 0(0), 1-19.
[34] *See* Omizzolo M., Sodano P., 'The European Meta-Borders; The Outsourcing and Militarization of European Borders and the Violation of Human Rights of Sub-Saharan Refugees', *REMHU* (2018), 26(54), 151-70.
[35] Fassin D., 'Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries. The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times', *Annual Review of Anthropology* (2011), 40, 213-26.
[36] *See* Glissant E., *Caribbean Discourse*.
[37] De Genova N., 'The 'migrant crisis' as a racial crisis: do Black Lives Matter in Europe?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (August 2017), 41(44), 1-18.
[38] Karenga M., 'Du Bois and the question of the color line: Race and class in the age of globalization', *Socialism and Democracy* (2003), 17, 141-60.

the many to reach EUrope legally and safely.[39] The sea is itself implicated in the violence of interventions conducted in the name of border management.[40] These interventions are making the Mediterranean an "empty space that separates Europe from Africa and Europeans from Africans, erasing the historical identity of the Sea as a place of connection and movement".[41] This empty space is being filled by dominant discourses that re-colonise movement, and drain the historical meaning of water as matter that does not matter:[42] the waves of the Mediterranean are made to wash away alternative markers of history and erase present and past voices: as Walcott puts it, 'the sea has locked them up.'

The Mediterranean Sea and its abstractions are also organised as an infrastructure, one of the deadliest in the world,[43] that controls and polices uneven movement. Constituted as a frontier,[44] the maritime borders of the EU are not systematically drawn but considered a wider domain of intervention where rights and responsibilities for coastal states are tight up to some sort of politics of experimentality.[45] Water in its original condition is "fluid, circular, universal, a unifying element where borders are difficult to trace, to grasp, to see".[46] The closed space of the Mediterranean is circular, compared to other land infrastructures, ruptures can happen without creating disruptions. The maritime order distributes the territorial fear of the land by connecting human communities to an

[39] *See* Salter M. B., 'The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self".
[40] Squire V., 'Divided Seas, Parallel Lives', *Women's Studies Quarterly* (2017), 45(1/2), 69-89, 72.
[41] Mainwaring C., 'At Europe's Edge: Migration and the Crisis in the Mediterranean', *Border Criminologies*, 14 October 2019. Available at: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/10/europes-edge [accessed 15 October 2019].
[42] Butler J. (2011) *Bodies that Matter* (Routledge).
[43] 'The world's deadliest sea crossing', *Amnesty International*, 12 January 2018. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/worlds-deadliest-sea-crossing-mediterranean [accessed 16 October 2019].
[44] Pezzani L., *Liquid Traces: Spatial, aesthetics and humanitarian dilemmas at the maritime borders of the EU*, PhD Thesis, March 2015. Available at: https://research.gold.ac.uk/12573/1/Redacted_ARC_thesis_PezzaniL_2015.pdf [accessed 16 October 2019].
[45] While Adriana Petryna in her work focuses on the politics of experimentality in terms of the outsourcing and offshoring of experimental activities for clinical trials. I am referring here to 'experimentality' as a mode of governance in which nation continuously push boundaries between of legality to see how far they can go with taking advantage of uncertain jurisdictions at sea. *See* Petryna A., 'Experimentality: On the Global Mobility and Regulation of Human Subjects in Research', *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* (2008), 30(2), 288-304.
[46] Vendramme G., 'What is the purpose of your visit? A journey towards the high seas', *Migrant Journal*, Vol. 1, Across Country, 88-96.

archipelago of possibilities and risks. The sea also needs to be approached as a digital archive,[47] a technologically mediated space of thick governance in which infra-structural violence oscillates between fluidity and solidity.[48] The "visual culture of humanitarianism"[49] that the datafication of movement produces while monitoring clandestine trips expands this "scopic regime".[50] In this space of patchy maritime borders, the responsibility to intervene to deter smugglers and the duty to intervene to rescue lives are both called into question. This questioning involves a multiplicity of engagements that these interventions establish with life. Policing and rescue are both understood as a technology of governance for the co-making of human mobility as an uncertain and unequal field of intervention at sea.

Such uncertainty has been addressed legally. In 1982 the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are established the various degrees of sovereignty of nations with respect to their jurisdiction of world's oceans, setting guidelines for the use of marine natural resources, for business and for the protection of the environment.[51] The conceptual division of the maritime boundaries establish specific spaces that form the architecture of the sea: internal waters; territorial sea; contiguous zones; exclusive economic zones; fisheries and ecological protection zone; continental shelf; the high seas (a 'terra nullis' in which no states exercise sovereignty as it is "reserved for peaceful purposes").[52] Search and Rescue (SAR) zones have been established across the high seas where coastal states have the duty to organise operations for assisting people in distress and coordinate rescue operations.[53] Within the limits of

[47] Pezzani L., *Liquid Traces*, 10.
[48] Vyjayanthi Rao, 'Speculative Seas', *in* Güven I., Topal H. (eds.) (2011), *The Sea-Image: Visual Manifestations of Port Cities and Global Waters*, (New York: Newgray), 124, *qtd in* Pezzani L., *Liquid Traces*, 54.
[49] Mclagan M., Mckee Y., (2012) *Sensible Politics: The Visual Culture of Nongovernmental Activism* (New York: Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).
[50] Jay M., 'Scopic Regimes of Modernity', *in* Hal Foster, *Vison and Visuality* (Seattle, WA: Bay Press, 1988), 3-23.
[51] Vendramme G., 'What is the purpose of your visit?', 95.96.; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (UNCLOS).
[52] *Idem*.
[53] SAR Convention, 1979. Available at: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/RadioCommunicationsAndSearchAndRescue/SearchAndRescue/Pages/SARConvention.aspx [accessed 16 October 2019].

operational safety, people at sea have to be rescued regardless of their identity or zonal status so that "sovereign jurisdiction takes second place to international law, customary law and universal norms concerning the aid and rescue of people in peril at sea".[54] The lack of conceptual clarity about concepts such as 'distress', 'assistance', 'rescue' and 'disembark' in a 'place of safety', which entails responsibility for processing potential asylum applications in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement, has led to disputes over which states should intervene in different stages of rescue.[55]

This is further complicated in the Mediterranean by the existence of overlapping SAR zones (such as those of Malta and Italy that are signatory to different versions of the Convention or Greece and Turkey) while other coastal states, such as Libya, "officially accepted the existing SAR regime and the obligation it entails only in July 2017, but it has not yet signed the SAR Convention and remains unable to independently conduct effective operations".[56] This has led to repeated standoffs where different claims are continuously being made about which state should be rescuing people, and in which port people should be disembarked.[57] These conflicting maritime legal regimes often clash with states practices in a context where the 1951 Refugee Convention, International Human Rights Law, the Law of the Sea, and the human smuggling and trafficking frameworks intersect. The space of the Mediterranean Sea, a liquid terrain of *floating grounds* of unbundled and unequal sovereignty, is "speedy and secure for certain goods and privileged passengers, slow and deadly for the unwanted".[58] The unwanted are not only migrants but also the self-organised network of ships that intervene in rescuing lives

[54] Pugh M., 'Drowning not Waving: Boat People and Humanitarianism at Sea', *Journal of Refugee Studies* (2004), 17(1), 50-69, 51.
[55] Pezzani L., *Liquid Traces*, 101-02.
[56] Cusumano E., Pattison J., 'The non-governmental provision of search and rescue in the Mediterranean and the abdication of state responsibility', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs,* 31(1), (2018), 53-75, 58-9.
[57] Heller C., Pezzani L., 'Can Europe make it? Time to end the EU's left-to-die policy', *Open Democracy*, 24 June 2014. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/time-to-end-eus-lefttodie-policy/ [accessed 15 October 2019].
[58] Heller C., Pezzani L. and Situ Studio, 'Forensic Oceanography: Report on the 'Left-to-die-Boat'. Available at: https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FO-report.pdf [accessed 15 October 2019].

at sea: NGOs, fishermen and other vessels. Their constant criminalisation works to recast humanitarian agents as facilitators of illegal migration especially when conducting SAR operations: "the humanitarian purpose of SAR has become compromised in the name of border security with ensuing consequences".[59] The submission of humanitarian intervention to border control requires a deeper engagement with practices of rescue and processes of capture through the entanglement of military and humanitarian articulations of security. Before doing this, the structuring of elastic sovereignties[60] in the Mediterranean starts with the different treatment of 'boat people'.

The term 'boat people' has been first used in the 1970s to describe people who fled Indochina in fishing boats during the Vietnam War. The scale of the exodus was so pronounced and deadly that the images of 'boat people' raised an international outrage.[61] Since then, the phenomenon of people travelling by boat seeking safety has become more visible in the global and more regional contexts: from Cuban and Haitian 'boat people' trying to reach the United States;[62] to those seeking refuge in Australia;[63] to the Southern Mediterranean boat migration and those who cross the Channel from France in a desperate attempt to get to the UK.[64] As the aesthetic of border crossing have changed according to the sophistication of controls,[65] 'boat people' in the Mediterranean are often "portrayed as gypsies of the sea […] readily corralled into the securitisation project which fabricates a threat to the identification of the settled 'self' with a particular spatial

[59] Ghezelbash D., Moreno-Lax V., Klein N. and Opeskin B., 'Securitisation of Search and Rescue at Sea: The Response to Boat Migration in the Mediterranean and Offshore Australia', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* (January 2018), 67(2), 315-51.
[60] Pezzani L., *Liquid Traces*, 96.
[61] Pugh M., 'Drowning not Waving', 51-2.
[62] Stepick A., 'Haitian Boat people: A study in the conflicting forces shaping U.S. immigration policies', *Law and Contemporary Problems* (Spring 1982), 45(2), 163-96. Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3657&context=lcp [accessed 16 October 2019].
[63] McKenzie J., Hasmath R., 'Deterring the 'boat' people: Explaining the Australian government's people swap response to asylum seekers', *Australian Journal of Political Science* (2013), 48(4), 417-30.
[64] 'Record number of migrants cross the Channel to UK in a single day', *The Guardian*, 11 September 2019. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/sep/11/record-number-of-migrants-cross-channel-to-uk-in-single-day [accessed 16 October 2019].
[65] Pezzani L., *Liquid Traces.*

organisation – the territorial state – as homeland".[66] As Pugh has observed, 'boat people' often get lost within a securitised mould where their humanity is veiled by discourses that centre on movement as a metaphor, especially the "dehumanising equation of voyagers with ineluctable forces of nature."[67] It is, therefore, possible to recognise how the 'making' of migrants, and migration more broadly, is complex and accounts for ways of governing identities so that (b)ordering can be considered a natural activity.

'Boat people' are forced to embark on deadly journeys to reach EUrope. Caught within a securitised and 'humanised' gaze at sea, migrants are often dehumanised and made to exist as part of a collective of individuals who can only be gazed upon, objectified, and neutralised. Since being *detected* is not the same as *being protected* as the Left-to-Die-Boat case,[68] among others, remind us, the European 'gaze' is often almost self-serving as it acknowledges bodies but not as fully-fleshed 'human' presences. What we see is bodies who have left their homelands; what we do not see is how difficult it is for people to assert their rights. This is further complicated by the fact that even within international law, "the human right to mobility is not fully protected […] it remains an asymmetrical right, as it is not complemented by a corresponding right to immigrate".[69] As such, this asymmetrical right creates people whose rights and possibility of belonging are conditional and who have to *ask* (or beg) to be 'rescued'.

'Sharing is Caring': The Military-Humanitarian Border at Sea

Death by crossing, or better put, death by policy[70] in the Mediterranean Sea is not a novelty of current times. Since the 1980s migrants from the Global South embarked on

[66] Huysmans J., 'The Question of the Limit: Desecuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (1998), 27(3), 569-89, 573, *qtd in* Pugh M., 'Drowning not Waving', 54.
[67] Pugh M., 'Drowning not Waving', 54.
[68] Heller C., Pezzani L. and Situ Studio, 'Forensic Oceanography: Report on the 'Left-to-die-Boat'.
[69] Scovazzi T., 'The Human Tragedy of Illegal Migrants', *Mapielan Bulletin*, 28 November 2015. Available at: http://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=4&ArticleId=223&Article=The-Human-Tragedy-of-Illegal-Migrants [accessed 16 October 2019].
[70] Pezzani L., *Liquid Traces*

perilous journeys in an attempt to reach the European shores.[71] Due to a toughening of legislation designed to deny entry,[72] migration was restricted by the imposition of further controls on seaborne movements. Such controls have externalised the Mediterranean as a place of passage, a "path",[73] where the possibility of death is part of a journey to life. The increasing crossing of the Mediterranean Sea by boat has determined a significant rise in the number of (un)recorded deaths.[74] In particular, the events of October 2013 where many people coming from Libya died, became highly mediatised.[75] In the aftermath of these events labelled as 'tragedies', Italy launched the military-humanitarian Operation Mare Nostrum with an explicit focus on rescuing migrants at sea, preventing deaths and controlling the external borders of the European Union.[76]

Operation Mare Nostrum had a proactive focus on conducting SAR operations close to the Libya coast, rescuing about 15000 migrants before ending on October 2014 due to a growing concern that it represented a pull-factor of migration within the maritime environment.[77] The more humanitarian policing of 'our sea' was superseded by Frontex

[71] Zamatto F., Argenziano S., Arsenijevic J., Ponthieu A., Bertotto M., Di Donna F., D. Harries A., Zachariah R., 'Migrants caught between tides and politics in the Mediterranean: an imperative for search and rescue at sea?', *BMJ Global Health* (2017), Commentary, 2(3). Available at: https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/2/3/e000450.full.pdf [accessed 16 October 2019].

[72] Pugh M., 'Europe's Boat People: Maritime Cooperation in the Mediterranean', Chaillot Paper 41, Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris-July 2000, 1-80, 24.

[73] *See* Lutterbeck D., 'Blue vs Green: The Challenge of Maritime Migration Controls', *Journal of Borderlands Studies* (2019), 1-17, 4; Ratzel F., *Anthropogeographic* (1909), *Das Meer als Quelle der Volkergrosse* (1911).

[74] *See* 'Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by Boat. Mapping and Documenting Migratory Journeys and Experiences', Final Project Report, Warwick University, 16 Available at: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/crossingthemed/ctm_final_report_4may2017.pdf [accessed 16 October 2019].

[75] Lizzie Davis, 'Lampedusa boat tragedy is 'slaughter of innocents' says Italian president', *The Guardian*, 3 October 2013. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/03/lampedusa-boat-tragedy-italy-migrants [accessed 16 October 2019]; Jim Yardley and Elisabetta Povoledo, 'Migrants Die as Burning Boat Capzises Off Italy', *The New York Times*, 3 October 2013. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/europe/scores-die-in-shipwreck-off-sicily.html [accessed 16 October 2019].

[76] Tazzioli M., 'The Desultory Politics of Mobility and the Humanitarian-Military Border in the Mediterranean. Mare Nostrum Beyond the Sea', *REMHU*, (Jan/Jun 2015), 44, 61-82, 63.

[77]For instance, *see* United Kingdom Parliament (2014) written answers. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/141015w0001.htm [accessed 16 October 2019]. "We do not support planned search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. We believe that they create an unintended "pull factor", encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths. The Government believes the most effective way to prevent refugees and migrants attempting this dangerous crossing is to focus our attention on countries of origin and transit, as well as taking steps to fight the people smugglers who wilfully put lives at risk by packing migrants into unseaworthy boats."

Operation Triton with a more explicit focus on securing external borders.[78] While Mare Nostrum was coordinated by the Italian Navy and Air Force with some financial support from the European Union, Operation Triton involved the voluntary contribution of 15 European States operating with a limited budget compared to the Italian mission.[79] Both operations deployed military assets exercising a form of "militarised humanitarianism" where the securitisation of borders was legitimised by large investments for the military-industrial system[80] and the protection of the meta-borders of EUrope.[81] It is on the grounds of humanity that military and private actors contribute to the rescue of people at sea and the necessary push-back of their boats.[82]

Figure 6. (Operation Themis) supports Italy with border control, surveillance and search and rescue in the Central Mediterranean[83] (screenshot: Antonella Patteri)

[78] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'The Humanitarian policing of 'our sea', *Border Criminologies Blog*, 20 April 2015. Available at: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2015/04/humanitarian [accessed 16 October 2019].

[79] Cusumano E., 'Migrant rescue as organised hypocrisy: Eu maritime missions offshore Libya between humanitarianism and border control', *Cooperation and Conflict* (2019), 54(1), 3-24.

[80] Tazzioli M., De Genova N., Fontanari E., Prano I. and Stierl M., 'Humanitarian Crisis' *in* 'Europe/Crisis: New Keywords of 'the Crisis' in and of "Europe', De Genova N., Tazzioli M. (ed.) *Near Futures Online* (2015), n.1. Available at: http://nearfuturesonline.org/europecrisis-new-keywords-of-crisis-in-and-of-europe-part-5 [accessed 16 October 2019].

[81] Omizzolo M., Sodano P., 'The European Meta-Borders'.

[82] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing'.

[83] Frontex, Operation Themis: https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/main-operations/operation-themis-italy-/ [accessed 20 October 2019].

This doubled focus is evident in a series of operation that Frontex has launched in the Mediterranean on February 2018, one of which is Operation Themis (fig.6), with the aim of supporting coastal states with "a law enforcement focus while continuing to include search and rescue as a crucial component".[84] This is a consistent shift from the military-humanitarian focus of Mare Nostrum where "the aim [was] to increase the level of human life security and the control of migration flows".[85]

According to this, SAR is now framed as being incidental to border patrolling as it is considered to be beyond the agency's mandate, therefore discontinuing the humanitarian spirit of the maritime conventions by turning rescue into a matter of customary law.[86] If, on the one hand, the humanitarian foundations of SAR prescribe a humanitarian order at sea, on the other hand, the conflating of SAR with migration/border control has securitised the scope for conducting search and rescue operations in the first instance. These tensions between alternative responses to migration are increasingly merging, making it apparent that they are both functional to the integrity of (b)ordering.[87] As many scholars have argued, the hyper-securitised context in which responses to boat migration take place is justified on the basis of the fact that migrants are *at risk* and *a risk*.[88] In this sense, to enhance the possibility of making the "war on smugglers"[89] more visible, a double rationale of governing unruly mobilities is at work, linking 'illegalised' movements to 'threatening' and 'victimised' circumstances of the "war on migration".[90] The militarisation of responses to curtain migrants' mobility in the Mediterranean

[84] Frontex: Operation Themis: https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/main-operations/operation-themis-italy-/ [accessed 20 October 19].
[85] http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/NazionaliInCorso/MareNostrum/Notizie/Pagine/Comunicatostampa18ottobre2013.aspx *qtd in* Tazzioli M., 'The Desultory Politics of Mobility', 64.
[86] Ghezelbash D. et al., 'Securitisation of Search and Rescue at Sea'.
[87] Perkowsky N., 'Frontex and the convergence of humanitarianism, human rights and society', *Security Dialogue* (2018), 49(6), 457-75.
[88] Aradau C., 'The Perverse Politics of Four-Letter Words'.
[89] Garelli G., Tazzioli M., 'The Humanitarian War Against Migrant Smugglers at Sea', *Antipode* (2018), 50(3), 685-703.
[90] The relationship between war and migration is complex. Wars forcibly displace people and produce 'refugees'. At the same time, a language and strategies of war are being deployed to contain people on the move who are 'illegalised' as 'enemies' to combat as might represent a 'threat' to the population and welfare of nation-states.

answers this need of making two wars, fought on different fronts, converge as the same object of containment: enhancing border controls and deter migrants from reaching EUrope will result in saving lives.

The militarisation of controls in the Mediterranean is exemplified by the launch in 2015 of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, formally European Naval Force Mediterranean. This operation was launched as a part of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, in line with NATO engagement in the Aegean with Operation Sea Guardian[91] (and the rise of shooting-to-kill polices at sea).[92] In particular, Operation Sophia is organised around implementation stages[93] where, in the name of dismantling networks of (human) smuggling, member states can take offensive measures, such as the search and seizure of migrants boats so to disrupt human trafficking.[94] In 2016, the mandate of Operation Sophia has been extended to include the training of the Libyan Navy and Coastguard and to help implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya. In 2017, the Council of the European Union further extended Operation Sophia's mandate in terms of surveillance activities, sharing of information about agencies and the training of Libyan Coastguards in more effective ways.[95] Functioning as a pre-emptive barrier for migrants to exercise their right to leave and claim asylum, the targeting of 'protectors' of the 'protected' also reduces the chances for the EU principle of non-refoulement to be triggered. The direct effects of Operation Sophia are that migrants face more risky journeys and rely on alternative and risky routes.[96] While these activities should be conducted in compliance with International Human

[91] This is the first time that NATO and an EU civil agency (Frontex) cooperate in the field. Available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_SG_AnnualReport_2016_en.pdf [accessed 14 October 2016].
[92] Moreno-Lax V., 'The EU Humanitarian Border and the Securitisation of Human Rights: The 'Rescue-Through-Interdiction/Rescue-Without-Protection' Paradigm', *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2018), 56(1), 119-40, 127.
[93] See EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia's mission. Available at: https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/#story [accessed 16 October 2019].
[94] Moreno-Lax V., 'The EU Humanitarian Border and the Securitisation of Human Rights'.
[95] *Ibid.*
[96] *Ibid.*

Rights Law, the indirect effects of this operation concern the moralisation of reasons through which this modality of governing mobility is perpetuated. As humanitarian government 'cares through control' and 'controls through care',[97] what we are witnessing is the enactment of responses that are cast as mutually achievable goals.[98] Border security and migrant safety, deterrence and rescue, are not only two sides of the same coin,[99] but are also shared rationales for governing multiplicities in which caring is mutual and equal from both parts.

The growing use of military technology, assets and personnel within the maritime context are the by-product of escalations where border enforcement and irregular border crossings intensify according to their respective engagements with containment and mobility.[100] Justified both on security and humanitarian grounds, the expansion of police forces with a military status is made visible at sea where warships and other military hardware is deployed to stop migrants and criminals.[101] For instance, in Italy the Guardia di Finanza, a law enforcement agency responsible for patrolling illegal drug smuggling and prevent financial crimes, can be considered a kind of militarised police force whose activities are entangled with economic checks and the vigilance of people at sea.[102] In patrolling the southern borders of EUrope, naval operations led by Frontex and member states operate within a military-strategic field of intervention. While this military regime of justification might be contested,[103] missions and mandates that aspire to protect a political order also allow for coercive action. The border assemblage works through dispositions that are activated/disactivated directly from the field of military strategy: "killing is inhibited while containment and deterrence are activated, as well as

[97] Fassin D., *Humanitarian Reason.*
[98] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'Humanitarian Rescue/Sovereign Capture'.
[99] *Ibid.*
[100] See Andreas P., *Border Games.*
[101] Lutterbeck D., 'Policing Migration in the Mediterranean', *Mediterranean Politics* (2006), 11(1), 59-82.
[102] *Ibid.*
[103] Bigo D., 'The (in)securitisation practices of the three universes of EU border control: Military/Navy – border guards/police – database analysts', *Security Dialogue* (2014), 45(3), 209-25, 212.

indifference to the lives of individuals around".[104] The presence of the military at sea, therefore, might not discriminate between good civilians and (alleged) threats once containment is made relative to the geopolitics of borders. These geopolitics of the EU borders are also biopolitical in the sense that they act as a form of governing that targets people for the well-being of European citizens. In the name of enhancing the welfare of Europeans, a form of neo-pastoralist rationale of governance is constantly deployed.[105] While, as Bigo observes, biopolitics cannot be the dominant analytical grid for understanding border controls,[106] the specific biopolitics mobilised onto subjects are of fundamental importance for reading practices of border management as being in excess to policing. These practices, in fact, cut in two life distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable ways of living (and this is particularly visible in the context of life in camps).

Even though the militarisation of borders cannot be reduced to the maritime context, the interstitial space of the sea is increasingly giving rise to new re-significations of security and humanitarianism trough lives that are being rescued by military actors. The "rescue-without-protection" and "rescue-through-interdiction" practices that Moreno-Lax identifies[107] are closely connected ways in which migrants' subjectivities are limited to lives who are rescuable and lives which are not. The politics of rescue/un-rescue force us to rethink acts of rescue through a rationale of survivability. People who are rescued in the Mediterranean survive but their survival is further defined as political (im)mobility once their access to rights is denied when they are disembarked on land. As Ignatieff convincingly writes, "rights are inescapably political because they tacitly imply a conflict between a rights holder and a rights withholder".[108] The rights holder is often

[104] *Ibid.* 220.
[105] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing', 58.
[106] Bigo D., 'The (in)securitisation practices of the three universes of EU border control', 220.
[107] Moreno-Lax V., 'The EU Humanitarian Border and the Securitisation of Human Rights'.
[108] Ignatieff M., "I. Human Rights as Politics. II. Human rights as Idolatry", *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Princeton University, April 4-7, 2000. Available at: http://pgil.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Human-Rights-politics1.pdf [accessed 17 October 2019], 330.

deprived from accessing rights and limited in his/her possibility of articulating political demands. While rights, at least normatively, cannot be confused with aspirations,[109] it is important to stress that the political movement surrounding claims for rights go beyond the failure to get formal recognition, and give rise instead to vital forms of resistance. The scene of rescue at the edges of the military-humanitarian borders at sea provides us with a privileged position for understanding practices of (b)ordering migrants as they are often pre-empted from making claims to rights, and when they are rescued and enter within the reach of the state, their freedom and autonomy are graded in different ways. From the space of the sea as a *continuum*, practices of channelling, filtering and sorting extend to the land where an archipelago of fundamental exclusions and inclusions, paired with rationales for governing 'the unwanted for the wanted', take place. Those who can escape, who do not escape, who stay, who cannot stay, who are encouraged to leave or to stay, who are fingerprinted, who are allowed to claim asylum or are made 'deportable' and disciplined otherwise, as we will see, put forward a specific claim as they want to be recognized as people who matter or 'count.' They want to count not simply, in biopolitical terms, as a subject that needs to be contained, made *(only)* to survive and discouraged from living politically, but as subjects whose mobility is first of all political.

Mapping Circuits of (Im)mobility: (B)ordering Movement

In answering the question of what a border is, Etienne Balibar writes:

> "The idea of a simple expression of what is a border is by definition an absurdity. Making a border means staking out a territory, declaring its frontiers and therefore defining and imposing an identity. But likewise, defining and identifying in general is nothing more than drawing up a border and laying boundaries".[110]

[109] *Ibid.*, 330.
[110] Balibar E., "Qu'est-ce qu'une frontière?", *in Asylum, Violence, Exclusion in Europe, analysis, prospective)*, (educational Science Section Workbooks), Université de Genève, 1994, 335-43 *qtd in* Nantes School of Research Platform. Available at: http://beauxartsnantes.fr/sites/default/files/u490/ECherel-Borderresearch.pdf [accessed 15 October 2019].

Thinking about borders, therefore, means reproducing their very possibility of existence as their definition and representation are not immune from border-making. The responsibility of producing accounts that are representative of multifaceted borders then is felt as an epistemological imperative. In my view, a fair representation of 'borders' can only be achieved when complex ideas are thought beyond the supposed determinism of *what borders are* by giving more attention to *what borders do*. When moving away from the maritime borders of the EU to its territories we can see more explicitly the effects of (b)ordering on migrants' lives. As spaces are imminently productive of differentiations, there is nothing 'objective' about borders if not that they function to connect and divide at the same time. The different nature of borders, such as the ones at sea and those on land that I will consider in more detail in this part of the thesis, represent a *continuum* in border-making. Border-making is a process of (b)ordering where the migrant and its engagements with political boundaries are often reduced to containing them in spaces of (im)mobility. These spaces are governed in ways that ensure the survival of people so that they can continue to live only in minimal terms. Migratory trajectories to EUrope are always shifting in relation to more pervasive and sophisticated ways of controlling borders to the point that borders are now better understood as mobile devices of control.[111]

While this work also considers (human) mobility in relation to politics, it explores ideas about (im)mobility as a way of governing migrants' ways of life (by a biopolitical specification of life) to be of fundamental importance for making manifest the effects of (b)ordering. (Im)mobility is thought here in relation to mobility and not as its opposite, as immobility. In particular, (im)mobility as a political concept and state rationale refers to the continuous shifting of mobility as a condition that constraints people but also allows them to exercise a form of calculated autonomy.

[111] Amilhat Szary A., Giraut F., 'Borderities: The Politics of Contemporary Mobile Borders', *in* Amlhat Szary A., Giraut F. (2015) (eds) *Borderities and the Politics of Contemporary Mobile Borders* (Palgrave Macmillan, London).

According to Schewel, migration studies suffer a mobility bias as immobility is only rarely accounted for.[112] Incidentally, on this reading of immobility, those who don't migrate are unavoidably cast as lacking the resources and agency to leave and the fact that people do not necessarily *want* to migrate in not properly accounted for.[113] I would revisit this mobility bias by considering (im)mobility not as an analytic tool for non-migration,[114] but as a concept that enables us to better grasp how migrants are both allowed to be mobile and immobilised (also politically), and focus on the ambiguity between forms of calculated autonomy and control. Migrants who are kept (im)mobile can engage with life as far as they keep living *with* death, surviving in the sense they should keep on living as such. As a political concept, instead, (im)mobility captures the liminality of the politics of survival that are exercised upon migrants in terms of promoting both a reduced autonomy and control. Migrants move in space, when not detained, but are restrained in their political actions and practical engagements as they are reduced to a life that needs to be survived and not fully lived. However, migrants and their alliances actively contest the terms of their (b)ordered existence, and this will be evident when considering a (protest) camp in Rome. Mapping circuits of (im)mobility then means taking a closer interest in thinking of ways in which migrants are immobilised and mobilised while kept at distance from the possibility of engaging with a different idea of life and make politics of their own. These circuits contain, disperse and reduce migrants to remnants in excess. They remain in excess if they are not channelled within the legal frameworks of asylum and for the state which decides who counts as human and as object of threat; yet-to-be full political subjects, however, strive to persevere no less than full political subjects.

[112] Schewel K., 'Understanding Immobility: Moving Beyond the Mobility Bias in Migration Studies', *International Migration Review* (2019), 1(28), 1-28.
[113] *Ibid.*, 6.
[114] *See* also Lubkemann S.C., 'Involuntary Immobility: On a Theoretical Invisibility in Forced Migration Studies', *Journal of Refugee Studies* (December 2008), 21(4), 454-75.

Mbembe talks of 'borderization' as:

> "the process by which certain spaces are transformed into uncrossable places for certain classes of populations, who thereby undergo a process of racialization; places where speed must be disabled and the lives of a multitude of people judged to be undesirable are meant to be immobilised if not shattered".[115]

Borders, as Mbembe puts it, have been transformed in the name of security into accelerating and decelerating practices that generate value according to the principle of dissimilarity rather than affinity predicated on separation and division rather than mutual coexistence.[116] The circuits of (im)mobility where migrants transit through (in accelerated or decelerated fashion) result in certain racialized or otherwise discriminated subjects to be (kept) still in different degrees and borders become places of sorting, places of condensation and places of containment.[117] These are overlapping spaces of governance that are imposed upon migrants, but sometimes, as we will see later, they provide the opportunity for migrants to self-organise against the encroachment they suffer.

***Places of Sorting*: Hotspots**

Hotspots were introduced by the European Commission as part of its Agenda on Migration launched in May 2015. Hotspots were established as a purposive response to the increased arrival of migrants through the Mediterranean route, and as a strategic supplement to national authorities in identifying, registering and fingerprinting newcomers.[118] Hotspots were piloted in Greece where there are currently five hotspots

[115] Mbembe A., 'Bodies as Borders', 9.
[116] *Ibid.*, 9-11.
[117] As Agnew remarks, there are three dimensions to place. Firstly, place is "a site in space where an activity or object is located, and which relates to other sites or locations because of interaction, movement and diffusion between them". Secondly, place is not merely a location but also accounts for where everyday life activities happen, that is where social life flourishes. Place here is formed by a series of *locales* such as workplaces, malls, churches and so on. Thirdly, the idea of *sense of place* as identification with "a unique community, landscape and moral order".[117] According to this, place is also unique and particular to singular constructions. In this sense, calling these 'spaces' 'places' aims to account for what mobilities produce in relation to 'institutions of control'. This is important even though in referring to circuit of (im)mobility I focus less on the production of 'place' and more on the institutionalisation of control through space. Agnew J., "Space and Place" *in* Agnew J., Livingstone D. (eds.) *Handbook of Geographical Knowledge* (London: Sage, 2011), Chapter 23. Available at: https://www.geog.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/users/jagnew/416.pdf [accessed 18 October 2019].
[118] This is operationalized through the support of different agencies such as the European asylum office, Frontex and Europol.

(on the islands of Chios, Kos, Leros, Lesvos and Samos) and in Italy where there are also five hotspots (in Lampedusa, Messina, Pozzallo, Taranto and Trapani).[119] The document that establishes these hotspots provides indications on how this approach was going to be operationalised:

> "Those claiming asylum will be immediately channelled into an asylum procedure where EASO support teams will help to process asylum cases as quickly as possible. For those not in need of protection, Frontex will help Member States by coordinating the return of irregular migrants. Europol and Eurojust will assist the host Member State with investigations to dismantle the smuggling and trafficking networks".[120]

According to this, the hotspot approach works on three interlinked aims: to register people and process asylum claims; to perform deportations for those who are not deemed as entitled of presenting asylum cases; to target traffickers and human smugglers and their networks.[121] Initially, hotspots were thought as a solution to the 'burden sharing' of migrants' arrivals at the Southern borders of the EU and to police the conduct of countries such as Greece and Italy have been accused of letting migrants move around Europe without taking their fingerprints.[122] Established as spaces of transit and sorting, hotspots exist today as spaces of semi-detention. Following the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal on 20 March 2016, the hotspots in Greece rather than spaces of transit became *de-facto* places of confinement where migrants wait for their applications to be examined and are eventually returned to Turkey.[123] By attempting to retain control over mobilities,

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[119] Hotspots at the EU external border: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/623563/EPRS_BRI(2018)623563_EN.pdf [accessed 17 October 2019].
[120] European Commission, 'A European Agenda on Migration', 13 May 2015. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf [accessed 17 October 2019].
[121] *Ibid.*
[122] Martin L., Tazzioli M., 'Governing Mobility through the European Union's 'Hotspots' Centres', *Society and Space*, (Introduction), (8 November 2016). Available at: http://societyandspace.org/2016/11/08/governing-mobility-through-the-european-unions-hotspot-centres-a-forum/ [accessed 18 October 2019].
[123] Help Refugees, 'The Eu-Turkey Deal: Explained', 5 April 2018. Available at: https://helprefugees.org/news/eu-turkey-deal-explained/ [accessed 18 October 2019].

the logistical infrastructure of the hotspots redistributes and channels movement around new moral and spatial *loci*.[124]

The EU hotspots' approach to migration containment, therefore, raises many questions regarding the management of mobilities through space and time. More importantly, as Garelli and Tazzioli have shown, the hotspots system impacts on migrants lives and geographies as their identities are rendered precarious and reshuffled temporally, while their mobility is spatially confined.[125] Migrants are made (im)mobile in the sense that the hotspot traps them in islands and camps where their conditions are precarious so that their individual and collective political engagements can be further restricted. Thought of as a fast-track solution to member states processing centres, hotspots function as a pre-frontier of EUrope where "asylum officers render asylum decisions on the basis of nationality, rather than individual circumstances".[126] Hotspots do not represent then a structural solution to the management of mobile populations, but a further advancement in the mechanisms of exclusions for the many:

> "When strategies of spatial containment and the criterion of nationality are not enough for disciplining mobility and narrowing the access to protection, states introduce temporal borders that *vertically cut across* the sites".[127]

This vertical cut further disrupts people on the move in their possibility of accessing legal networks of recognition. On top of this, it is essential to stress the fact that hotspots are ambiguous facilities for the initial reception and identification of migrants arriving by sea which extend both as open and closed sites of aid beyond immediate rescue.[128]

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[124] Mezzadra S. and Neilson B., *Border as Method*, 8.
[125] Tazzioli M., Garelli G., 'Containment beyond detention', 10-11.
[126] *Idem.*
[127] Tazzioli M., 'Identify, Label, Divide: The Temporality of Control and Temporal Borders in the Hotspots', *Observatory of the Refugee and Migration Crisis in the Aegean*, 8 November 2016. Available at: https://refugeeobservatory.aegean.gr/en/identify-label-and-divide-temporality-control-and-temporal-borders-hotspots-m-tazzioli [accessed 17 October 2019].
[128] Hotspots at the EU external border: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/623563/EPRS_BRI(2018)623563_EN.pdf [accessed 17 October 2019].

As widely explored, institutions of care rule over unruly populations by establishing their own hierarchy of needs.[129] Pallister-Wilkins argues that the hotspot makes possible and necessary humanitarian interventions in practice: a specific humanitarian triage is at play at hotspots where mobility and life designate control and care.[130] The intertwining of both rationales is identified in terms of the biopolitical engagements that hotspots produce both in terms of exclusion and inclusion of the population concerned. It cannot pass unnoticed that as a mobile spatial entity,[131] the hotspot rationale has systematically reproduced and multiplied entrenched ways of governing the 'undesirables' of the world. As Walters puts it, "the humanitarian crystallizes in the midst of complex relations of inequality, far from neutralizing political conflict it should be seen as an emergent zone of politics in its own right".[132] Politically then, the hotspot model reinforces ways of thinking about humanitarian borders but also physical borders by reaffirming their presence where they are supposed to be. Biopolitically, these borders permeate migrants' bodies, making them experience the consequences of such re-(b)orderings in terms of pre-emptive governance. Migrants are reduced to people who should *(only)* survive by living in the wait, and whose life needs to be delimited to what is acceptable for the state. Looking at the shifting geographies and politics of migration control through hotspots helps us to unveil tense relationships between ideal types of care, but also control. Created to speed up the process of identification of 'irregular migrants', hotspots re-territorialise borders and function to limit the politics of movement of migrants by fixing *their* time to place.

[129] Agier M., *Managing the Undesirables.*
[130] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'Hotspots and the Politics of Control and Care', *Society and Space* (6 December 2016). Available at: https://societyandspace.org/author/polly-pallister-wilkins/ [accessed 18 October 2019].
[131] Spathopoulou A., 'The Ferry as a Mobile Hotspot: Migrants at the uneasy borderland of Greece', *Society and Space*, 15 December 2016. Available at: https://societyandspace.org/2016/12/15/the-ferry-as-a-mobile-hotspot-migrants-at-the-uneasy-borderlands-of-greece/ [accessed 18 October 2019].
[132] Walters W., 'Foucault and Frontiers: Notes on the Birth of the Humanitarian Border', *in* Brockling U., Krasmann S. and Lemke T. (2011) (eds) *Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges* (New York: Routledge), 138-64, 156.

Places of Condensation: Islands Model of Detention

Within the Euro-Mediterranean migration system, islands play a determinant role in contributing to the control and spatialization of migratory movements. It is not a coincidence that hotspots are located on islands functioning as part of a broader system of migration management. The proximity of islands to zones of interception allows nation states to mediate access to asylum[133] before and regardless of migrants reaching mainland EUrope. Hotspots located on islands offer the possibility for coastal states to re-assert where their borders are supposed to be, that is within the margins of their sovereign jurisdictions. These margins are spatially and politically significant when looking at migrants' (im)mobilisations *in* and *through* islands. In particular, political geographers have highlighted the importance of looking at islands to examine geographies of sovereignty and the rendered precariousness of migrants' lives within them.[134] Within the framework of securitised/'humanised' migration, islands represent an opportunity to discourage migrants from accessing legal recognition and further their journeys on main sovereign territory. Broadly speaking, islands also represent a fertile terrain in which governance operates "gradually".[135] As Alison Mountz puts it, "nation-states are using islands to capture liminal populations, neither home nor arrived, not able to legally become refugees or asylum-seekers because of their location at a distance from sovereign territory".[136] The 'in-betweenness' of islands limit migrants' claim to rights and political life, and leaves them trapped by a geography of inconclusiveness.

We can, for instance, think of the Greek islands and how they have come to symbolise this idea of entrapment. From places of transit, islands are increasingly being conceived as places of destination[137] in which detention is not only institutionalised

[133] Mountz A., 'The enforcement archipelago: Detention, haunting, and asylum on islands', *Political Geography* (2011), 30, 118-28, 121.
[134] *Idem*.
[135] *Idem*.
[136] *Ibid.*, 118.
[137] Bernardie-Tahir N., Schmoll C., 'Islands and Undesirables: Introduction to special issue on Irregular maritime migration in Southern European Islands', *Draft Paper*. Available at:

through rigid state facilities but also normalised through the settlement of migrants in camps. Of these, the Moira refugee camp in Lesbos, the largest of the Greek's islands, has acquired a certain scholarly and mediatic visibility also due to the precarious life conditions in which people are kept.[138] The EU sponsored camp in Moira, contingent and constituted by the presence of the hotspot itself, calls for care and asks for control: the basic humanitarian needs are being met while the potential security risk for migrants to reach sovereign territory are minimised.[139] Built on a former military base, the repurposing of Moira from a strategic military geopolitical asset to a facility of care and control exposes important patterns that evoke violent topographies of exclusion and exception and run throughout the histories of islands.

Located at the intersection between distance and proximity, islands enforce practices that "deter, detain and deflect migrants".[140] They transfigure detention beyond centres where the margins are not completely separated from the politicization of islands features. Bernard Debarbieux talks of islands as "places of condensation" evoking "an analogy with the condensation of water vapor: a densification process (water aggregating in a small volume) that gives visibility (water drop) to that which had not been [visible] (water vapor)".[141] The French geographer emphasises the concrete and symbolic relation of islands with human developments and territorial production that are global.[142] Highlighting the passage from invisibility to visibility, the notion of condensation helps us to disrupt the more topographical idea of distance, bringing to the fore the spatial and political potential of islands. Undoubtedly, the island of Lampedusa fits this description.

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https://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/MWG/201314/Bernardie-Schmoll-IslandsandUndesirables.pdf [accessed 18 October 2019].

[138] McElvaney K., 'Rare look at life inside Lesbos' Moira refugee camp', *Aljazeera*, 19 January 2019. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/rare-life-lesbos-moria-refugee-camp-180119123918846.html [accessed 18 October 2019].

[139] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'Hotspots and the Politics of Control and Care'.

[140] Mountz A., 'The enforcement archipelago'.

[141] Debarbieux, B., 'Le lieu, le territoire et trois figures de rhétorique', *L'Espace Géographique* (1995), (2), 97-112, *qtd in* Bernardie-Tahir N., Schmoll C., 'Islands and Undesirables'.

[142] Ratter M. W. B. (2018) *Geography of Small Islands. Outposts of Globalisation* (Springer International Publishing: Hamburg), 3.

As Bernardie-Tahir and Schmoll put it, "the island has turned into a resonance chamber for many issues, including the management of maritime migrants, deportation, detention, hospitality and solidarity, and the intertwined intervention of local, national and supranational institutions".[143] The fact that on the island are concentred Italy's sea borders makes it possible to dilute migrants movements.

Federica Mazzara attempts to unpack such complexities by looking at the island of Lampedusa through the interplay of visibility and invisibility. Drawing on Bauman's categories of the "tourist" and the "vagabond",[144] Lampedusa is first thought through the lens of these two different categories of wanderers where autonomy and freedom are decurted for the later.[145] Within these spaces that are rendered invisible or hypervisible, detention is concretely spatialised but also de-spatialised as 'outdoors prisons' that fabricate more permanent and temporary figures of migration. Islands are then heterotopias that contain undesirables' bodies in which real utopian space is made impossible.[146] What emerges from Mazzara's very insightful book on counter-mapping the gaze on migration is an account of the island of Lampedusa as a complex multi-layered space of disruptive governance.[147] Lifting up these layers, the criminalisation and preventive illegalisation of migrants intertwine with the continued militarised-humanitarian trend in the island. Foucault talks of "the great confinement" as a response to the mad and outsiders of central Europe at the end of the 16th century: their separation from visible margins was accomplished with the emergence of the asylum-house.[148] Similarly, islands are being repopulated by a new range of unwanted and repurposed as marginal places of disciplinary conduct.

[143] Bernardie-Tahir N., Schmoll C., 'Islands and Undesirables'.
[144] Bauman Z. (1998) *Globalization: The Human Consequences* (Polity Press), 89.
[145] Mazzara F. (2019) *Reframing Migration: Lampedusa, Border Spectacle and the Aesthetics of Subversion* (Peter Lang AG, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften; New edition), 11-2.
[146] *See* Pugliese J., 'Crisis heterotopias and border zones of the dead', *Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* (2009), 23(5), 663-79.
[147] Mazzara F., *Reframing Migration.*
[148] Foucault M. (1961) *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (Vintage Books, 2006).

It is not surprising then that humanitarian camps created for civilians draw on the military camp created for soldiers. From 2008 to 2011 the ex-NATO base Loran operated in Lampedusa as a temporary reception centre to tackle the 'humanitarian emergency' of North Africa. This former military base while operatively dismantled, was still considered as a military zone by Coast Guards and Carabinieri who kept making use of its facilities.[149] Karina Horsti reports on the memorialisation of Loran, now an abandoned structure and once an architecture of surveillance and control: an open/closed space that still retains a strong feeling of confinement, complemented by "signs of humanitarian authority that governed the migrants by the logics of protection and alleviation of suffering".[150] In examining what remains of this space, Horsti provides a rich account of the merging of the humanitarian and securitised rationales of the border at Loran. This rationale endures today and transcends border zones, producing a new humanitarian border regime. William Walters has diagnosed the rise of humanitarian borders as a parallel move to the strategizing of state frontiers into instruments of migration control:

> "the humanitarian border emerges once it becomes established that border crossing has become, for thousands of migrants seeking, for a variety of reasons, to access the territories of the global North, a matter of life and death".[151]

The humanitarian border actualises new spaces by reinventing zones and emergencies as humanitarian.[152] While this border manifests under specific circumstances and at the hand of different actors,[153] it has to be considered as fluctuating so that its field of intervention is distributed along migrants' routes and "zones of qualification".[154] These zones transcend but also reify the idea that detention is custody so that care is secured.

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[149] Horsti K., 'Remains of Rescue and Confinement: Humanitarian (b)ordering in Lampedusa', *Border Criminologies*, 7 September 2015. Available at: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2015/09/remains-rescue [accessed 18 October 2019].
[150] *Idem*.
[151] Walters W., 'Foucault and Frontiers', 138.
[152] *Ibid.*, 139.
[153] *Ibid.*, 145.
[154] Barry A., 'Technological Zones', *European Journal of Social Theory* (2006), 9(2), 239-53 *qtd in* Walters W., "Foucault and Frontiers", 48.

As Mazzara argues, "to protect migrants is first and foremost an act of protecting ourselves, by confining, securitising and sanitising the others through practices of hospitality/exclusion".[155] Hospitality and exclusion become entrenched in modes of (b)ordering that are mutually supportive. This leads us to think that referring to reception centres or to detention centres does not change the fact that these facilities host and divide. What is at stake in detention is not only the (im)mobilisation of migrants, but their very subjectification of indeterminate statuses. They are made to live in the wait, in between worlds, that mostly account for their basic needs of survival so that they can just continue living on state terms. While detention starts well beyond the physical borders of EUrope, islands within its jurisdiction condense mechanisms of detention with new modes of (b)ordering, making coexist insularity with isolation. Isolation here is spatially configured to reduce the political potential of migrants' struggles.

Places of Dispersal: Encampments of Camps

In chapter two I explored the camp as a tool to govern people who are made to remain in excess. In particular, drawing on the work of Papadopoulos and others, I considered camps as porous speed boxes that serve to decelerate migration by controlling movement through time.[156] Moving away from Agamben's vision of the camp as "catalytic converter" of order based on lawful exceptions, the camp has so far been presented here also as a function of time that works to recalibrate space in terms of acceptable temporalities of movement. Keeping this in mind, mapping circuits of (im)mobility also requires us to engage with ideas of camps not only in their institutional forms but also as improvised and makeshift sites of political negotiation. I will now reflect on camp

[155] Mazzara F., *Reframing Migration*, 51.
[156] Papadopoulos D., Stephenson N., Tsianos V., *Escape Routes.*

typologies more broadly but also look at urban (protest) camps focusing on a particular camp in Rome, and at the forms of 'solidarity' and impasse that are generated within.

In *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government,* Michel Agier scrutinizes the mechanisms of control and care over some populations, "the world's residual 'remnants,' dark, diseased and invisible".[157] Exploring the disturbing ambiguity of humanitarianism, Agier notices that interventions under the humanitarian banner today go well beyond the spaces of the camps: there are many forms of *encampments* and these are made up of networks, leaderships and values.[158] These are spaces of mobility, spaces of excessive liquidity,[159] where people are not only spatially confined but also circulate under the care and control of formal and more informal regulatory technologies of survival, control and distancing.[160] The de-spatialization of the camp, therefore, is an expression of the pervasiveness of ways of managing the rejected of the world. Of these spaces, Agier identifies four main constellations of functions and modes of ordering the movement (and the politics) of individuals: self-organised refuges; sorting centres; spaces of confinement; unprotected reserves.[161] The first type are self-organised camps, shelters that are established in absence of hospitality; the second type are sorting centres that group and divide people on the move; the third type are more traditional refugee camps managed by international and state agencies; the fourth type are camps for internally displaced people.[162] On the border and between borders, (im)mobility has become waiting, transiting, settling and unsettling: "the border is everywhere that an undesirable is identified and must be kept apart, 'detained' and then 'expelled'".[163]

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[157] Agier M., *Managing the Undesirables,* 4.
[158] *Ibid.*, 5-6.
[159] *Ibid.*, 36.
[160] *Ibid.*, 39.
[161] *Idem*.
[162] Agier M., 'Humanity as Identity and Its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian Government)', *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development,* 1(1), (Fall 2010), 36.
[163] *Ibid.*, 50.

While causes and categories of justification for making people 'undesirable' might differ, the continuity among these spaces is in the form of government that enacts a power-over life. Power-over life operates as a network of knowledge and practices where the very humanity of the 'undesirable' is contested. In these spaces, the life of migrants is often reduced to its minimum so it can be controlled and sustained by forms of interventions that aim to maintain *mere* survival. In camps, migrants and their alliances struggle for life,[164] or, as I suggest, for affirming ways of living life. The fact that migrants erect makeshift camps, 'occupy' space, and reconstitute their everyday lives according to their needs, represent the first disruptive element of thinking circuits of (im)mobility through the lens of a power of (human) life.[165] So far this aspect has been only partly considered in this thesis but its implications for thinking politically will be better assessed in the next chapters and chapter five in particular, not as simply as a power-of but also as a power-to. When focusing on this typology of camps, therefore, the tension is not just between control and care per se, but also on the ways in which care is self-organised transversally, across grassroot solidarity nets and migrants' demands, so that control can be resisted.

'Illegalised' around the 'margins',[166] dispersed in order to be made capturable and precarious, places and practices of migration are being stretched from the periphery to the centre of communal life. This is well depicted in the MigMap Project that provides an interactive visual cartography of European policies for governing migration in four maps.[167] These maps identify the key players in the context of migration and borders management in EUrope (map1); the various discourses surrounding and shaping migration (map 2); the process of Europeanization of EUrope through polices (map 3).

[164] Katz I., 'Between *Bare Life* and *Everyday Life*: Spatializing Europe's Migrant Camps', *Amps*, 12(2), (2017), 1-21, 13.
[165] The same could also be said about how migrants self-organise in hotspots and islands.
[166] Margin is understood here to be not just a geographical category, but a more de-spatialized way of excluding people.
[167] *See* the MigMap Project. Available at: http://www.transitmigration.org/migmap/home_entry.html [accessed 19 October 2019] *qtd* in Papadopoulos D. et al., *Escape Routes*, 168.

Particularly interesting is Map 4 (fig.6) that identifies places of mobility, places of everyday life, public institutions and border installations. These do not exist in a vacuum but are influenced by nation states and supranational agencies. From a reading of these maps it is possible to fully grasp "how and where the production of knowledge is taking place in the area of migration – and who is participating and has access to it."[168]



Figure 7. MigMap Project, Map. 4 Places and Practices[169] *(screenshot: Antonella Patteri)*

Map 4 (fig.7) mobilises spaces of high political visibility as temporary (places of mobility) or more permanent settlements (border installations) in which spatial thresholds are continuously being crossed. Suspended at the margins of the centre, camps might exist unseen, outside sites of civic environment, but migrants' mobility and engagements bring them at the centre of citizens' gaze as their movements makes them intersect with practices of everyday life.

[168] *Idem*.
[169] *Ibid.*

Over the last decade, a network of camps has emerged on the way to EUrope.[170] From processing centres, reception centres, state-run detention camps to improvised camps, urban camps and more self-settled encampments, isolation and (im)mobilisations are always constraining people in spaces of coercion. Control over human life is often maintained by dispersing people in encampments, reducing their capacity to organise politically, and often made evictable.[171] The care for a shelter, and the control over the permanence of settlements, intersects with new spatial strategies. As all forms of contentious politics are spatial,[172] camps' locations respond to tactics of vicinity to infrastructures of mobility, border zones, and migrants' routes. In some other cases, camps reproduce urban ghettos, "places of survival on the spot", where people are immediately cast aside from the space/politics of the city.[173] Returning to Foucault and its concept of heterotopia, Agier talks of off-places, places outside or at the edges of normal orderings where confinement possesses extraterritoriality.[174] This extraterritoriality is experienced by migrants in terms of a double locality of exclusion: "They are excluded from the native places that they lost through displacement, and they are excluded from the space of 'local population' where the camp or other transit zones are located".[175] Extraterritoriality then is a cause of excesses that are political while being "confined outside".[176] Off-places make up real places keeping alive the extraterritorial tension between who cannot be included and who needs to be excluded. The fiction of extraterritoriality and the void of exception allow the heterotopia to build its artefact -

[170] Katz I., 'A network of camps on the way to Europe', *Forced Migration: Destination Europe* (January 2016), 51, 17-9.
[171] Van Baar H., 'Evictability and the Biopolitical (b)ordering of Europe', *Antipode* (2016), 0(0), 1-9.
[172] Brown G., Feigenbaum A., Frenzel F. and McCurdy P., 'Introduction: Past Tens, Present Tens: On the Importance of Studying Protest Camps', in *Protest Camps in International Context: Spaces, Infrastructures and Media of Resistance*, edited by Brown G., Feigenbaum, Frenzel F. and McCurdy P., 1-22 (Bristol Policy Press at University of Bristol) *qtd in* Katz I., Martin D. and Minca C. (2018) *Camps Revisited: Multifaceted Spatialities of a Modern Political Technology* (Rowan&Liittlefied International: London, New York), 203.
[173] Agier M., 'From Refuge the Ghetto is Born: Contemporary Figures of Heterotopia', Chapter 11 *in* Hutchison R., Haynes D. B. (2012) *The Ghetto: Contemporary Global Issues and Controversies* (Routledge: New York, 2018), 278.
[174] *Idem.*
[175] *Idem.*
[176] *Ibid.,* 279.

boat, island, or camp - in the middle of a void that is the border of a social or national order.[177]

Urban (Protest) Camps: Political Encampments and Migrants in Transit

As already considered, today encampments of camps are proliferating on the way to EUrope. In this mapping of ubiquitous (b)ordering practices, cities have come to represent the point at which law enforcement meets locally scaled borders.[178] Many authors have discussed the continuous urbanization of cities where zones of disconnection are built and rebuilt in order to accommodate specific configurations of humanity.[179] In order to fully understand how the making of borders interacts with the space of the city it is necessary to stress how borders have become *internal* extensions of more recognisable limits.[180] The callous reality of borders, in fact, is brought into existence into the everyday spaces of universities, schools, hospitals, social services, employment agencies and so on. The urban fabric somehow absorbs the border regime constructing new spatialities of (b)ordering, and cities are made to act as mediators of this new geography.[181] The pervasiveness of borders within social life aims not only at enforcing reasons of containment by policing movement through identity checks or by reporting 'irregular' migrants to state authorities, but also functions to reiterate and normalise *how,* and to some extent also *where,* the recipients of these measures should live. The '*how'* of migration regards the ways in which migrants can be made precarious, while the '*where'* is always shadowed by the possibility of the camp. As already considered, there are different typologies of camps that are associated to different administrative categories of

[177] *Idem*.
[178] *See* Graham S., 'Cities as Battlespaces: The New Military Urbanism', *City* (2009), 13(4), 383-402.
[179] *See* Davis M., *Planet of Slums*.
[180] Lebuhn H., 'Local border practices and urban citizenship in Europe', *City* (2013), 17(1), 37-51, 40.
[181] Sassen S. (2010) *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 314.

regulated mobility.[182] Within their own genealogy of making, urban protest camps represent a peculiar manifestation of a diversity of camps where demands are formulated in confrontation with the state.

Feigenbaum and others define a protest camp as "a place-based social movement strategy that involves both acts of ongoing protest and acts of social reproduction needed to sustain daily life".[183] Drawing on this definition, the authors trace the origins of protest camps to then turn attention to their more contemporary forms, by also identifying four major emergent infrastructures of protest camps. These infrastructures include engagements with media activities, protest action, governance and recreation.[184] What makes protest camps distinguishable from other forms of protest are these infrastructures, but also the practices that accompany protest activity which are intended to mobilise the constituent power of political autonomy and social care.[185] The constitutional capacity of protest camps is given centre stage in the sense that camping works as protesting so that social movements refine their strategies of action within it. In the case of migratory movements, camps are often set up as a necessity to the forced dispersal and management of people on the move. Shifting attention from the institutional camps of the state to makeshift camps, informal camps are often linked to protest camps even though their ephemeral character forces us to rethink *means* and *meanings* of protesting. The notion of 'protest' camps is here re-conjugated to accommodate how protest can be articulated not just in terms of precise infrastructures of confrontation but through less settled and organised strategies of dissent. Often, such strategies are channelled by the intervention of members of grassroot organisations. In such circumstances, protest is not necessarily performed or even recognised as such, but it is experienced through acts of denunciation

[182] McNevin, 'Ambivalence and citizenship: Theorising the political claims of irregular migrants', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (2013), 41, 182-200, 185 *qtd in* Darling J., 'Forced migration and the city: Irregularity, informality, and the politics of presence', *Progress in Human Geography* (2017), 41(2), 178-198, 179.
[183] Feigenbaum A., Frenzel F., McCurdy P. (2013) *Protest Camps* (Zed Books), 13.
[184] *Idem*.
[185] *Ibid.*, 221.

that establish political relationships between the outside, the margins and the inside of camps.

The visibility of migrants' encampments is often associated to a situation of protest where, paraphrasing Judith Butler, the body appears and is recognised by others, making these spaces political.[186] While it is important to recognise the political relevance of encampments, here the recognition of migrants as political subjects or not, remains subservient to the kind of identities that are assigned to them by the regime of recognition who validates them. As recognition is always pre-determined, bodies are often thought as biopolitical before appearing in the public arena: a body that exists as such. In order to discourage this, therefore, we need to think anew according to what protest might mean even when direct visibility is decurted. This will be better considered later in this chapter when looking at a migrants' camp set up by the Baobab Experience in Rome. For now, it is important to consider the political character of cities in ensuring that migrants' politics of presence are enacted through the negotiations between local/urban life and mobile borders. Isin remarks that the city offers a platform for rethinking political subjectivities so that presence can be claimed.[187] As we will see in the case of Calais in the next chapter, visibility needs to be situated within migrants' strategies of movement where they also need to hide in order to postpone their claims.

Claiming presence then, involves a dynamic engagement with the politicization of mobilities. As Darling reminds us, "there is a need to be wary of positioning presence as straightforward claim to visibility".[188] In line with this, presence needs to be disjoined from the aims of mere visibility and understood instead as a key concept for thinking about urban (protest) camps where the formal aspect of occupying (public/private) spaces

[186] In particular, *see* Chapter 2 'Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street' in Butler J. (2015) *Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press).
[187] Isin E. F. (2012) *Citizens Without Frontiers* (London: Bloomsbury), 109, *qtd in* Darling J., "Forced migration and the city".
[188]Darling J., 'Forced migration and the city', 191.

intersects with the informality of migrants' existence. This is often the case for migrants who transit in sites.[189] As the concept of transit is not contemplated within European laws, where migrants are either considered as legally claiming asylum or illegally staying within a given territory, their political presence is often denied in all its facets. These are migrants whose journey is rooted not only in the wider precarity and temporality of their movement, but also in the uncertainty that surrounds the reachability of their chosen country of destination: they find themselves stranded anytime their (im)mobility is promoted. However, migrants in transit exist not only because their mobility is obstructed but also because they do not give up their goals. In considering the context in which migrants in transit settled in a particular urban (protest) camp in Rome set up by a grassroot organisation, the Baobab Experience, I move away from ideas of a protest camp as a repertoire for social movements, a space of social reproduction, or a place-based site of ongoing protest.[190] The infrastructures of solidarity set up in this camp, before its eviction in October 2018, could be defined as fragile. Nevertheless, this camp carries political potential by showing how protest works through the re-politicization of claims based on a politics of presence. The aid organisation that self-organised this specific camp with migrants in Rome understood that (b)ordered survival had to be contested by making this space political.

***When in Rome*, Yes, We Camp!**

In the summer of 2018, the informal camp and the humanitarian *presidio* (settlement) of *Piazzale Maslax* near Tiburtina Station in Rome was still a reality. A few months later, in October 2018, people living in this camp were evicted and their tents and communal belongings were destroyed by the Italian authorities. Before this intervention, the

[189] Ansems de Vries L., Guild E., 'Seeking refuge in Europe: spaces of violence of migration management', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2019), 45(12), 2156-66.
[190] *See* McCurdy P., Feigenbaum A. and Frenzel F., 'Protest Camps and Repertoires of Contention', *Social Movement Studies* (2016), 15(1), 97-104.

grassroot citizen-led organisation, the Baboab Experience, had erected about two hundred tents in an empty parking space owned by the Italian Railway National Services. This now empty parking space is situated in front of a massive edifice called Hotel Africa, one of the first buildings occupied in Rome by migrants since 2004, and it is today the only structure that exists to remind us that many migrants were transiting there. While the informal camp of *Piazzale Maslax*, that took the name from a former host of the camp - a nineteen years old Somali migrant who committed suicide in a reception centre in the south of Italy - existed for about a year, the history of informal settlements set up in Rome by the Baobab Experience goes back to 2015. The *centro sociale* (social center) situated in via Cupa from 2004 to about 2014, grew spontaneously in the summer of 2016 where the Baobab *centro sociale* was made available for migrants looking for temporary accommodation. Since more migrants arrived in Rome especially between 2015 and 2016, the volunteers decided to turn the settlement in via Cupa into an open-air camp. Tents, services, mattresses and so on started to appear on the streets catching the attention of media and politicians, raising issues of disorder for the local administration.[191] This structure of aid could no longer hold due to evictions and interventions by the police, and volunteers had to think about more efficient ways to conduct their activities. These activities ranged from providing meals, medical checks, and assisting migrants before furthering their routes.

The Baobab Experience started then to provide mobile support to migrants after the definitive eviction of the space in Via Cupa in October 2016.[192] The volunteers of the organisations initially relocated their operations to an area behind Tiburtina's station, central and visible from the city's central hub. The informal settlement had to be moved again, with volunteers and migrants setting up a camp not that distant from the previous

[191] Bock J.J., 'Grassroots Solidarity and Political Protest in Rome's Migrant Camps', *in* Katz I., Martin D. and Minca C. (2018) *Camps Revisited*, 159-75.
[192] *Ibid.*

location in Tiburtina, this time less visible, a parking space devoted for touristic buses but left unused. The informal camp *Piazzale Maslax* became a political encampment and a symbol of protest against local authorities, Italy's reception system and European policies at large. Even though this place can be considered the last example of a series of encampments that have been set up by the Baobab Experience in Rome, the informal camp of *Piazzale Maslax* represented a continuum of experiences for the politically engaged possibilities that emerged from claiming migrants' presence through different kinds of activism.

Close to the entrance of the *Piazzale Maslax*' camp, authorities put cemented blocks on the road so as to discourage members of organisations from reaching the camp and offering services to migrants (eventually, this barrier was removed). During the last weeks of July 2018, there were about two hundred fifty people staying in the camp. A little gardening space was located at the main entrance of the camp where some volunteers did gardening with some migrants. The parking space was surrounded by tents, with a communal area devoted to cooking and eating even though most of the meals were distributed by organisations. In this makeshift camp there were not proper infrastructures of support such as toilets and electricity was minimally provided. When I visited the camp on a warm summer day in July, some of the people staying in the camp were playing football and, since music was on, others were dancing in the background. Parked in the camp was the van of No Name Kitchen, a group of independent volunteers active in Serbia, Bosnia and Italy at the time while another van had been readapted for the distribution of clean water. At the centre of the camp there was a tent with a Star Wars character, Chewbacca, printed on it: this tent had most likely been a donation to members of the Baobab Experience but there, in the middle of the camp, we were symbolically reminded that rebellion comes in different forms.

The camp was populated by different nationalities with different statuses. The majority of people came from Eritrea, Francophone Africa, North Africa, Iraq, Sudan and Nigeria. People who lived there were mostly migrants in transit, people who were looking for an accommodation while made to live in limbo, transiting through Rome after escaping centres of identification in the South of Italy, or after being pushed south from the northern regions of Italy. Those categorised according to different degrees of illegalization were accompanied by those who had initially come to Italy with visas or humanitarian permits but were not able to renew them and were therefore made homeless and in need of an accommodation. A small number of people who had their status recognised via political or humanitarian claims and considered legal by the Italian state, had nonetheless to stay in this camp for transients because they had no other options. Part of the migrant population that lived in the camp had informal jobs outside it, but since they could not afford to live somewhere else, or their status did not allow them to rent a room, they had to stay there. The volunteers of the Baobab Experience made sure to keep in contact with migrants who had left the camp whenever possible. The organisation became essential not just in providing legal advice, medical assistance or ensuring that basic conditions of existence were met in the camp but also because they worked towards ensuring that the migrants' presence was not forgotten at a political level.

The politicization of this camp, in fact, was transversal and reflected a priority for the grassroot organisation that was that of denouncing the system of reception in Italy, the local administration in Rome, and the fallacies of European regulations at large. People living in the camp, in fact, epitomised, in various degrees, all the problems that surrounded the politics of qualification, abandonment and illegalization of migrants. The local administration in Rome had a key role in tolerating and/or criminalising this space, in the same way in which the national police was often sent in loco to carry out the identification of migrants in the camp. Due to its location, reachable mostly by car and

only if people were purposively travelling there, this camp was kept away from everyday life visibility and mostly mediatised as such. Members of the Baobab played a decisive role in accounting for the presence of migrants by mobilising politically. Contrary to principles of neutrality that surround the provision of aid defined as humanitarian, the group of volunteers of the *Boabab Experience* were clear that their interventions had to be militant by critically opposing local/national/European policies. More importantly, the volunteers understood that without their activism the space of *Piazzale Maslax* would have denied migrants of their political presence. As Isin and Rygiel have explored, the logic of the camp can be better grasped if instead of considering them as *spaces of abjection*, where people are reduced to their bare life, we consider camps as *abject spaces* that are:

> "spaces in which the intention is to treat people neither as subjects (of discipline) nor objects (of elimination) but as those without presence, without existence, as inexistent beings, not because they don't exist, but because their existence is rendered invisible and inaudible through abject spaces".[193]

Of these spaces, the two authors identify frontiers, zones and camps as spaces where people are exempted from exercising politics. While frontiers and abject zones halt the migrants' ability to enact rights and act as political subjects, camps also rely on a logic of internment where the aim is that of revoking the status of subjectivity.[194]

Drawing on this, it can be argued that any camp enacts a logic of survival, that is ensuring the provisions for humans that are securitised, while undermining their politicization. In this case, subjects with rights become migrants in transit but not subjects of politics.[195] Ultimately, the volunteers of Baobab Experience were aware that *Piazzale Maxlax* camp was not a political solution but an important starting point to give migrants a voice. Envoicing took different shapes within, on the edges, and outside the camp:

[193] Isin E. F., Rygiel K., 'Abject Spaces: Frontiers, Zones, Camps' in Dauphinee E, Masters C. (2007) *Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave), 181-203, 184.
[194] *Ibid.*, 198.
[195] *Idem*.

migrants took part in political marches organised by Baobab or specific events that aimed to make local communities aware of the political limbo in which they were trapped but also organised political initiatives themselves –for example they invited a writer on pan-Africanism to give a talk in the camp or established an information network about migrants' rights. On a specific occasion, a reading of the Italian constitution with a specific focus on the right of asylum, article 10 comma 3,[196] was organised in the context of a broader discussion of asylum policies and reception systems. Due to the political engagement of aid workers and migrants, this camp became a symbol of protest where the invisibility of migrants was counteracted by a politics of presence.

These political engagements were at the core of the reasons of the eviction of the camp of *Piazzale Maslax* in October 2018. This eviction was presented by the newly established Lega-Five Stars Movement coalition of government in Italy, and especially the then Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini, as a necessary sanitisation of Rome so that order could be re-established. Migrants were relocated, some were just dispersed. The experience of *Piazzale Maslax*, however, was useful to denounce not only the precarious conditions in which migrants were made to live, but also because it insisted that one could shift the narrative of aid/securitisation and focus on migrants' political presence only by mobilising politically. What was tolerated by the state/city authorities in the space of *Piazzale Maslax* was the existence of migrants as long as they disappeared from the public space; what was not tolerated was that people living there, and volunteers supporting them, made themselves visible and politically engaged. Migrants and volunteers, in fact, openly contested (b)ordering practices that aspired to reduce migrants to survival and volunteer's support to the mere provision of essential aid. *Yes, We Camp!* inscribed on one of the camp's walls, encapsulates all too well, a new way of understanding 'camp'

[196] Article 10(3) of the Italian Constitution prescribes that "The foreigner, who is prevented in his country from effectively exercising the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, has the right to asylum in the territory of the Republic, according to the conditions established by law".

not only as a noun but as a verb which reclaims the agency of those who too often have it theorised away.

Figure 8. Picture of the informal camp of Piazzale Maslax before its dismantlement in October 2018.[197]

Icarus as migrant

In Greek mythology, Icarus is known as the boy who dared to fly too close to the sun on wings of feathers and wax made by his father, Daedalus. According to the myth described in Ovid *Metamorphoses*, by means of these artificial wings, Icarus attempted to escape imprisonment from the labyrinth in which King Minos relegated him. He left Crete, and despite his father recommendations, flew too near the sun causing his wings to melt, falling into the sea where he drowned.[198] As it is well known, myths play a social function as they are stories that address important and difficult questions about the edges, behaviour and morality of human beings more in general.[199] The story of Icarus exemplifies the limits and risks through which we can also think of the history of our

[197] . This camp was situated next to a building called Hotel Africa, occupied by migrants since 2004, with different graffiti, one of which: "YES, WE CAMP". Picture of the mural available at: https://baobabexperience.org/yeswecamp/#jp-carousel-2293 [accessed 20 October 2019].
[198] Ovid, *The Fall of Icarus* (Penguin Classics, 2015).
[199] For an introduction of the role that myths play in our cultural, political and religious life in modern days, *see* Martin R. (2016) *Classic Mythology: The Basics* (London: Routledge).

present times. In this light, Pieter Bruegel's painting *Landscape with the Fall of Icarus* (fig.9) can assist us as we rethink the contemporary predicament of migrants.

Figure 9. Peter Bruegel, Landscape with the Fall of Icarus, 1560.[200]

Bruegel's painting describes different scenes within a landscape in motion. Without caring for Icarus who waves his feet desperately in the water (lower right-hand corner), a ploughman, a shepherd, and a fisherman continue carrying on, without any worries, their daily activities. The fall of Icarus is depicted by Bruegel as an almost unnoticed event in the background. The landscape in the painting is given more importance in respect to the position of humans, and the imminent death of Icarus within it. In the words of William Carlos Williams' poem homonym to the painting: "insignificantly / off the coast / there was a splash quite unnoticed / this was / Icarus drowning".[201] This is also eloquently

[200] Bruegel P., 'Landscape with the Fall of Icarus', Royal Museum of Fine Arts in Belgium Painting available at: https://artsandculture.google.com/exhibit/landscape-with-the-fall-of-icarus-%C2%A0/MgIyXpmuNdcLJg [accessed 20 October 2019].

[201] William Carlos Williams, 'Landscape with the Fall of Icarus', *Collected Poems: 1939-1962, Volume II* (New Directions Publishing Corp). The poem is available at: http://english.emory.edu/classes/paintings&poems/williams.html [accessed 24 January 2018].

expressed by W. H. Auden's poem 'Musée des Beaux Arts' dedicated to the painting, which begins with these words:

> "About suffering they were never wrong,
> the old Masters: how well they understood
> its human position: how it takes place
> while someone else is eating or opening a window or just
> walking dully along".[202]

The indifference towards the drowning of Icarus is somehow explicative of today's governing of migration. Icarus' flight resembles today's migrants' journeys not only for the death that he encounters at sea but also for attempting to resist a life that has been assigned to him. While Icarus is often taken as an over-reacher, as a figure that overly challenges the lethal effects of the sun despite his father's warnings, migrants embark themselves in journeys that could be deadly despite being aware of what they might experience. Daedalus' warnings to Icarus are somehow reminiscent of Donald Tusk warning to 'economic' migrants not to undertake a life-threatening journey to Europe. In a speech on March 2016 Tusk warned would-be-migrants not to embark in deadly journeys to Europe saying: "Do not come to Europe. Do not believe the smugglers. Do not risk your lives and your money. It is all for nothing".[203] The reminiscences of Icarus drowning with that of the deaths in the Mediterranean Sea seems to be an easy explanation of how this figure can be inserted within today's spectacularised migratory dynamics. The story of Icarus is also a story of limits. The idea that Icarus acted beyond his mortal limits, contesting his own potentiality to behave like a God, is a prominent part of a story that calls into question the morality of those who behave with 'hubris'.[204] In the same

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[202] Auden H. W., 'Musée de Beaux Arts'. Poem available at: http://english.emory.edu/classes/paintings&poems/auden.html [accessed 24 January 2018].
[203] *See* 'Do not come to Europe:' Donald Tusk warns economic migrants', *The Guardian*, 3 March 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/03/donald-tusk-economic-migrants-do-not-come-to-europe [accessed 24 January 2018].
[204] To the Greek, 'hubris' referred to the way humans openly challenged their own limitations behaving like Gods. This word has come to be understood as a way to excessive pride and self-confidence that calls for the punishment of those who transcend their given potentialities.

way, migrants who leave their circumstances of living in the search of a better life are often cast as putting themselves in the condition of being punished, suffer, and even die.

The second analogy regards the power that security control asserts, and it is well evident in the role that the landscape plays in the painting. The landscape represented in the painting is totalising in respect to the humanity and death of Icarus. While we notice Icarus drowning only later on, it is the landscape that commands our attention. Similarly, our gaze is directed to the practices of rescue and securitisation in the Mediterranean rather to the conditions of migrants once they reach mainland and if their death is made visible, it is often presented as the result of their 'fatal' actions (both in terms of 'lethal' and as a product of 'fate').

Conclusion

The Mediterranean Sea, in conclusion, represents today a very contested space where migrants are left to die, rescued or deterred from reaching territorial waters according to new rationales of assistance. At sea, assistance is not simply a duty to rescue but also a responsibility to police and pre-empt migrants from reaching the EU so that discourses about human rights merge with the need to securitise borders. These borders are increasingly being externalised to African countries so that responsibilities for rescuing lives are unevenly shared. Besides military actors, the sea is also populated by commercial vessels and non-state organisations. Criminalised for rescuing people in distress, NGOs are constantly accused to be a pull-factor to border crossings at large. From scenes of rescue to militarised jurisdictions, the Mediterranean, as a multi-layered infrastructure of control of unbundled sovereignty, is the space where "shipwrecked lives" are being crafted so that migrants' humanity can be further graded on land. The simultaneous rise of care and control over migrants' lives are manifest on the shores of the European Union.

Within a broader context of migration management, lives that are rescued are channelled across different circuits of (im)mobility. Hotspots, detention in islands and encampments of camps are functioning as interconnected strategies for the containment and care of migrants. By living in the wait, isolated, discouraged from furthering their journeys, gazed and disciplined otherwise, people on the move constitute a threat to the body of host populations that is the only legalised community that nation states recognise. Caught within a biopolitics of survival, migrants are expected to (only) survive whilst being denied a political potential, but they also renegotiate their condition across border points. As seen in this chapter, often the way in which these negotiations take place is through wider alliances that migrants make with aid workers. As explored in the case of BaoBab Experience in Rome, the political (im)mobility of migrants living in *Piazzale Maslax* was counteracted by migrants' claims to political agency. The heightened politicisation of this camp, now evicted, contrasts with a less visible kind of politics that is in the making in areas like Calais. In the next chapter, I will consider experiences of encampments in Calais and forms of policed humanitarianism, by focusing on survival not just as a strategy of (b)ordering but also as an experience that gives raise to struggles for life. As we will see, in fact, survival is not only life governed *with* death but, most importantly, is a mode of 'overcoming' death that accounts for any struggle that aims to contest ways of living that delimit people's life.

CHAPTER 4

Policing Humanitarianism: Everyday (B)ordering in Calais

Figure 10. 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity'; "Because you voted again for safety, discipline, convinced to move away the fear of changing. We will still come your doors and we will shout even louder" Fabrizio de André. Orgosolo Mural (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Figure 11. When you put together two things that can resist. Orgosolo Mural (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Introduction

In October 2016 the French authorities demolished the makeshift camp in Calais known as the 'Jungle'. Following the eviction of the camp thousands of people have been relocated around France, while many others have remained in the area. Even though the number of migrants in Calais has sharply declined compared to when there was a proper settlement, many people still come to the North of France in the hope of reaching the UK and live in conditions which have significantly worsened. Despite the hardening of borders of the EU, those who have made it to Calais mostly end up sleeping rough in industrial areas, under bridges, parks and in scrappy woodlands. As they have to continuously hide from the police, who threaten them with violence, take away and trash their belongings, and constantly move them around in order to unsettle them, migrants' demands and institutional (in)visibility is perpetually renegotiated on the ground. As migrants in transit who reach Calais cannot simply reverse their journey and do not want to stay in France either, they have nowhere else to go but to live in the wait. Such life in purgatory affects the terms of their staying as people suffer from living in the open space all the time, supported only by the work of grassroot aid organisations. Posited in a limbo between life and death, neither fully rescued nor fully abandoned, migrants move in between these complementary rationales of the state.

In this chapter I consider how humanitarian interventions are being policed in Calais by addressing the role that police forces play in reducing migrants to acceptable forms of survival and enacting state practices of care and control, while aid organisation perform a vital intervention in support of migrants. I argue that biopolitical ways of governing migration in Calais ensure that people *(only)* survive as a measure of how their lives can continue only if they are delimited to it. I then shift my attention to infrastructures of solidarity, from the Calais Warehouse to operational buses in Calais, by looking at the on-stages/off-stages of migration, configurations of mobility and

criminalization of aid. As such, I will provide a reading of their activities in the field that accounts for the ways in which these experiences go beyond the mere preservation of lives. I conclude by looking at how these relational activities become acts of 'affirmative survival' by identifying what I call the politics of perseverance which are the expression of how strategies of (b)ordering are being redefined by migrants who engage with politically lived life. The multiple ways in which a politically lived life can articulate itself will be addressed in greater depth in the next chapter. In this chapter, I first problematise the relationship between theory, research methods, and fieldwork and, by delinking theory from specific research methods, I start this chapter by highlight the benefits of a post-qualitative inquiry grounded on thinking.

Theory as *Modus Vivendi*, Fieldwork as *Encounter*

Theory provides a framework of analysis for looking at phenomena, shaping our relations with social reality and channelling the objectives of such thoughts. As a way of making sense of things of the world, the broader significance of our experience is also, if not first and foremost, theorised as a form of knowledge that orders our own abstractions. Hence, theory organises thinking by selecting what accounts for concepts and directing us to the important questions that need to be asked. In this light, theory as a method seeks to control the production of knowledge by constructing fields of *knowability* that then make claims of truth according to the validity assigned to processes of data collection. One of the main problems in considering theory as a method is that what can be done is already grounded on ways of making sense of what can be imminently thought. According to conventional humanist methodologies, even when theory emerges from the ground this is still inserted within prescriptive ways of understanding findings. Findings are taken backwards to explain what theory can be. In other words, within research the function of theory is provisional to findings that are in relation to what is included and excluded within it. As

already observed when looking at borders as method, these are both institutions and a set of relationships that need to be interrogated beyond their methodological limitations. We encounter borders and borders encounter us. These encounters are not immune to our own status: we unequally stand in front of them, are allowed to cross them or even dismiss them.

Theory as a *modus vivendi* means "reading, thinking, writing and living with theory".[1] While theory regulates discovery by inscribing relationships to narratives with a fixed meaning, what theory as a *modus vivendi* aims to do is to allow the encountering of the real to be analytically problematised as a possibility for intensifying thinking. Originated from Latin, *modus vivendi* literally means 'way of life', an arrangement that allows life to progress without conflict. Theory as an agreement for reading social reality coexists with what is - but also with what could be. Living with theory, therefore, is not simply an experience of the now but a possibility for later. The kind of theory that informs field-research includes a *not-yet* as thinking itself is inquiry that meets reality.[2]

On this point, St. Pierre convincingly suggests that we need to think research as a post qualitative inquiry that "has no substance, no essence, no existence, no presence, no stability, no structure […] it presumes an ontology of immanence and it is always becoming".[3] As a tenant of poststructuralism and transcendental empiricism, St. Pierre argues that becoming cannot exist prior to its 'coming' that is when status quo is no longer maintained as such, but is confronted with what will happen.

The context of discovery follows a context of justification where "the pre-empirical, before-fieldwork component of a study (theory, thinking) and a separate 'empirical' component of a study which involves going to the 'field' and 'collecting

[1] St. Pierre E. A., 'Writing Post Qualitative Inquiry', 604.
[2] *See* St. Pierre, E. A., 'Nomadic inquiry in the smooth spaces of the field: A preface', *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* (1997), 10(3), 365-83.
[3] St. Pierre E. A., 'Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence', 9.

empirical data'" are assumed as symbiotic.[4] If we assume that theory contains objective reason before 'letting life walk in', we also assume that discovery is not a process of research but one of capture. Capturing social reality means making it pre-thinkable so that this is reduced to pre-emptive inquiries that control validity at the cost of creativity. If there are not pre-existing methods that accompany social inquiry it is because what compels us to think is not methodologically preferable to what we will encounter.[5] A post-qualitative inquiry, therefore, does not tell us what to do in the field but allows us to think beyond attempting to apply pre-existing ways of thinking to things of the world.[6] We might still do so but only as a matter of possibility. We think according to a certain conceptual order, this is unavoidable, but it is also essential to try to displace it. Displacement is discovery and discovering while thinking is what allows conventional research ratios to be contested. This does not mean rejecting *tout court* existing structures of thought when conducting research in the field, or even methods of research, but to privilege beginnings by looking at ontological and epistemological unknowns that are already *post* in respect to the inquiry that we think we should conduct.[7] While acknowledging that this position confronts risks of (mis)representation,[8] the fact that we are confronted with 'objective' and 'scientific' knowledge as *pre-thinking*, forces us to commit to a different idea of representability. This idea attends the material, empirical and ontological but it does so by focusing on knowledge that does not reproduce methodologies, but ideas.[9]

[4] *Idem.*
[5] *See* Smith W. D. (2012), 'Concepts and creation', *in* Braidotti R., Pisters P. (eds.), *Revising normativity with Deleuze* (London, England: Bloomsbury), 175-88.
[6] St. Pierre E. A., 'Post-Qualitative Inquiry in an Ontology of Immanence'.
[7] *Ibid.*, 10-11.
[8] Gerrard J., Rudolph S., Sriprakash A., 'The Politics of Post-Qualitative Inquiry: History and Power', *Qualitative Inquiry* (2016), 23(5), 384-94. In particular, post-qualitative research calls into question the positionality of the researcher, the lack of historical grounds and the inclination to decentre the 'human'.
[9] St. Pierre A. E., 'The posts continue: Becoming', *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* (2013), 26(6), 646-57, 647.

While in Calais, what I have seen, observed, felt, asked, thought and written is a succession of events that I have been able to witness, to take notes on, while also listening to aid workers there who either replied to my questions or described their daily experience in the Calais Warehouse where I volunteered for about two weeks. During this very intense time I participated also to food distribution to migrants. What follows, therefore, is an account of words, reasons and references that link ways of thinking about what is happening on the ground in Calais, and to some extent Dunkirk, with what is happening when discourses and narratives interact with the same reality that we are trying to reveal and re-discover. In this thesis I do not make claims of validity, generalisability or objectivity of my findings but put them in dialogue with a spectrum of ideas that enable me to rethink established parameters. What interests me is to think about how political modes of governance are enacted within the space of the border but are also counteracted by forms of activism that can make available alternative modalities of thinking. As Taylor writes, "Ultimately, the promise of post-qualitative research is political: it keeps methodology on the move in order to better attend the gaps, silences, excisions, and exclusions".[10] These gaps, silences, excisions and exclusions touch the "immanent, embodied, entangled and situated" space of reasoning about what is missing in political research.[11]

Why Calais?

To Dover from Calais

After midnight we drive through Sangatte
on the outskirts, where teenagers rush to the tunnel

In the big-cat gleam of our headlamps
the boys pause for a heartbeat---disappear in a flash

[10] Taylor C, 'Rethinking the empirical in higher education: post-qualitative inquiry as a less comfortable science', *International Journal of Research & Media in Method* (2017), 40(3), 311-24, 321.
[11] Taylor C, 'Rethinking the empirical', 320-21.

If you're not really a Syrian
is it safer in the Congo, or Afghanistan?

While we all fiddle with our smartphones
sniffer dogs inhale the articulated lorry

Two ferrymen tell me how they feel
okay because they pull up the bridge and sail away

It's only a joke if it's funny
so I don't laugh at 'they weren't exactly *invited*.'

Tell me, if Great Britain is so full
why is this middle-of-the-night-crossing so empty?

Karen McCarthy Woolf[12]

So far, the discussion about the borders of the European Union has taken us from the Mediterranean Sea to islands, from encampments to a (protest) camp in Rome. While the borders of the EU are being stretched outside the outer limits of maritime control to islands of detention, in the Franco-English space of Calais borders are being taken inside the limits of European territorial jurisdictions. This move from *out* to *in,* from *south* to *north*, responds to the necessity to push migrants down and up so that borders can legitimately follow the asymmetry of migrants' movement. Attention to the cross-managed (b)ordering practices in Calais, therefore, serves to punctuate not only the mobility of borders but their very mobilisation for containing and repressing migrants but also tolerating them as merely surviving beings. It can be argued then that while the space of the Mediterranean Sea is *hypertrophic*, as its borders increase in size in relation to the offshoring and externalization of migratory controls, borders in Calais are *atrophic*, that is they are committed to decreasing in size anytime that responsibilities for 'illegalised' movement cannot be externalised outside EUrope.

Why migration in Calais, and Northern France at large, matters? Calais is the principal ferry port in Northern France and the main trade centre with the UK. While

[12] Woolf K. M., 'To Dover from Calais, and: Tatler's People Who Really Matter', *Soundings: A journal of politics and culture* (Winter 2016-7), 64, 146-7, 146.

migrants attempting to reach the UK via the Eurotunnel, the port, stowing away on vehicles or *via* boats have intensified, especially since 2013, the city and the area surrounding Calais have been for long characterised by the presence of migratory populations. For the majority of migrants who reach Calais, attempting to illegally enter the UK is the only solution to then legally claim asylum there. Unless specific arrangements are made, for example human corridors and other state-to-state and international agreements, it is not possible to claim asylum from abroad. Considering that a unique system of reception exists within the EU, it is necessary to be in the country in which the asylum application is intended to be filed in order to legally claim asylum. The Dublin regulation, in fact, determines that the first country of arrival is the one responsible for registering migrants who claim international protection. As an outcome of this policy, those who refuse or cannot claim asylum in such countries escape the control of the state, are abandoned by it or are allowed to stay only if their life can be reduced to the provision of bare necessities. This creates an (im)mobilising situation in which escape, abandonment but also *mere* survival become irreducible to the need to contain people in their demands for movement. It is then possible to understand why Calais has strategically become a bottleneck where migrants temporarily concentrate living in the wait while negotiating their position within the borders of the EU.

Calais has been chosen as a research area of (b)ordering in EUrope in relation to two main aspects. Firstly, Calais represents a peculiar case: the French territorial and legal jurisdiction of space and the UK political influence on it makes a perfect example of how borders are managed according to EU and member state policies, but also cross-managed between states. This also provides a specific imaginary of the border that is no longer characterized by its fixity and as an impenetrable line of separation that can only be crossed if permission is first granted. Secondly, since the dismantlement of the main Jungle camp in Calais, many volunteers and organisations have settled in Northern France

carrying out essential projects. Looking at uneven mobility also by considering how citizens self-organise against a state project of containment, helps us understand how different responses to the governance of migration can exist. As part of the politics of migration, therefore, grassroot aid organisations are developing mobile infrastructures for supporting migrant populations in the area. These practices go beyond immediate assistance or a minimalist idea of biopolitics that does as little as preserving people's lives, as they often disrupt the acceptable care tolerated by the state. *Help Refugees* and other umbrella organisations working in the field and in the Warehouse in Calais, in fact, fall into the idea of ordinary people who associate and integrate the political demands of migrants by establishing a networked approach to giving aid. Continuously criminalized by politicians, laws and regulations, such organisations operate in a fragile environment in which discourses, practices and assumptions about acceptable aid to migrants and the need to actively support their struggles are in a constant dialogue. In particular, I argue that these organisations operate to contest the terms of migrants' existence as *mere* survival. Migrants are a securitised problem to contain and as such in need of interventions that make their lives worth of minimal aid but, as I will discuss in this chapter, even the provision of aid is often discouraged by the state for fear that migrants would settle in this border area. Since they provide aid that goes beyond the minimal aid provided by the state, aid organisations are often held responsible for the presence of migrants in Calais. In such circumstances, the need for migrants to go away governs a series of policies and court rulings which only facilitate survival and reinforce the notion that their stay in Calais only has to be seen as temporary. Survival, therefore, is made possible through minimal interventions which aim at avoiding that migrants settle in Calais and mobilise thus evading the control of the state.

As discussed in the previous chapters, (b)ordering migrants rests on the troubling paradox of the simultaneous mobilisation of securitisation and humanitarianism. Survival

in Calais happens in the background of complex dynamics that aim at (im)mobilising migrants politically while creating a hostile environment. Migrants are disempowered by forcing them to engage in daily struggles to secure food or shelter, struggles which are renewed every day by constant police interventions which make migrants' existence dependant on the destruction of their communities and possibilities for mobilisation. In other words, what matters is to control how migrants live so that they can *(only)* survive or go away.

Camps in Calais

The history of Calais is first of all a history of a border in the making. Divided in two between the UK and France extraterritorially, this border is cross-managed also politically and financially. In 2003 the British and French governments signed *The Touquet Treaty,* de facto agreeing to conduct juxtaposed immigration controls.[13] The idea of juxtaposed controls implies that those travelling between the two countries have to clear immigration in the country of departure rather than arrival. Following this, France carries out immigration controls in the UK, such as in the port of Dover and at London St Pancras International where the Eurostar departs, while the UK police carries out immigration entry checks in Paris Gare du Nord and Calais Fréthun. By moving the British border to France, and stretching the French border to the UK, passports are checked twice by both border officials. In the case of French checks in the UK, entry to the Schengen area takes place before reaching the actual country of destination.

At the present date, numerous fences have been built to protect the port, the Eurotunnel terminal, and train tracks on the other side of Calais. Such forms of control are combined with the UK large commitment to increase Channel border security. In

[13] 'Implementation of Frontier Controls at the Sea Ports of both Countries on the Channel and North Sea', *Le Touquet*, 4 February 2003. Available at: http://www.fortunes-de-mer.com/mer/images/documents%20pdf/legislation/Internationale/Surete/Traite%20Touquet%202003%20RU.pdf [accessed 4 December 2018].

January 2018, UK Prime Minister Theresa May and French Prime Minister Emanuel Macron signed the *Sundhurst Treaty* further strengthening the joint operation of control of migration in Calais. On such occasion, the UK committed an extra £44.5 million to be spent for the management of their shared border and that of speeding up the process for asylum applications.[14] In what is referred to as "part of a strategic relationship on migration", the *Sundhurst Treaty* establishes a closer co-operation between the two countries in managing their shared border with the aim of reducing "the number of people attempting to cross it illegally and at risk of safety and life".[15] These words capture well the tension between two different rationales of containment that are that of protection of borders and that of protection of lives at borders. The agreement states that the two countries need "to work together to reduce migratory pressure at the shared border and on the French side of the Channel and North Sea".[16] In more detail, such cooperation regards the assessment of asylum claims that migrants make in France; the transfer of asylum seeker and unaccompanied minors; the deportation of third country nationals with no basis for staying in the EU. A fourth main point is also included in the scope of the treaty that is:

> "to implement, in accordance to applicable law, a programme of mutually agreed specific measures to combat organised crime rings, fraud and illegal movement of goods and persons, and to discourage illegal immigration, through joint action in source and transit countries".[17]

In addition to this, both countries commit to deploy liaison officers to facilitate cooperation in coordinating border security. By reaffirming shared responsibility in key areas in Northern France, both countries' commitment to maintain control in these border-

[14] Travis A and Heather S., 'UK to pay extra £44.5m for Calais in Anglo-French deal', *The Guardian*, 18 January 2018. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/18/uk-to-pay-extra-445m-for-calais-security-in-anglo-french-deal [accessed 20 January 2019].
[15] 'Treaty between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the French Republic concerning the reinforcement of cooperation for the coordinated management of their shaped border'. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/674885/Treaty_Concerning_the_Reinforcement_Of_Cooperation_For_The_Coordinated_Management_Of_Their_Shared_Border.pdf [accessed 22 January 2019].
[16] *Idem.*
[17] *Idem.*

zones has led to a decrease in the number of migrants who can reach the UK, therefore forcing many to make a clandestine entry.

Even though its long history of migration goes back well before the 2000s,[18] the first migrant camp officially opened in Calais in 1999. Located close to the Eurotunnel, the Sangatte camp was set up with the help of French authorities in a warehouse previously used as a deposit to build the tunnel. Dismantled in 2002, due to the perceived pressure of migrants who were seen as settling in the area, the process of externalising the UK border into French territory can be situated as a response to more convergent migratory movements. Post-Sangatte makeshifts camps started to emerge more visibly and with it the continuous destruction and reconstitution of dispersed encampments. While the migrant situation in Northern France, and Calais in particular, has always been a matter of public attention, it became more of a well-known humanitarian/security problem as the migrant population increased in 2014. In particular, Agier and others report on a series of expulsions of migrants conducted on humanitarian grounds from several encampments on May 2014 without consulting parties involved or providing sustainable relocations: "on the pretext of a sanitary operation of treatment against scabies, the inhabitants of three encampments were evacuated and left destitute".[19]

This resulted in the creation of a makeshift camp and in April 2015, the so called 'Jungle Camp', that counted more than 9,000 people at the time of its dismantlement in October 2016, came into being.[20] No formal recognition of the camp took place, even though the state erected some structures of reception, and its management was mostly done by NGOs, citizens and migrants themselves.[21] The vulnerable architecture of the

[18] For a systematic history of migration and the border(s) in Calais, *see* Agier M., Bouagga Y., Trépanier M, Fernbach D. (2019) (translated by David Fernbach). *The Jungle. Calais's Camps and Migrants* (Polity Press: Cambridge).
[19] *Ibid.*, 32.
[20] Buchanan Elsa, 'Migrant crisis: A record 7,300 people now live in Calais' Jungle migrant camp', *IBTimes*, 21 July 2016. Available at: https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/migrant-crisis-record-7300-people-now-live-calais-jungle-migrant-camp-1571819 [accessed 4 December 2018].
[21] Such as the Centre Jules Ferry, the daytime reception centre opened by the state and the Centre d'Accueil provisoire or CAP (temporary accommodation centre) made of containers who could host about 1,500 people.

camp consisted in a series of 'village-like' services, buffer zones of communication and places of worship. All of this gave to the camp a settled semblance causing concern for its potential for attracting more people. More than three years after its dismantlement, there are still more than 2,000 migrants scattered between Calais and Dunkirk.[22] While this number of people is not overwhelming, what is overwhelming is their inability to cross the border to the UK.[23] Left without an organic community or proper infrastructures of support, their living conditions have today worsened.

The 'making' of migration in Calais encompasses organised camps, dispersed movement, evictions, relocations, violence, hope and the institutional framing of the space, providing a powerful metaphor for representing the 'wildness' of migration. In order to justify evictions and reclaim order, migrants are routinely animalised and criminalised. This is evident when considering the proposal of seizing migrants age dental checks or the zoopolitical construction of their identity through the uses of a specific language to describe a range of aspects attached to their mobility such as 'swarms,' 'caged,' 'preys' that need to be 'hunted' and so on. Overall, these are just few examples that describe how the outcome of security policies need to be understood in relation to a *security continuum* that stems from territoriality to borders that are first of all constructed as criminogenic. At the same time, the humanitarian character of reception of migrants in Calais is emphasised by a series of legal actions that prescribe the administration of aid by the state. Networks of grassroot solidarities aside, such (b)orderings persist today in Calais and have been possible by forms of policed humanitarianism whereby order is kept by tolerating the provision of aid as far as it can be controlled by the police, municipal authorities and the visible hand of states, in this specific case France and the UK, but also by the European Union at large.

[22] Numbers are also disputed here, with some aid organisations affirming that there are at least 3,000 'migrants' in transit living in the area.
[23] Ansems de Vries L., Carrera S., Guild E., 'Documenting the Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean', 2.

Policing Humanitarianism: Police Violence and the Survival of Bodies

Police, the military and humanitarian organisations, from more established international agencies to self-organised responses of civil society, are in the frontline for the daily management of migration. The managerial orientation of governing 'illegalised' movement has transformed containment into a matter of violence or provision of basic aid. Agier highlights that enacting border controls in the name of keeping the 'undesirables' of the world at a distance means to recognise that there exists a functional solidarity "between [the] humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and military ordering (the hand that strikes)".[24]

There is a connection between the way in which the border as a space of humanitarian government manage migrants' lives and the policing/militarisation of controls at borders. According to Redfield, the political concern for life encompasses destruction when humanitarian interventions aim at assisting populations by maintaining their physical existence when such actions do not lead to more than ensuring that the bare minimum is provided.[25] Life in crisis, according to Redfield, is maintained by a medical humanitarianism: the value of life that Medecins sans frontières attaches to lives is one that preserves people's existence by restoring physical health. This leads to circumstances where relieving suffering is limited to preserving the physical integrity of a person without providing the person with the dignity expected by humanitarian interventions. On the other hand, (b)ordering strategies make biopolitical survival possible only if political life is discouraged through policed interventions. These interventions serve to redistribute life so that some can just exist as such while others are considered more important humans with access to better, more fulfilling lives. In contemporary migration regimes, as Mbembe reminds us, what counts is "the redistribution of life on different

[24] Agier, *Managing the Undesirables*, 5.
[25] *Idem*.

scales of insurability and non-insurability [and] borders are not obstacles to free movement. They are boundaries between species and varieties of humans".[26] (B)ordering, therefore, also results from the unequal effects of borders that keep people in motion, territorially segregated, confined but also ensure their survival as such.

In *The End of Policing* Alex S. Vitale looks at law enforcement and the militarisation of space in order to understand how the realm of public safety has been reduced to abusive policing. Particularly, he considers the role of police in society recognising a shift in the state of policing today. As it is often assumed, the police use force legitimately for the benefits of the whole society. What is less clear, however, is how such legitimacy "fabricates social order".[27] As part of this fabrication, managing disorder and protecting classes is first and foremost a political activity that aims to meet demands that are not necessarily founded on broad ideals of justice. As Vitale puts it, "The reality is that the police exist primarily as a system for managing and even producing inequalities by suppressing social movements and tightly managing the behaviour of poor and non-white people: those on the losing end of political arrangements".[28] While forms of policing and resistance have changed over time, the basic idea that the police needs to maintain order by managing the "poor, foreigners and non-white" is an established idea of how dispersed inequalities can be exploited by a system that is economically and politically unequal as well.[29]

The dramatic expansion of police activity, especially in relation to their scope and militarised techniques of repression, has raised issues regarding the relation between its role as apparatus of the state and the life of its citizens. Beyond rights of citizenship, the main referents of violent policing are those who are kept outside the polis like migrants.

[26] Membe A., 'Bodies as Bprders', 11.
[27] Neocleous M. (2000) *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power* (Pluto Press) *qtd in* Vitale A. (2017-2018) *The End of Policing* (London-New York: Verso Books), 34.
[28] Vitale A., *The End of Policing*, 34.
[29] *Idem.*

As these are framed as remnants in excess that need to be managed differently, that is outside the law for the 'illegalised' status that inhabit, intensive policing becomes a marker of wider notions of order. It is not just about protecting citizens per se, by constructing a biopolitical division between deserving and undeserving bodies, but it is also about providing clear indications about the very necessity to treat migrants differently. In other words, the aim is also that of making 'truth' converge with unequal regimes of governance. In this respect, the potential for social mobilisations for those who directly challenge the order of the state, such as migrants that cross borders without permission or mobilise, is considered as repressible for the intent of deploying acceptable levels of violence.[30] In this context, humanitarian interventions are policed according to which forms of survival are acceptable and which other forms need to be further lowered. The idea of policing humanitarianism, therefore, aims to highlight more controversial practices that aim to make people *(only)* survive. Police interventions in Calais aim to delimit the perimeter of action for migrants to what can be accepted from them. They should survive, live *with* death, but they should not claim more than that. Aid organisations, as we will see, sometimes provide more than that and this unavoidably entails a refocus of policing that criminalises humanitarian interventions more broadly. In other words, practices which disregard human rights, criminalise migrants but also aid workers.

'The French State is the Police': Between Tolerance and Repression

In France there are two national police forces, the *Police Nationale* and the *Gendarmerie Nationale*, policing services are also conducted by the so called *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité,* abbreviated CRS. The CRS is the riot police that is stationed in Calais and Dunkirk permanently, even though its main role is that of crowd control

[30] *See* Jones R., *Violent Borders*.

during protests. The CRS agents assert their presence in Calais in various ways, from keeping people always on the move causing a perpetual feeling of insecurity, therefore discouraging them from staying in the area, beating them up and carrying out daily evictions. During my stay in Calais, volunteers from different aid organisations reported daily intimidations that the police carried out against migrants by subjecting them to coercive and psychological threats but also against aid workers themselves by disrupting their activities. The kind of violence and harassment that volunteers experienced was a fraction of what migrants experienced and I will get back to it later in this chapter: here suffice to say that it is nonetheless important to acknowledge the way in which solidarity is being targeted.

At the time of my staying in Calais during the last weeks of August 2018, evictions were happening every day in different locations, except on weekends. This violence was perpetuated by officers who routinely confiscated people's vital belongings and burnt their tents. Over the summer of 2018, migrants were continuously being exposed to violence of any sort: volunteers often 'witnessed' it indirectly as they could not be on the field 24 hours a day. Aid workers told me of migrants lamenting of having suffered physical injuries (i.e. broken cheek bones), of being beaten in the morning and tear gassed in the evening, of being arbitrarily deprived of their phones: they added that such violence had become almost a routinised behaviour. This is part of police strategies of disruption that aim to exhaust lives so that a reduced form of survival is the only way to keep people docile, disengaged and orderly reduce their agency. For many of those who transit in Calais, the French state is the police so that their experience of France is referenced through a system that cannot be fully trusted.

The humanitarian base operationalised by the Prefecture of Calais offers services to people in transit such as access to drinking water, sanitation and the distribution of

food as outlined by French humanitarian law.[31] Such services have been provided after a series of court's rulings. *La Vie Active*, supported by the State, has been offering water and sanitation to migrants in Calais since the summer of 2017, following a court ruling upheld by the Conseil d'État.[32] In March 2017, Calais Mayor Natacha Bouchart introduced a ban blocking food distribution to migrants. The decree was intended to discourage gatherings so that public disturbances could be avoided.[33] In May 2017, this decision was reversed by a tribunal that found the decree to be infringing legal standards of treatment for migrants.[34] In March 2018, *La Vie Active*, contracted by the government, started distributing also meals daily at two locations identified by local authorities patrolled by the police.[35] While organisations in the area welcomed the decision of the state to take responsibility for people in transit, the service proved to be insufficient to cover people displaced in different zones of Calais. When statist humanitarianism fails, humanitarian activism intervenes so that these two processes are often complementary, but I would argue, the State only tolerates those interventions that it deems acceptable. Most importantly, and this is the real *aporia* of human rights and the rule of law in their convergence within the governance of migration, organisations have denounced how state-provided aid or state-sanctioned aid is never immune from the contradictions that state-centric humanitarianism and securitisation bring to the fore. In some cases, while

[31] *See* Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile. Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006335286&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158&dateTexte=20111110&oldAction=rechCodeArticle [accessed 5 February 2019].
[32] 'Calais Update – French Government to begin Food Distribution for Refugees', 5 March 2018. Available at: https://medium.com/thedigitalwarehouse/calais-update-french-government-to-begin-food-distribution-for-refugees-f73fd4742c08 [accessed 5 February 2019].
[33] Amelia Gentleman, 'Calais Mayor bans distribution of food to migrants', *The Guardian*, 2 March 2017. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/02/calais-mayor-bans-distribution-of-food-to-migrants [accessed 5 February 2019].
[34] Jack Steadman, 'A tribunal in Lille has suspended the inhumane ban on distributing food in Calais, deeming it illegal', *Help Refugees*, 22 March 2017. Available at: https://helprefugees.org/news/tribunal-lille-suspended-inhumane-ban-distributing-food-refugees-deeming-illegal/ [accessed 5 February 2019].
[35] Charlotte Boitlaux, 'French Government starts distributing 700 meals a day in Calais', *InfoMigrants*, 8 March 2018. Available at: https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/7942/french-government-starts-distributing-700-meals-a-day-in-calais [accessed 5 February 2019].

the government distributes meals, the police dismantle camps.[36] Security forces, therefore, militarise not only spaces of distribution in which order is said to be at stake, but also those of everyday life. Fears that migrants would create new permanent camps have pushed the local government to dismiss its own obligations towards them. It is then not surprising to find that migrants do not trust these services and that boycotting aid provided by the French government is often a means of resistance. As an aid worker put it: "It is true that those who feed you are also those who beat you".

These mechanisms of tolerance and repression ensure that, on the one hand, migrants are tolerated and essential support is provided; on the other hand, to make sure that migrants do not stay in the area where support is given, support needs to be policed and continuously disrupted. Ultimately, migrants are constantly uprooted in order to disallow potential reconfigurations of space and organised struggle. The aim is to qualify the life of migrants as *mere* survival. Surviving migrants, in fact, make the biopolitical project of the state clear in the sense that their life is reduced to a lower threshold of tolerable existence.

(In)Visibility and Migrants' Struggles

The visibility and the invisibility of the migrant is both targeted according to the need to detect, dismiss, and/or care about them or control their movements and the risk they can present. Migrants' mobility is a matter of framing that can be instrumentalised by the state to project visibility and invisibility in relation to risk. Most of our perceptions about risk and reality are shaped by the production of knowledge about what can be called securitised invisibility. Those who are affected by such politics of knowledge are included or excluded through decisions that are made upon them regarding their possibility to be

[36] Charlotte Boitlaux, 'In Calais, the 'government' dismantles camps while meals are being distributed', *InfoMigrants*, 30 March 2018. Available at: https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/8365/in-calais-the-government-dismantles-camps-while-meals-are-being-distributed [accessed 5 February 2019].

seen. As Beck argues, relations of definition are now relations of domination as the real power lies in the possibility of determining and assessing what is a risk and what is not. In so doing, the unseen is made knowable through the securitisation of invisibility.[37] Invisibility as a strategy of governance regulates the relation between threats and their knowability so that legitimacy is defined by what has to be seen or unseen. Beside recognising the 'natural' invisibility of risk, it is manufactured invisibility that takes decision-making to the realm of its unseen consequences.[38] While Beck describes such politics in relation to climate change, it can be argued that such logic runs through the management of migrants. The institutional power of risk definition, in fact, takes the figure of the migrant and fragments it in relation to a hierarchy of uses. Visibility is designed as the possibility of investing in the controllability of risks that are first of all defined as knowable, while invisibility comes as the de-legitimisation of what should not be acknowledged by political power. Visibility (recognition) and invisibility (abandonment), therefore, become an exercise of power that works through the denial of what is hidden. In this process of objectification of threats through the intertwining of visibility and invisibility, the very humanity of migrants is made to disappear, lost within the gaze of what needs to be represented as invisible.

This move is well exemplified by Rene Magritte's painting entitled *The Human Condition* (fig.12) where "the viewer is prevented from seeing the actual subject matter being painted, because it is blocked by the artist's painting of the subject matter: we are only allowed to see what we are allowed to see".[39]

[37] Beck U. (2016) *The metamorphosis of the World* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] 'The Human Condition', *Totally History*. Available at: http://totallyhistory.com/the-human-condition/ [accessed 14 February 2019].

Figure 12. René Magritte, The Human Condition, 1933[40]

Such is the case with risk, as perception moves to the forefront of reality through 'politics of mediation'. For instance, when considering the processes of threat construction in chapter one, I considered the idea of perception to be of fundamental importance. Such politics, in fact, drive on the organised irresponsibility of politicians and institutional creators in making only some subjects/aspects matter. In so doing, politicians and institutions fail (as they do not know how to cope with risk) but also do not fail (as their politics of invisibility is making risk invisible to the public).[41]

Migrants are not only affected by this kind of politics of (in)visibility, but also drive them on in ways that are strategic to their re-invention. Migrants' struggle for affirming their lives through visibility needs in fact to be understood in terms of their engagement with the necessity to make their cause count and that of making, sometimes, their presence hidden. While on the one hand the visibility of migrants is securitised for

[40] Magritte R., 'The Human Condition', National Gallery of Art, Belgium: https://www.nga.gov/collection/art-object-page.70170.html [accessed 20 October 2019].
[41] Beck U., *The metamorphosis of the World.*

the needs of state security, national identity and populism, on the other hand their presence is denied through the invisibility given to their political engagements. In the same way migrants make themselves unevenly visible in response to the stipulations of the Dublin regulation. Such a system has proven to be particularly problematic also due to the volume and concentrations of arrivals reducing EUrope to the discretional politics of nation-states.[42] Moreover, it has become necessary for many migrants who aspire to reach certain European countries to escape the control of the state in which they first arrive or transit through in order to then legally claim asylum in the country of their choice. This has given rise to a series of mechanisms of resistance that aim to keep people on the move invisible as they attempt to cross into visibility, that is qualified presence within a territory. Here resistance is often silenced due to the need to avoid being caught before reaching their chosen country of destination, in the case of Calais, mostly the UK.

Moving away from the institutional (in)visibility thrown upon migrants by the state to the uses that migrants themselves make of their hidden presence, it is important to remark that the terms of confrontation between migrants and the state are often characterised by strategies of escape. Escaping from the state, for migrants, is a very important strategy of resistance. While regimes of power control dictate what should be 'seen' and what should go 'unseen', therefore strategizing human suffering and security accordingly, people on the move can experience invisibility as an opportunity to further advance their political demands. The fact that migrants interact with the state but also have to strategize their visibility when relating to it, leads them to make calculations about their visibility in order not to damage their case when they will attempt to reach the UK. Considering that people transit to Calais mainly for the aim of reaching the UK, making their movement recognisable to the French state is often experienced as problematic so this means that even though the French state is an indispensable interlocutor for people

[42] This especially in relation to the 2014-2016 period.

in transit, decisions are also being taken by migrants in terms of situating their engagement with it.

From migrants burning their fingerprints so that their biometrics cannot be collected and stored giving them digital invisibility, to those who hide around the woods in Dunkirk in an attempt to then cross the channel, invisibility is a means to an end, that is that of crossing borders and eventually claiming asylum in the country of choice. This raises some issues because making themselves invisible in France they do not have a way of effecting change of their own conditions whilst residing there. In some ways, therefore, aid workers in Calais are the ones who mediate the institutional, but also situational and embodied, invisibility of migrants by filtering their everyday demands for better conditions in an effort to make them count as political actors. As an aid worker puts it:

> "people will try to remain invisible while being in Calais. They are operating out of the economy, below the kind of way of living, affecting their capacity of being able to request rights. The possibility for people to assert their politics and political views in relation to their 'illegalised' conditions are, therefore, not always possible in terms of open protest as this would imply making themselves visible also in terms of getting arrested or being exposed to more violence".

In some cases, visibility is only postponed as people on the move record their experiences in order then to make them visible to support their cases later on. An aid worker recounts this:

> "people write diaries, film audios so that not all is lost, not only from the perspective of retrospectively demanding their rights but also to highlight the lack of human rights in the area".

The wider implications of escape and invisibility, therefore, are not simply intended to be non-confrontational, but are also part of a process where biographies are in the making. While protests happen in Calais and in Dunkirk, as the two main sites of distributions both of aid and of migrants' dispersal in the North of France,[43] more attention needs to be given to the different ways in which migrants affirm their presence

[43] For instance, during my staying in Calais we were informed that a group of women organised a protest in Dunkirk to delay a planned eviction of a camp there.

by engaging with their conditions of life. When Macron visited Calais in 2018 and a march was being planned in protest against the French government and in solidarity with migrants, a group of them wanted not only to march but they wanted to put banners up. Aid workers from the *School Bus Project*[44] provided materials but they did not engage in the creation of the banners. While this refers to what is visible, that is protesting and banners, the hidden element of this equation regards the kind of conscious engagement that people have with their conditions. While visibility always makes an implicit reference to invisibility,[45] it is also the expansion of optics into politics that make such terrain more controversial for people who demand recognition. Both visibility and invisibility, in fact, often make migrants-as-humans-who-struggle to redefine their survival disappear, reducing their presence to the uses that institutional framings need to make of it. As such, it is important to also recognise that the ways in which migrants' struggles also depend on the ways in which we frame these struggles. As we have seen in the case of Rome, the idea that migrants should merely survive is rejected and rationales for governing lives can be always disrupted from within.

Infrastructures of Solidarity: From the Calais Warehouse to the '*Will' of the Bus*

In August 2015, at the peak of the so-called 'migration crisis' in EUrope, the hashtag *#HelpCalais* started to emerge on social networks. Launched by a group of friends who wanted to raise £1,000 and bring donations to Calais, the project reached £56,000 in a week. In response to the growing demands for supporting migrants in the area, *Help Refugees* started its grassroot operations soon becoming the largest aid organisation in Northern France. From a social media campaign to a global movement, since 2015 more than 25,000 people have volunteered with the charity. Help Refugees has established in

[44] I will consider later in this chapter in more detail the activities of the *School Bus Project*.
[45] Merleau-Ponty M. (1968) *The Visible and the Invisible* (translated by Alphonso Lingis) (Northwestern University Press).

Calais a networked and fieldwork approach by supporting migratory populations on the move there. While the UK charity delivers projects in other areas of the world, Calais is a pivotal case of a self-organising citizens networked response to the ways in which borders and migrants are managed within and between specific nation states, but also the EU.

In 2015, *Help Refugees* partnered with *L'Auberge des Migrants*, an aid organisation created in 2007 by former artists and teachers, and in September 2015 it opened a Warehouse to store, sort and then distribute items in the field. Along with these two main organisations, another six organisations operate in the Warehouse providing support to people on the ground: *Refugee Community Kitchen (RCK), Utopia 56, Refugee's Women Centre, Refugee Info Bus,* the *School Bus Project* and the *Refugee Youth Service*. While *Help Refugees* and *L'Auberge des Migrants,* and partially *Utopia 56* too, distribute non-food items such as blankets, sleeping bags, hygiene kits, clothing and so on, other organisations provide specific services such as internet, food, education and leisure time. As we will see, these organisations and their activities support migrants in substantial ways, disrupting the more general idea of what is the aid that should be provided to them. Before paying a closer attention to the activities coordinated in the field, it is offstage, within the parameters of a cooperative experiment, that volunteers come together in response to policies that are oppressive and repressive in practice.

The Calais Warehouse

As I have observed during my stay in Calais, a typical day for volunteers in the Warehouse starts around 9 am. The morning brief, run by experienced volunteers, usually takes place a bit before that when updates about what happened the day before, the general condition of the migrants in question, a general assessment of their situated needs and the most important tasks to carry out for the day are set out. New volunteers receive an induction

by an experienced coordinator who introduces them to how the space within the Warehouse is organised and how activities are structured according to different roles and responsibilities. During the morning brief we were told not to take pictures of the front of the Warehouse. Organizers are alert to the fact that the power of sharing what is happening here runs on social media and the necessity of dissemination to support their activities but they are also mindful that making the outside of the building too recognisable means making the whole operation vulnerable due to intimidatory acts that have taken place in the past. The organisations have even asked Google not to make it appear on its maps for this reason. What happens inside the Warehouse, instead, is sharable through social media as long as it does not give away the coordinates of its location (fig.12).



Figure 13. #MoreThanAMigrant. Board with messages from volunteers (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Inside the Warehouse, on the right, there is a board where the eight organisations are presented as connected together by the specificity of the services they offer (figs. 13, 14). Their activities are carefully mapped and presented as interrelated. These mapping makes it absolutely clear that the network and its aid distribution works through a meticulous arrangement of space and interconnection of places.

Figure 14. Board with the eight organisations collaborating in the Warehouse (photograph: Antonella Patteri)



Figure 15. A description of the different projects carried out in the Warehouse (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

On the left, there is the kitchen run by *Refugee Community Kitchen* (figs.16, 17, 18) an organisation created in 2015 by four friends who came together to offer assistance and distribute food to people displaced in the area. Meals are prepared here by volunteers who overlook the entire process from preparation to the actual distribution on the ground. The organizers are proud of the resilience with which they have kept the operation running: they explained to me that the French police had attempted to close it down for health and

safety reasons, but the volunteers successfully prevented the closure and, when I was there, it was still operating at full capacity.

Figure 16. Refugee Community Kitchen (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Figures17-18. Refugee Community Kitchen (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

As we were walking through the warehouse, my interlocutor, explained to me that donations are accepted and sorted according to the idea that 'anything is better than nothing'. However, adamant that clothes also serve to *dignify* migrants, the volunteers prefer, when possible, to only distribute items that are in good conditions to avoid a sense

of degradation (fig.18). Donations are therefore carefully assessed according to the specific state of the item and redirected to meet critical needs on the ground. Significantly, black skinny jeans were considered the most popular item as they are practical in the sense that those who wear can easily become less 'visible' to the police and their movements are not impeded in case they need to run away in an emergency situation.

Figure 19. Model to assess suitable items for distribution (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

The items that need to be repaired, darned, and repurposed are taken to the cleverly named SEWHO (figs.20, 21, 22, 23, 24) (a pun on the central London location Soho), a space within the building in which items are made reusable. It is here that I have seen how even a broken tent can become a comfortable and much-needed and comfortable blanket.

Figure 20. SEWHO station (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

*Figure 21. SEWHO station (*photograph*: Antonella Patteri)*

Figure 22. SEWHO station (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Figure 23. SEWHO station (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Figure 24. SEWHO station (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Next to SEWHO there is one of the most important areas in the Warehouse, that is Tent World (fig.25) the site where all the tents are kept together and in good order. Obviously, tents are extremely valuable items in this context and they are considered priority items to be distributed in the field together with boots, sleeping bags, blankets, and waterproof jackets. Apart from being of practical value, tents also have a huge symbolic value are they are seen by the migrants as shelters while sleeping bags are considered to be less settling, less of an accommodation. At the same time, however, they are also dangerous target as the police identifies them with migrants 'not on the move' and therefore targets them during raids. For this reason, when evictions occur, tents are usually confiscated or destroyed by the police with the intention of making it more difficult for people to settle and to create distress among communities. Consequently, constant police interventions mean that there is always an urgent need for tents since, on average, a single tent can be considered the equivalent of accommodation for migrants for a period of only five days. Notably, since during my stay, evictions were taking place twice, even three times a day, it was evident that a hostile environment which kept migrants in a constant state of transience was perpetually being reasserted by continuously uprooting them; this was achieved also by taking away the migrants' few possessions every time.

Figure 25. TENT WORLD (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Figure 26. Items general check (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Warehouse 1 was flanked by Warehouse 2, where were stored the items considered not worthy of distribution (fig.26). Far from being disposed of, these items were set to be recycled and re-donated, often to a network of craftsmen who could repurpose them effectively. Sleeping bags were sorted in huge containers within this space and, like tents, they were continuously distributed and re-collected from the field if they needed to be checked or repaired and then amended and redistributed for further use by the volunteers according to the assessment of needs on the ground in a seemingly incessant cycle (fig.27).

Figure 27. Warehouse 2 (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

In line with the optimisation of distributing items, just outside the Warehouses a laundry had been set up where items could be thoroughly cleaned for reuse according to pre-established shifts (figs.28, 29, 30).

Figure 28. Laundry outside the Warehouse (photograph: Antonella Patteri)



Figure 29. Laundry shifts and items washed (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Figure 30. Washing machines where items for re-redistribution are washed (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

In front of the laundry, was parked the *Refugee Info Bus* along with other vans and next to them were various information stalls and the *Refugee Youth Service* point (fig.30). This space outside also served as a commune in which volunteers came together, shared their experiences and enjoyed work-related breaks. People from different backgrounds, professions and expertise gathered here to talk about migration, 'what is happening out there,' coming together to reflect on the experience of what it meant to be involved in the organisation of a response to univocal and damaging ways of constructing 'illegalised' movements.

Figure 31. Meeting points outside the Warehouse (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

The Warehouse in Calais is a huge place which, in order to be run successfully has to rely on the cooperation of many different charities, the most important ones and the founders were *Help Refugees* and *L'Auberge des Migrants*. Over the last two weeks of August 2018, when I was there, more than 70 short-term and long-term volunteers worked to sustain this operation. Some long-term volunteers also shared an accommodation outside the Warehouse. Since it was summer many students too had time to come to Calais and volunteer there, along with people who took time off from work, such as primary and secondary school teachers since the schools were also closed for the summer break. This influx of volunteers makes the summer a time where it is easier for the aid organizations to meet the needs of the migrants since they can rely on an army of volunteers; from October on, however, I was told that there might be only 15 people carrying out all the sorting and distribution of donations, further stretching help on the ground.

Overall, the Warehouse is a massive experiment in communal working and, for some, communal living: the right of each of the many organisations to do things differently, according to the needs of the people they support, is recognised as is the need

to coordinate, coexist and share goals. A team of coordinators makes sure that things run smoothly across the Warehouse: they form part of the welcome team; operate as Warehouse managers; provide general updates and coordinate daily meetings. Human rights and police training are offered to new volunteers so that they are able not only to accurately map conditions in the field but also to assess and denounce violations and respond to unlawful intimidations or demands. As we can see, the Warehouse did not only cater for primal needs but also offered support that goes beyond immediate assistance with food, shelter, or health. The provision of aid, moreover, was not limited to add legal representation to basic needs but, even within the parameters of the need to prioritise operational needs dictated by the dire conditions of the migrants, the provision of aid also extended into education and cultural activities. As far as the volunteers were concerned, ideological dreams could live up to their broader construction, to them what seemed most urgent was to get the work done and, by default, build a safer and less deprived environment for migrants. Even though the space was structured and managed under the imperative of making distribution work organically within and beyond the Warehouse, volunteers organised to transform their space into a hub connected with a broader network. The Warehouse as space is fixed in its location but what happened there can be considered part of a process and continuum that uprooted more traditional ideas of place and extended it in such a way that it both mirrored the mobility of migrants displaced in the area and provided a more solid response to their needs.

The space of the Warehouse function as a meeting point and place of connectivity for migrants otherwise dispersed in the area and belonging to different communities. This remained true after the dismantlement of the Jungle camp in Calais, when communities were further dispersed and new communities congregated around the area. When I was there, I could observe that migrant communities had organized themselves according to their needs and preferences. Some smaller groups came together according to shared

nationality: in the area called Old Lidl, for example, there were people who originated from Afghanistan while in the Little Forest there were Eritreans and Ethiopians. Other areas, however, included mixed nationalities. All these communities of people on the move were connected by the space of the Warehouse which was a site that created a conversation across geopolitical borders that are generally presented to us as uncrossable but also rejected the idea that (b)ordered living can only be predicated on exclusion, and that (b)ordering can only be an univocal and overdetermining mechanism. Humanitarian aid of the kind provided by the Baobab Experience and the Warehouse is instrumental to denounce and counter oppressive and repressive ways of (b)ordering. What networked and grassroot aid can do, by refusing to become implicated in the politics of containment provided by the state, is to rethink borders as a place of connectivity and organized response. The geopolitical border that divides the UK and France in Calais, and the border that 'illegal' migrants were made to 'carry inside' in the urban space of the Roman *Piazzale Maslax* community are reimagined and repurposed as sites from which the forces behind the very (b)ordering migrants are subjected to, can be resisted. Mezzadra and Neilson have considered how the multiplication of different types of boundaries have diversified the semantic field of borders:

> "Symbolic, linguistic, and urban boundaries are no longer articulated in fixed ways by geopolitical borders. Rather, they overlap, connect and disconnect in often unpredictable ways, contributing to shaping new forms of domination and exploitation".[46]

Listening to the stories that volunteers from aid organisations in Calais and Rome told me about their experience, however, shows that new forms of dominations and exploitations are only one side of the story and that the violent enforcement of borders can also become an occasion to create connections and articulate resistance in multiple ways. Borders have always two sides, disconnecting and connecting, excluding and including. In the case of Calais, the most obvious way in which the UK and the French

[46] Mezzadra S. and Neilson B., *Border as Method*, 81.

border connects for the domination and exploitation of migrations is through the violence of the police against people on the move and, at large, through the creation of perpetual hostile environments for migrants. The way in which the border disconnects is through the line at physical borders that concretely maps the territorial jurisdiction of each country. In the case of the Warehouse, the physical border that maps the territorial jurisdiction of France and the UK and the organisations working on the ground, is the very reason and occasion for connections that rethink this very border from the perspective of everyday forms of re-connection that volunteers, projects, and direct deliveries, perform and sustain.

"Shout out about what is going here" is what a member of the welcoming team told me on the first day in the Warehouse. The Warehouse is not only an off-stage site of distribution of items or services. The enduring energy of the place forces us to think that networked responses to state managed migration are essential for re-connecting ideas of what life means for those who struggle for it. Even though such re-connections are linked to the connections and disconnections that political power systematically establishes, what needs to be 'shouted' is never already silenced. In Calais, the (b)ordering of voices is confronted with the concrete work of those who 'shout out' against the violence of borders: this violence is mapped, denounced by volunteers who work in the field and by the migrants themselves who document and reflect on their suspended journeys.

The "Will" is on the Bus

Migrants' journeys are important not only in relation to border crossings per se, but also for how people strategize their mobility. The projectuality of migrants' journey is not only politically relevant for the challenges it poses mainly to states in terms of their sovereign jurisdiction, but also because of the networked means of resistance they rely on to cross multiple frontiers. Technologies and infrastructures such as roads, routes and

vehicles then need also to be taken into account in the study of migration politics. While not all migrants' journeys might be politically salient,[47] overall, they undoubtedly play a fundamental role as they allow movement to continue. This idea of including means of transportation within the political realm is well explained by Walters who refers to the idea of *viapolitics*.[48] Here *via* (from the Latin '*via*', which means 'road' but also, crucially, 'way') draws attention to transportation and communication as vital components of mobility and ways of moving but also thinking – at the same time it highlights the journey rather than the destination, the fact of being on the move and transient. In particular, as Walter puts it, "Vehicles, routes and journeys matter not just because they shape migration worlds; they matter because the ship as well as the city, and the road as well as the agora have provided a locus for problematisations of the human and for the possibility of politics".[49] In line with this, Walter advances three theses on *viapolitics*:

> "1) research on migration should be more attentive to the way vehicles feature in migration controversies: the way that ships, trains, buses and other vehicles mediate the public understanding of migration and border-crossing is rarely neutral; 2) vehicles also matter as they are mobile zones of governance and contestation in their own right; 3) under certain circumstances, vehicles and their infrastructures become the object and setting of political action".[50]

In considering these three aspects, Walters looks at how humans interact with vehicles in strategic circumstances, somehow redefining the more spectacularised perspective that frames migrants as being simply forced to travel by boats, trains and so on. Vehicles produce paradoxes as they possess a positive and a deadly function: we can think of the boat in the Mediterranean; the train from Ventimiglia to France in which migrants attempt to further their journey to Northern Europe; the deportation flights in

[47] Walters W., 'Migration, vehicles and politics: Three theses on viapolitics', *European Journal of Social Theory* (2015), 18(4), 469-88, 470.
[48] *Idem*.
[49] *Ibid.*, 472.
[50] *Ibid.*, 474.

which planes are deployed to expel migrants; the bus that is used by officials to remove migrants and temporary dispersing them in detention centres within national territories. At the same time buses, vans, trains, boats and planes are used by migrants (openly or in a clandestine way) to reach friends, relatives and zones of contact while waiting to further their instances.[51] The ambiguities of what means of transportation can do to encourage or discourage migration further emphasises their often neglected role in the processes of migration. The possibility of being a site of contestation, a zone of governance and a set of political action makes the vehicle itself a hybrid entity in which questions of how migrants have access to it, how they relate to it, how they use it and how they confront its limits need also to be given centre stage.[52] As Walters remarks, such inquiry is necessary as it is "one that treats the interconnections of humans and vehicles as irreducible feature of migratory struggles"[53] which, he reminds us, do not only happen in fixed settings and structures but are also catalysed by vehicles, routes and infrastructures.[54]

The experience of how vehicles connect with migration struggles through networked aid is reconsidered by looking at how a series of organisation in Calais use the bus to provide services and interact with migrants dispersed in the area. Migrants' movements are tracked by volunteers who bring the bus to them and with it the mobilisation of solidarities and mobile relations that aid workers establish with migrants dispersed in the area and the migrants establish amongst themselves. Such relations, in fact, also need to be explored in terms of iterative experiences where migrants are not simply the recipients of aid but are also integrated within the learning practices facilitated by the BUS. For all the organisations working in Calais, the BUS is a means to go to the

[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*, 478.
[54] *Idem*.

field and establish vital connections with people in the area and develop projects where aid is not experienced as something that can only be provided *to* migrants, but as something that can be co-created by providing migrants with the possibility of engaging with a different idea of life. This idea expands life and does not reduce it to matters of *mere* survival. In what follows, I will consider in more detail the experiences of the *Refugee Info Bus*, the *Refugee Youth Service* and the *School Bus Project* in the Calais area.

Refugee Info Bus

The *Refugee Info Bus* project was founded in 2016, at the time where the Calais 'Jungle' camp was still a reality in Northern France. At the very beginning of the project, an old horsebox was converted into a mobile office and Wi-Fi hotspot. This volunteer initiative provided mobile network and beamed Wi-Fi to about 400 refugees per day. In addition to this, volunteers of the project delivered workshops keeping people on the move informed about the UK and French asylum systems. When the 'Jungle' camp was evicted, the organisation distributed more than 4,000 multilinguals info-packs containing legal and emergency information for those migrants forced to leave Calais. Many individuals continued living in the Calais area scattered about. Due to this dispersal, volunteers realised that they needed to have a constant internet service that was reliable and useful in order to reach everyone, disseminate vital information, and develop formative projects. The BUS today continues to operate in these areas where it is parked up near migrants' settlements and internet is provided for a certain amount of time (fig.31), and phones can be charged. It is in these new site points which extends from forests to parking spaces, that the experience of *Refugee Info Bus* continues to play an important role.[55]

[55] *See Refugee Info Bus*: https://www.refugeeinfobus.com [accessed 20 October 2019].

Figure 32. Refugee Info Bus (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

If digitalization can be instrumental to (b)ordering migrants as we have seen in chapter two, digital connections are also extremely important for people on the move. They are a significant aspect of migrants' movement, giving rise to what Papadopoulos and others call "mobile commons".[56] The fact that this service functions as a mobile lifeline is explicative of the idea that connections are fundamental not only in terms of keeping contact with people in countries of origin, but also with those who live in zones of transit, particularly because in Calais there is no longer a centralised camp. At the moment it is far worse than 2016 as dispersal has made it extremely hard to build a community and the absence and impossibility to form a community is a key aspect and the result of the precarization of migrants' lives: as migrants are perpetually made to experience insecurity, it is hoped that they will eventually go away.[57] When I was there *Refugee Info Bus* was covering three sites in Calais and to Dunkirk where lots of people

[56] *See* Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., 'After Citizenship', 190. The idea of 'mobile commons' will be better discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis.
[57] *See* Tazzioli M. (2014) *Spaces of Governmentality: Autonomous Migration and the Arab Spring* (Rowman & Littlefield International).

also lived in precarious conditions. The bus parked for about three, four hours in each site and internet was provided in Dunkirk four times a week, in Calais six days a week. In addition to this, the bus parked in the Warehouse for one day a week so that all volunteers had the opportunity to get to know better what the situation on the ground actually was (fig.33). Once the bus entered the areas in which migrants were gathered, the volunteers put out a big generator and up to a hundred people could charge their phones. This was a very particular moment and an aid worker recalled this experience with these words:

> "When everybody sees the bus people just come over and then two minutes later you hear all the beeps, the phones beeping all at the same time, and people will start calling, saying Hello, you will hear lots of people calling home. The BUS also functions as a community centre in which people can relax and talk with their friends. The BUS "wants to be a safe place".

Figure 33. Refugee Info (Bus) Day (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Refugee Youth Service

Refugee Info Bus was not the only project that I saw was being developed by the volunteers in Calais. Founded by three friends in November 2015, the *Baloos Youth Centre* was created to provide a recreational, educational and communitarian space within the 'Jungle' camp with the idea that minors could relax and participate in activities. The project developed later on into an NGO, the *Refugee Youth Service*, in which issues such

as child protection, education and attention to child resettlement programs were all promoted. The Mobile Youth Centre that was operating when I was there in Calais, was a vehicle that served different zones in Calais and Dunkirk providing a safe space for minors, information about asylum procedures, and facilitating legal routes. There are two kinds of youth services, one that provides some sort of structured leisure and educational activities, everyday services, everyday table games, football games, and a barber shop in which the boys could do their hair and even study; the other that focuses on helping young people to get accommodation, finding legal ways to help them to reach the UK, some even through the Dubs amendment. This became increasingly difficult as the Dubs amendment added to the Migration Act 2016 to provide a safe passage and relocate unaccompanied children refugees in EUrope to the UK, was abandoned at the beginning of 2017 and only a minimal portion of the almost 3,000 minors initially planned to be guaranteed safe passage, have been able reach the UK.[58]

There is always uncertainty about the size of the current migrant population in Calais and my stay there was no exception. The reason for this is that it is not possible to map people's movements with certainty: people are not registered when they first reach the area and are in constant flow. Nevertheless, according to reports from volunteers, it transpired that most of the dispersed population in Calais, and Dunkirk, was composed of young adults. Of these, there were also many unaccompanied minors who were waiting or aspired to be resettled in the UK. Many minors, therefore, were stuck in Calais, outnumbering the quotas allowing the possibility of reaching the country under family reunification laws. The organisation also encouraged minors to stay in France as an option, but unfortunately this was not an option for many of them. As a volunteer explained:

[58] Bulman M., 'Government's treatment of child refugees under Dubs scheme broke law, Court of Appeal rule', *The Independent,* 3 October 2018. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/dubs-child-refugees-home-office-immigration-home-office-supreme-court-a8566191.html [accessed 3 February 2019].

> "there are many reasons for this such as the fact that many minors have family connections in the UK, or do not speak French as most of the kids speak English as a second language so that they could start working in England, go to school there".

On top of the considerations made by the volunteers one should also take into account the level of violence that minors are exposed to since when they arrive in Calais and which can constitutes a powerful deterrent for many to consider France as a 'safe' place. The kids first experience of France is Calais and the whole of France is Calais to them, so when presented with the idea that they might be able to have a very nice life in France they tend to thoroughly dismiss it.

Unfortunately, in fact, kids' experience of France amounts to being beaten by the police, being chased by them and having their items requisitioned. Considering the scale of the abuse from the police, from what they consider to be the French State, many minors' encounters with authority come in the form of violence. This has been well-documented in a report produced by Human Rights Watch L*iving Like Hell: Police Abuse Against Child and Adult Migrants in Calais.*[59] Through dramatic accounts provided in part by minors, the report effectively displays the scale of the police abuse in Calais where:

> "police use pepper spray most frequently at night, on asylum seekers and migrants who are asleep or whom they have just woken up […] Food and water that have been sprayed cannot be consumed and sleeping bags and clothing must be washed before they can be reused".[60]

As many minors recall in this report, such experiences come to inform their everyday life in Calais where intimidations and police abuses are the preferred mode of constraining people who stay in the area while attempting to go somewhere else. Between the duties of a hosting system, in this case France, and the concomitant responsibilities of keeping order, such situation creates a paradoxical, but unavoidable conditions of insecurity in

[59] *Human Rights Watch*, 'Living Like Hell: Police Abuses against Child and Adult Migrants in Calais', 26 July 2017. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/07/26/living-hell/police-abuses-against-child-and-adult-migrants-calais [accessed 1 February 2019].
[60] *Idem*.

which the Janus-faced practices of the police are both reaffirmed and revealed. As a volunteer puts it:

> "As migrants see it, why would they talk with someone who will get them into an accommodation, while they also get paid to clear their belongings. They are part of the same system, so it is frustrating and difficult to think otherwise. The young adults who live in Calais are striving for *survival* in all kind of ways while there are two governments that are failing them at the same time: the English side and the French side".

School Bus Project

The *School Bus Project* was set up in 2015 by educators and community members when the Calais Jungle camp was at its peak. The project started by conceptually thinking about the possibility of providing mobile education for those migrants, especially minors, who by embarking on long and uncertain journeys, encountered also the risk of missing out on the possibility to get an education. In the 'Jungle', a double decker bus was converted into a classroom and it was functional till October 2016, when the camp was officially dismantled. In October 2017, the Project was reorganised as part of the network of organisations in the warehouse (fig.34) and re-adapted to the new circumstances on the ground, providing educational opportunities in different zones in both Calais and Dunkirk.

Figure 34. School Bus Project in the Warehouse (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

The bus was taken back to Calais, refurbished and subdivided upstairs. Classrooms can sit about twenty people. In the bus there is also a subsection where learning is done and a fun section where people can relax, and it is quiet. People can have conversations there. Downstairs the concept is much more open: people can listen to music, play games and share time together. The situation significantly changed post-Jungle, especially with the latest agreement signed between the UK and France, and as a result of which the number of migrants scattered in the area were of an inferior number compared to 2015/16. Nevertheless, people still came back or stayed there in an attempt to cross further border(s). As an aid worker directly involved in the projects highlights:

> "While some are trying to find their way into the UK, many want to study, to continue the life they have created, a certain number wants to join family, and a number of people want to re-join more distant family; there are people who have husbands, wives and children there. Most of the migrants are now in Dunkirk where the population is composed mainly of Iraqis, Kurdish, families and young children. Ultimately, the bus project is about stimulating a safe environment in which children and young people who do not go to school can keep on with their education".

In other words, the aim of mobile education was that of making a positive intervention within the disruptive circumstances in which migrants found themselves by having had to leave their country of origin and the institutional learning in which they were inserted. The *School Bus Project*, as did/do other projects at large, responded to the need for recovering what Anderson calls "stolen time," that is the waste of time predicated upon migrants' spatial (im)mobility.[61] Waiting time, emptied time, time withheld. This "stolen time" serves to decelerate migratory movements by means of extraction.[62]

When the weather gets warmer in Calais, as it was when I was there, it was possible to set up outdoor classroom spaces, otherwise activities took place in the bus. Direct delivery, training, and advocacy are the three strands of the project. Usually, the team was led by teachers with educational background who were responsible for the

[61] Andersson R., "Time and the Migrant Other: European Border Controls and the Temporal Economy of Illegality", *American Anthropologist* (2014), 116(4), 795-809.
[62] *Ibid.*

planning, development and delivery of the classes that were mainly organised thematically, for example on themes such as growth, identity, friendship, storytelling and science. This kind of organisation was necessary because of the way in which teaching takes place, but also in terms of the differentiation that is needed for the learners that attended the classes. In terms of migrants' engagement with learning, this took often the shape of an iterative process in which people made calls for certain subjects to be taught. Teaching languages such as English was not one of the primary goals, especially in order to avoid perpetuating the myth of the UK as a place of 'salvation'. Migrants were informed about the classes by routinised visits to the areas in which the school bus parked: *Come and Learn with Us* was been put on different languages. In addition to this, migrants themselves were invited to make demands about the content of their learning experiences. One example of this, as a volunteer told me, was that a number of young boys wanted to learn more about sex education so orientation classes were delivered in response to their demands. Through mobile connections, youth services and iterative learning, these projects challenge the voiding of aspirations' of people on the move. At the same time, however, aid workers were also continuously targeted for making this border area a space of contestation of biopolitical life.

Targeting Solidarity, Making Borders

Under article L622-1 of French's immigration law, "any person who directly or indirectly facilitates or attempts to facilitate the entry, movement or irregular stay of a foreigner in France will be punished by imprisonment of five years and a fine of 30,000 euros".[63] There are exceptions to this provision for individuals or associations that provide free legal assistance and aim "at preserving [migrants] dignity or physical integrity".[64] While

[63] Code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile.
[64] *Idem*.

this law is supposed to be a deterrent to those profiteering from refugees and migrants, people and organisations that do not fall into this category are also increasingly targeted as such. Instances of solidarity that are within the law are often criminalised. This is becoming the *modus operandi* for how citizens organise when making sure that the needs of migrants are being looked after. In response to the increasing participation and activism of citizens and organisations in assisting 'illegalised' migrants, states are now shifting attention from targeting traffickers to those who provide them humanitarian support, accommodation or are deemed to facilitate their crossing of borders.

According to the EU Council Directive 2002/90/EC member states should sanction a series of behaviours that constitute smuggling and assistance, often conflating these and effectively reducing migrants' access to fundamental rights. Civil society organisations, citizens and local authorities are all compelled to respect the idea of what constitutes irregular migration, raising concerns for those who are left without papers and as such further excluded by the state.[65] The persecution of those who commit so-called crimes of solidarity is also perpetrated through arbitrary police measures. *L'Auberge des Migrants*, *Utopia 56*, *Refugee Info Bus* and *Help Refugees* published a report that records police harassment of volunteers in Calais from the 1st November 2017 to the 1st of July 2018. During this time, 646 incidents were identified and reported, with police officers and volunteers' interactions registered as surveillance; ID checks and traffic controls; body searches, searches of vehicles and personal belongings; obstruction of volunteer activities through fines, banning distribution, immobilisation of vehicles; verbal abuse and physical violence.[66] The constant pressure faced by volunteers was exacerbated by the presence of CRS anti-riot officers. After the Jungle camp in Calais was dismantled, police constant

[65] The directive defines the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence with the aim of combatting "the aiding of illegal immigration both in connection with unauthorised crossing of the border in the strict sense and for the purpose of sustaining networks which exploit human beings". Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32002L0090 [accessed 7 February 2019].

[66] 'Calais: the harassment of volunteers', Study of 1st November 2017 to 1st July 2018. Available at: https://helprefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Police-Harrassment-of-Volunteers-in-Calais-1.pdf [accessed 8 February 2019].

pressures were intended to discourage migrants from staying in the area and policemen too felt they were on the frontline of an impossible battle:

> "We are asked to look busy, to evict people, to arrest them […] we could put 1,000 CRS here – but as long as England is over the border from Calais there will still be migrants here. Even without blankets and water. Politicians are trying to deter them from coming. But that's not going to happen".[67]

During my visit to a camp in Dunkirk a CRS van was parked at the main entrance of one of the sites. This was usually the norm and it was part not only of a surveillance strategy that targeted volunteers by observing and asking about their activities as soon as they approached the sites, but it was also a way to assert control and order over migrants' staying in the area, entering and exiting their sites. Officers routinely carried out identity checks on volunteers, body searches and pat-downs. As the use of car and vans are essential for reaching the sites and supporting the work of volunteers in the area, unjustified fines for parked or transiting vehicles constituted another intimidating practice, leading also to the banning of distribution of items and food. These measures, rooted between legality and illegality, come to inform a strategy of containment that redefines survival as something that can be guaranteed only within the parameter sanctioned by the state and the police. Food distribution or health support were generally tolerated but police interventions aimed at disrupting them ensured that volunteers and migrants could not take even basic aid for granted in an effort to discourage them to even consider asking for more and redefine 'dignity' as more than a plate of food, clean clothes or even legal representation.

It seemed clear, therefore, that humanitarian workers were exposed to different kinds of policing, some of which were indirect. The ambiguity of the securitised project of the state and that which holds humanitarian values at its centre of action was constantly redefining what containment meant. The fact that intimidation towards aid workers was

[67] Steadman J., 'One day I'll confess my sins to the Lord: French riot to violence', 20 January 2018. Available at: https://helprefugees.org/news/crs-officer-admits-police-brutality/ [accessed 8 February 2019].

intended to criminalise acts of solidarity put into question French (but also British) legal and extra-legal boundaries. The porosity of these extra-legal boundaries gives us a sense of how migration is seen to be facilitated by rationales of control and aid. As Tazzioli convincingly remarks:

> "the criminalisation of individuals and groups who are facilitating the crossing of migrants, without making a profit from doing so, opens up the critical question of who exactly is a smuggler today: the boundaries between supporting migrants for one's own financial benefit or for 'humanitarian' reason are constantly blurred".[68]

The criminalisation of activities in support of migrants shows how slippery is the seemingly shared codified idea of what life consists of, both in terms of its expansion and containment and in terms of what dignity amounts or is limited to. One of the volunteers I met in Calais referred to how their activities were reframed by the police as actions actively facilitating 'illegal' migration. Notably, many aid workers in Calais, particularly those who came from other parts of France, had not fully anticipated that the police would display such a negative attitude towards them, highlighting how processes of (b)ordering can function along lines which are different from those that regulate everyday life:

> "the police here are just so different, they do not feel like humans themselves and they do not treat [migrants] as humans either. There is, however, a level of resistance against the police, and denunciation is one of them".

These strategies of resistance involved coordinating with other organisations, tracking violations, reporting police abuse, minimising the disruption of activities in support of migrants in transit in the area but, most importantly, rejecting that the threshold of what is acceptable and unacceptable within the idea of solidarity is being drawn by the state. Dominant state narratives ambiguously construct the figure of the migrant as being

[68] Tazzioli M., 'Crimes of Solidarity', *Radical Philosophy*, 2 February 2018. Available at: https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/commentary/crimes-of-solidarity [accessed 10 February 2019].

'disposable',[69] 'deportable',[70] and a 'security threat'[71] while also being cast in the passive role of those in need of 'humanitarian assistance'.[72] These boundaries were resisted by the volunteers of grassroots aid organisations I met in Calais who remodelled them according to the challenges they faced in their daily interactions with the police.

Introducing the Politics of Perseverance: 'We are not giving up'

The increasing violence in the informal settlements like those in Calais affects migrants directly and, as we have seen, to a certain extent also aid workers. In different terms, both are exposed to the politics of exhaustion legitimised by the polices of the EU, nation-states and local governments.[73] Most importantly, these strategies are made to exist on the ground by the police that polices humanitarian interventions but also calculatedly tolerates them, therefore (b)ordering bodies who are deemed to (*only*) survive. As Welander and Ansems De Vries put it, "the politics of exhaustion refers both to the ways in which exhaustion is employed as a tool of governance and control, and to the ways in which it is experienced as a daily reality by refugees".[74] The continuous evictions, confiscation of migrants' belonging, burning of their tents or sleeping bags, and the policing and harassing of aid workers, ultimately lead to perpetual experiences of

[69] On the politics of disposability, *see* Bauman Z., *Wasted Lives.* Specifically, Bauman reflects on how migrants without documents are considered human waste as outcome of modernity. In a global context, those who are of little economic value are conceptualised as waste and made redundant and in excess by nation-states. In this sense, humans are de-humanised and considered as in surplus as result of strategies of globalisation and power calculations.
[70] On the legal production of 'illegal' migrants and the logic of 'deportability', *see* De Genova N., 'Migrant 'Illegality' and Deportability in Everyday Life'.
[71] On migration and security, *see* Guiradon V., Joppke C. (2001) *Controlling a New Migration World* (London and New York: Routledge), in particular Chapter 5, Bigo D., 'Migration and Security'.
[72] *See* Ktistakis Y., 'Protecting Migrants under the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Social Charter', (2013), *Council of Europe Publishing*. Available at: https://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/Source/migration/ProtectingMigrantsECHR_ESCWeb.pdf [accessed 15 January 2019].
[73] On the politics of exhaustion, *see* Welander M., 'The Politics of Exhaustion and the British Sea Spectacle', *Border Criminolgies*, 28 January 2019. Available at: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/01/politics [accessed 20 October 2019]; Welander M., Ansems De Vries L., 'Refugees, displacement, and the European 'politics of exhaustion'', *Open Democracy*, 30 September 2016. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/refugees-displacement-and-europ/ [accessed 20 October 2019].
[74] Welander M, Ansems De Vries L., 'Calais demolition: 'mission accomplished', the politics of exhaustion and continued struggle for mobility', *Open Democracy*, 25 November 2016. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/mediterranean-journeys-in-hope/calais-demolition-mission-accom/ [accessed 20 October 2019].

violence and trauma. These experiences are continuous and do not only involve the destruction of migrants' environments, but also aim to displace them, keep them on the move by reducing their political engagements mainly to strategies of survival. However, whilst vulnerability is continually reproduced and sustained by complex measures of dispersal, violence and misinformation,[75] people's struggles for life continue too.

From the Calais Warehouse to the mobile support of the Bus in the field, it is possible to map relations of migration within a context of solidarity, action, inaction and disruptions. Accounting for resistance in zones like Calais, where not even basic needs are being met, is not easy but it is both urgent and necessary. In such circumstances, in fact, migrants' forms of resistance often take the shape of what I refer to as 'affirmative survival'. 'Affirmative survival' accounts for the ways through which migrants assert their politics of perseverance by living on and struggling for life. In Calais, migrants' exposure to direct violence is mediated by both the work of volunteers but also by migrants themselves who assert their presence by continuously re-articulating their demands. These are expressed not only in terms of direct confrontation with the state but to begin with by challenging it through the refusal to comply with its underpinned logic of sedentary bias.[76] The state frames migration as a transgressive condition that is formalized through asylum policies, territorial delimitations and social construction of identities. This logic that upholds sedentariness in one's country of birth as the preferred or only option, is contested on the ground by people who keep moving between borders and despite them. At the same time, while the State wants those on the move to keep on moving until they reach the country of their destination and ask to be accepted there, migrants try to organise to make their lives on the move more livable and secure themselves outside the basic parameters of safety in which they are allowed to function.

[75] Welander M, Ansems De Vries L., 'Calais demolition'.
[76] *See* Foucault, M. (1991b) *Remarks on Marx: conversations with Duccio Trombadori* (translated by R.J. Goldstein & J. Cascaito) (New York: Semiotext(e)).

In terms of migrants' active engagement with being in charge of their own safety, an experienced aid worker who spent a long time in the field told me that:

> "migrants take turns in sleeping, they provide food to each other, while some people are sleeping, others will wash the dishes. They look out for each other, in terms of what they are doing. For instance, when trying to jump on lorries, someone has to stay behind and close the door, someone has to help another person, they organise even though is not necessarily conscious, but they organise in ways that keep them secure. In practical terms, this translates in migrants finding ways of engaging with the police by carrying very few belongings with them and continuously making themselves aware that they might be evicted from a certain location".

This was very evident in Calais where there was no main camp or settlement and the police were moving people all the time so that migrants could not carry more than a small backpack with few belongings or no belongings at all. Flipping once again the notion that digitalization and connectivity infrastructures are only deployed to control migrants, one needs to bear in mind that having a phone and changing SIM cards in order to elude control is also very important. Phones, in fact, help keeping migrants organized on the ground and enables them to respond more readily to threats. These threats, as an aid worker I spoke to in Calais recalled, are engineered in such a way that what is targeted is the very notion of community that access to mobile phones can create and reinforce in an alternative way:

> "It is this idea of keeping people awake, so that people who are awake will not sleep at night. This is mentally draining, and the police knows this so that is why it keeps people moving. This is really an inversional kind of politics that attempts to break communities because there is a misunderstanding of what a community is, and this is something that cannot be easily broken […] forms of resistance cannot be broken only by strategies of dispersal".

As Butler argues, we are all located within power relations that are simultaneously productive and oppressive and resistance does not permit escape from these.[77] However, it is possible to think of escape in terms of a different way to complement resistance, that is resilience. The theme of resilience and escape came up during my stay in Calais, resonating as a leitmotif for providing a more complex understanding of the dynamics

[77] Butler, J. (1997) *The psychic life of power* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

that migrants themselves put in place. While such dynamics would otherwise go unnoticed unless visibly expressed in terms of open contestation, it is often this kind of resilience that informs forms of resistance. What I am referring to here is not simply the idea that resistance is occluded and happens even when we do not see it, what Scott identifies in his ethnographic study of peasants in South Asia as "everyday forms of resistance",[78] but more specifically what happens when such processes take place within migratory transits that lack the social structures that we tend to associate with enduring communities. It is in this spirit that volunteers in Calais refer to migrant communities as enduring communities, forging concepts that cannot only take into consideration state-centric perspectives, but also situational conditions derived from the experience of communities which operate outside the ideological structures of the nation.

People look after each other and this is a communitarian value. The value that migrants attach to more-than-self-preservation through everyday strategies of resilience and perseverance is politically relevant and cannot be underestimated. The importance of grasping such dynamics lies in the fact that the system that embeds migrants with their limiting experiences is not simply re-adapted per se, but purposefully resisted and confronted with subversive projects that migrants (and aid workers) put in place by crossing borders, occupying space, and purposively trying to settle in their country of choice. The reasons behind migrants' movement are often in conflict with a rhetoric of passivity and opportunism that constructs people on the move as taking advantage of their conditions and it is also against this rhetoric that they have to fight. We do not know for certain why people move – there are many layers, factors and variables involved and claims cannot be preemptively assessed through a binary construction of legal and illegal mobility. Migration's drivers, in fact, are too often simplified and aggregated for the

[78] *See* Scott J. (1985) *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

purpose of creating deserving and underserving migrants. Mindful of the pre-emptive labels attached to them, migrants' politics of perseverance manifests itself into their decision to make noise and persevere in the face of them. As an experienced volunteer in Calais told me:

> "from the field in Calais you here migrants saying, "we are not going […] we are no leaving this place until the UK has fulfilled a number of commitments".

As refugees' rights are human rights, people on the move are aware of state responsibilities towards their unwanted presence in a foreign territory, as much as they know that claiming rights from those who deny them is problematic. Migrants try to find ways to make their staying bearable in the hope that new possibilities of crossing will come about at the same time in which they are forced to live the life of people whose transit is not permitted, if not outright criminalized, according to national and European laws more broadly.

Aid workers also practice, as we have seen, this politics of perseverance when they continue their work in the face of criminalization and harassment. They also join with the migrants in their fight against the pre-emptive labels and cover ups. At the end of August 2018, the news that the police intended to dismantle a camp near-by in Dunkirk reached the volunteers in the Warehouse. They were sure that the eviction would not result in the disappearance of migrants: as one of them told me:

> "Police will come and conduct a clearance, taking migrants tents and moving them out, and before the police has even left, people are already putting more tents up. The police do not care, they just leave. People will always come back where they were before, sticking together, keeping positive."

The volunteers immediately organized a visit to the threatened settlement before its dismantlement where I could see that many people were scattered among woods. The aid organisations working on the ground deployed a drone to record how many people were at risk of dispersal and keep a record which could be used to denounce the evictions themselves or reveal any cover up regarding its extent. It is here, in these small

engagements, that state oppression can be counteracted, in this case through the use of a drone which highlights the indispensable potential of militant solidarity.[79]

Conclusion

The present in Calais is characterised by complex dynamics of (b)ordering that profoundly impact migrants' lives. Migrant populations in Calais are continuously exposed to the policing of the French state which asserts its power of containment. The Prefecture of Calais has made available a few services for migrants such as water points, toilets and the distribution of meals but this humanitarian base offered by the French State alongside the violence of the police on the ground towards migrants – and to some extent aid workers too – is increasingly defining humanitarian interventions in terms of acceptable aid. The terms of migrants' engagements with their struggles are being re-addressed by organisation of citizens established in Calais. These organisations, born out from the formal settlement of the 'Jungle', actively struggle to deal with the circumstances of insecurity in which they are inserted as their activities are both calculatedly tolerated but also actively criminalised. Aid workers, and their purposive projects, disrupt and expose the survivalist project of the state and play an essential role not only by providing vital support to migrants, but, most importantly, by persevering in enriching their life through projects which engage migrants as beings entitled to a more bearable life and political life. Migrants too engage with or without the support of aid organizations in a politics of perseverance which counteract their criminalization or victimisation. In the next chapter I will further engage with a different approach to survival and migration whereby 'affirmative' survival is considered as a process of 'overcoming' one's condition based on the politics of perseverance. While biopolitics makes life an administrative task of politics, therefore reducing migrants' lives to

[79] *See* Pezzani L., Heller C., "A disobedient gaze: strategic interventions in the knowledge(s) of maritime borders", *Postcolonial Studies* (2013), 16(3), 89-98.

continue to exist disengaged from it, I will rethink struggles for survival as struggles for *life as politics*. These struggles redefine migrants' relations with borders and (b)ordering in ways that account for migrants' different forms of resistance.

CHAPTER 5

Life as Politics: Survival, Migration, Art

Figure 35. 'We are all Illegal Migrants'. Mural drawing on Giuseppe Pellizza da Volpedo's painting The Fourth State: The Workers' Walk, 1901. Mural Orgosolo (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Figure 36. Our homeland is the entire world. Orgosolo Mural (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

Introduction

The strategy for (b)ordering migrants' lives is considered here as a rationale for border and migration management that promotes *mere* survival. In the thesis, I argue that modes of (b)ordering constrain migrants' live to live *with* death by producing forms of survival that simply aim to preserve life at its minimal terms. The life of migrants is not only reduced to the bare minimum in biological terms, but it also (b)ordered as 'deserving' only minimal interventions so people can be *(only)* kept alive. Granted that migration cannot be separated from the systems of regulations it is inserted into but one should not forget that migration is also *relational* and therefore that we cannot fully erase neither migrants' struggles to persevere and assert their demands nor their presence as a political force of its own making. With this in mind, in this chapter I will rethink (b)ordering processes as the only possible reality for thinking the life and the politics of migrants by focusing on the ways in which they are disturbed, interrupted, and challenged. In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea of the politics of perseverance, linking it to the complex ways in which migrants attempt to reconstruct their social reality by continuously reasserting their demands, presence and political engagements, also in alliance with aid workers. In this chapter, I look at the relations that migrants establish with survival and borders and will then consider artistic engagements that repurpose framings of migration.

The politics of perseverance sustain the constitutive acts of what Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos call "imperceptible politics".[1] These acts are redrawing politics by giving visibility to 'nonmovements' of dissent. Moving away from ideas that these acts are merely responses to state control, more attention will be paid to the ways in which they affirm and re-affirm life. The life of those whose life is deemed expendable is also characterised by an *otherwise politics* in motion. As such, in order to account for the

[1] Papadopoulos D. et al., *Escape Routes*.

search for alternative paths by people whose life is shaped by (b)ordering (but as we will see, not exclusively by (b)ordering), we need to look at a series of negotiations that migrants initiate with life and borders. While the negative borders of EUrope control movement through biopolitical re-ordering, 'affirmative' political action is not simply a more positive answer to containment but represents the missing re-politicisation of instances that migrants themselves set in motion in their pursuit of *life as politics* by exceeding forms of life imposed upon them. Migrants' engagements do not exist in a vacuum and are not simply the expression of an alleged intrinsic 'criminality' of the migrants themselves but need to be put in dialogue with those new 'affirmative' ways they put in place while searching to enhance their circumstances of life.

Drawing on this and moving away from the idea of life that biopolitics specifies, the making of *life as politics* will be explored situating it within migrants' struggles to survive as political subjects, and with a political claim for allowing reiterations to be recognised as measure of how the predicament of resistance can be articulated. The discussion will then shift to how migrants bring their 'lived' experience to borders. What I refer to as 'affirmative' survival is intended to open up a conversation about self-organised practices of security, resistances, strategies of escape and dissent that evade traditional framings of agency. Those who can be considered *surviving migrants* for the state are now rethought as people who are 'overcoming' their (b)ordering condition and not just living with it. This aspect will be further considered analytically by a reading of the Autonomy of Migration and by considering the 'lived' experience of borders. In the last section of this chapter, I will consider artistic engagements and migration by looking at how the effects of surviving borders are being brought within society through public installation artworks and murals. The theatricality of borders, as nation states' walls, will be rethought in terms of what counter-spectacles of migration bring to politics through

art. I argue that art has the potential for allowing the restitution of life to migrants, interrupting their (b)ordering as people without agency.

Life as Politics

Survival has been considered in this thesis as what derives from the point of intersection between mechanisms for the control and care over the life of migrants within their mobility. Such mechanisms have been explored by looking at interventions that distribute life *with* death conditions. Nevertheless, migrants exist in excess not just as a result of policies, practices and discourses that force them to exist as such, but also as a result of alliances and the politics of perseverance that they enact. These exceed the need to contain them by entertaining the possibility of a richer life. In these circumstances, surviving can become 'making' a life that is no simply limited to enacting survival strategies, but also about attaching new meaning to the idea of life itself. In the 'making' of life, 'affirmative' survival is not just about ensuring the continuum of what is kept alive through biopolitics, but the recognition that life needs to be lived beyond the 'natural' or biopolitical value assigned to the lives of particular people and their bordered movements. To further rethink biopolitical (b)orderings, therefore, it seems necessary to look at the multiple arrangements that migrants establish with life, enacting *life as politics.*

Before making the move from biopolitics to *life as politics* we need to engage with the concept of politics of life highlighted in Fassin's work.[2] As Fassin argues, the analytical utility of thinking life in biopolitical terms does a disservice to the idea of politics that can be promoted. The main argument that Fassin puts forward, with respect

[2] In the thesis I engage with the idea of life that biopolitical governance specifies arguing that it grounds life in a notion of (b)ordering that delimits politics to administrative tasks. As such, in how life can be lived politically for some becomes a matter of survival. However, life has been problematised as being a totalising medium for understanding ordering as a domain of a biopolitical state. While in the thesis I discuss Fassin's idea of politics of life to then focus on *life as politics as power-to*, it is worth to stress that the links between politics and governance are multiple. The coming into being of subjectivities, in fact, touches modes of governance and knowledge production that necessitate complex and re-imaginative readings of politics-life. *See* Ansems de Vries L., *Re-imagining a Politics of Life.*

to Foucault's theory, is that biopolitics is not the same as politics of life and clarifies his claims by making four substantial points:

> "1) Politics is not only about the rules of the game of governing, but also about its stakes. 2) More than the power over life, contemporary societies are characterised by the legitimacy they attach to life. 3) Rather than a normalizing process, the intervention in lives is the production of inequalities. 4) The politics of life, then, is not only a question of governmentality and technologies, but also of meaning and values".[3]

In other words, Fassin asserts that biopolitics gives meaning to life not through politics but by understanding governance as governmentality: the government of populations is not the government of life. Life in biopolitics is denied in its substance, reduced to how technologies operate on human lives without concern for what politics does to these lives.[4] These reservations have been discussed by many authors who have considered how politics has virtually disappeared from biopolitics,[5] becoming even more a politics of difference that justifies itself through the language of biology.[6] As Fassin has noted using Dean as a springboard, Foucault "treats life from the perspective of conduct, biopower in terms of disciplines exerted on individuals, and biopolitics in terms of technologies normalising populations".[7] According to this, Foucault contemplates life as a *method* and not as a *principle*.

Life as a principle, according to Fassin, eludes consistent methods of intervention once the idea of life itself is dislocated from pure living matter. While cells and species validate our scientific existence, "life as such", as Fassin calls it, refers to "life as the course of events which occurs from birth to death, which can be shortened by political or structural violence, which can be prolonged by health and social policies, which gives

[3] Fassin D., 'Another Politics of Life is Possible', 44.
[4] Fassin D., *Life: A Critical User's Manual*, 85.
[5] Fehér F., Hellen A. (1994) *Biopolitics* (Aldershot: Ashgate) *qtd in* Fassin D., *Life,* 89.
[6] Fassin D., *Life*, 89.
[7] Fassin D., 'Another Politics of Life is Possible', 44. In particular, Foucault defines government as the "conduct of conduct" that includes modes of governing subjectivities as "technology of the self". In this sense, conduct is also a mode of power based on a relationship between ways of governing and ways through which human beings (are made to) act on themselves. *See* Mennicken A., Miller P., 'Michel Foucault and the administering of lives', *in* Adler P. S., du Gay P., Morgan G., Reed M. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Sociology, Social Theory, and Organization Studies: Contemporary Currents* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), 11-38.

place to cultural interpretations and moral decisions".[8] "Life as such" does not leave the biological living out of consideration but re-dimensions it according to a reinvigorated morality that aspires to bring meaning and value back to the things of life.[9] Giving ethical trajectories to biopolitics means to acknowledge that complexities of life cannot be reduced to the governability of the matter of living per se, by recognising instead how this matter gives sense to life itself. As Fassin remarks, to make live is "to reject into death", either practically as a consequence of the neglect of policy-makers towards certain groups of populations, or intellectually, as a result of not measuring the effects of these policies".[10] Theoretical distinctions about what constitutes life need then to contest more assertively the normalising path of life and death that is at the core of how biopolitical (b)ordering works. The politics of life, Fassin continues, regard also "the concrete ways in which individuals and groups are treated, under which principles and in the name of which morals, implying which inequalities and misrecognitions".[11] The fundamental idea that politics of life are at the necessary service of producing inequalities helps us to frame practices of politics besides focusing on their state-centric de-vitalisation.

To sum this up, for Fassin:

> "biopolitics is about the framing of the government of human beings, while the politics of life pertains to its substance. One is interested in the techniques and rationales of population management, whereas the others focus on the differentiation in the treatment of lives and its meaning in terms of unequal worth".[12]

All these shifts, with respect to Foucault's original thought, are extremely important as these take biopolitics away from its totalising limits, proposing a refocusing toward

[8] *Ibid.*, 48.
[9] According to Fassin, biopolitics is not a politics of life as life is elusive and only taken as a measure of a targeted population. A community of human beings, a population, is the real referent of biopolitics. He insists by stressing even Foucault leaves matters of life and death out of a proper analysis of political life, seeing population as a method of control as its real referent. *Ibid.*, 46.
[10] Fassin D., 'Another Politics of Life is Possible', 54.
[11] *Ibid.*, 57.
[12] Fassin D., *Life*, 91-2.

issues of "life as such".[13] Nevertheless, inspired by Arendt's idea that what characterises modernity is exactly the declining of the political and the raising of 'natural' life,[14] this thesis commits to the idea that a biopolitical focus on forms of life is a crucial starting point for capturing interventions in society upon human lives in ways that are also de-politicising. Missing this aspect, in fact, would mean admitting that the framing of the government of human beings and techniques and rationales of management are self-explanatory. The fact that biopolitics reduce life to technologies of governing and these render some people worthy of only minimal interventions is not necessarily an analytical problem but an opportunity that allows us to openly contest the *how* (power-over) and turn attention to the *what* (power-to) of living.[15] Once life is understood nor as a *mean*, as it is in biopolitical terms, it is possible to see *life as politics* that emerges from the ordinary, from what is necessarily political. In so doing, it is possible to cross a border between life as an object of governance and life as an object of lived life. To rethink biopolitical governance, that is concerned with capturing life by putting it in order and disallowing some people from engaging with it, what is needed is the re-politicization of politics in order to make life anew. The fact that biopolitical interventions take away politics functioning as a *method* for capturing 'life' and ordering it, in fact, provides us with an opportunity for resituating politics itself. Migrants lives can be reduced to *mere* survival, but this condition needs to be understood as always temporary and as always resisted: survival is not just about ensuring the continuum of what is kept alive through (b)ordering, but the recognition that those who are subjected to it, in this case migrants, struggle for a more fulfilling life and change the idea of politics within it. On this reading, politics becomes the search for new possibilities for living politically.

[13] *Ibid.*, 46.
[14] *See* Arendt H. (1958) *The Human Condition* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998).
[15] This idea of power-to draws on the work of John Holloway and it will be better addressed later in the chapter.
[15] *Ibid.*, 16.

In *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*, Asef Bayat looks at the ways in which every day social dynamics are altering society in the Middle East by focusing on what he calls practices of nonmovements.[16] The concept of 'nonmovements' explains well the idea that the agency of the dispossessed, whose constraints characterise the expression of their contentious politics, needs to be situated within their "quiet encroachment of the ordinary".[17] While Bayat writes in particular about the urban poor, the politics of the streets and the governance of urban life throughout cities in the Middle East, he also observes that:

> "This kind of spread-out and encroachment reflects in some way the nonmovements of the international illegal migrants. There exist now a massive border check, barriers, fences, walls, and police patrol. And yet they keep flooding— through the air, sea, road, hidden in back of trucks, trains, or simply on foot. They spread, expand, and grow in the cities of the global North; they settle, find jobs, acquire homes, form families, and struggle to get legal protection. They build communities, church or mosque groups, cultural collectives, and visibly flood the public spaces. As they feel safe and secure, they assert their physical, social and cultural presence in the host societies".[18]

The "encroachment" of ordinary people/migrants on ordinary life or (b)ordered conditions is real even if it is not organised in the traditional form of social movements, and, most importantly, it cannot be framed in terms of mere coping mechanisms. As such, Bayat argues that even the framing of these encroachments as "survival strategies" fails to account for how these incremental acts do not only aim to further people's claims but give life to powerful "nonmovements".[19] The poor or migrants might be framed as simply struggling to survive but, ultimately, this view is partial and biased as it does not reveal that the poor and, in my reading, the migrants are not just reducible to victims without agency.[20] While a political rationale of survival attempts to reduce the politics of the dispossessed to coping strategies of existence, Bayat insists that it is the state as engine of forms of life that the poor or the migrants are actually rethinking and confronting. The

[16] Bayat A. (2009) *Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
[17] *Ibid.,* 4.
[18] *Ibid.*, 15.
[19] *Ibid.,* 16.
[20] *Ibid.*, 49.

failure of biopolitical governance to bring the political within the governance of migration, as it views the political as synonymous with ways of managing lives, demands a renewed attention. Political (im)mobilisation that reduces life to *mere* survival can be reinvented once affirmative survival is seen to include a way of *living politically*. *Life as politics*, therefore, has no other imperative than making life the content of a politics that emerges through the politics of perseverance. Taking this further, we can say that *life as politics* starts with "the quiet encroachment [of] the silent, protracted and pervasive advancement of ordinary people" [21] or, indeed, migrants, who struggle to maintain a purpose in spite of their negative (b)orderings. This politics is not simply understood as a property of individual interaction but as a means to advance political life with a focus on the possible.

"I am, therefore I Am": The Politics of Perseverance

In *Changing the World Without Taking Power,* John Holloway investigates the meaning of revolution today. Based on the premise that the antagonist nature of power is overlooked in contemporary life, he attempts to re-substantiate *power-to* that exists as a rebellion against *power-over*.[22] As Holloway emphasises, "this is not a matter of power against power. The struggle to liberate *power-to* from *power-over* is the struggle for the reassertion of social flows of doing against its fragmentation and denial".[23] This struggle to liberate *power-to* functions as an anti-power and not as a counter-power. While counter-power works against ruling power, and actively reproduces power, anti-power aspires to recover the self-negation of doing. As Holloway eloquently explains, in fact, *power-to* exists only in the form of its negation: individual performances recognise the expression of the struggle for human emancipation that power negates.[24] There are

[21] *Ibid.,* 4.
[22] Holloway J. (2002) *Changing the World Without Taking Power* (Pluto Press).
[23] *Ibid.*, 16.
[24] *Ibid.,* 32.

categories of humanity that only exist through their disavowal. For this reason, Holloway argues, social science is unable to account for them due to the complexity of the forms of their denial.[25] The emancipation of our potential, then, according to Holloway, regards struggling for asserting our existence and being recognised for this:

> "there is a whole world of struggle that sometimes goes no further than saying 'no' […] but that often, in the course of saying no, develops forms of self-determination and articulates alternative conceptions of how the world should be".[26]

What Holloway calls "subversive invisible no", struggles without a voice and a face, represent what is denied in the everyday. The ubiquity of these "no" are not immediate resistance in the sense that what Holloway calls "Scream" and "Doing" mostly open up possibilities for the visibility of denied sociality. To understand the power of *anti-power* means to attempt to re-articulate the politics of organisation and militancy in terms of a disembodied struggle for recognising what has been 'rejected'. A positive reassertion of that which does not formally exist starts with ordinary ubiquitous oppositions. As a "cumulative breaking of linearity", the fragmentation of our projects and our sociality can no longer be seen as inactivity.[27]

Drawing on Holloway and his analysis of *power-to* as anti-power, therefore, it is possible to differently signify the continuous oppositions to our negation: while counter *power-over* is instrumental to reproductive power, *power-to* has a generative social purpose. By encompassing spectacles of power, "visible only insofar as they are considered to impinge upon power politics",[28] power can be actualised through its negation. In order to overt political possibilities of "doing", Holloway sustains that we do not need to look exclusively at how power is taken and re-appropriated but how it flows where it is negated.[29] "Screams" that are not immediately perceptible to political

[25] *Ibid.*, 7.
[26] *Ibid.,* 65.
[27] *Ibid.*, 88.
[28] *Ibid.*, 65.
[29] *Idem*.

hierarchies echo among socialities. If politics is also about the search for new possibilities of being, the politics of perseverance that migrants enact by continuously reconstituting and resisting their biopolitical (b)ordering play a part in rethinking not only what is not visible, but what has been othered - when not 'rejected' and dismissed. Attempting to understand how agency finds a space for itself through denial, does not mean to dismiss the coercive effects of control and caring over populations. The core argument is that assuming that survival speaks for itself is not enough: the subject of survival is (im)mobilised but also mobilises in-between. Borrowing from the German poet and dramatist Bertolt Brecht who argued that the fact that we do not see those who are in the dark[30] does not mean that their absence should be taken for granted. Their politics of perseverance remind us not just of their existence, but also that the terms of their (b)ordering can be challenged.

In this light, the politics of perseverance can be better understood once we posit reiterations at the centre of migrants' struggles for asserting the making of *life as politics* out of unequal, violent and unjust biopolitical processes of (b)orderings. Politics today needs reiteration for the simple reason that its immobilising power is unwilling to acknowledge *life as politics* which emerges outside that of a *method* of containment. A life that reiterates itself is a life that strives to persevere in being by becoming something more and something else than what it is supposed to be, or in other (Des Pres's words), a life engaged in 'overcoming'. In this sense, without retaining its original meaning, borrowing from Descartes famous proposition "Cogito ergo sum" translated into English as "I think, therefore I am", I would argue that the power of reiterations can be explained by a different semantic correlation: "I am, therefore I Am". What seems to be a tautology is presented here as an antanaclasis. Antanaclasis is a rhetorical figure of speech where a

[30] Brecht B. (edited Willett J. and Manheim R.) 'Closing Verses of the Ballad', *Brecht Collected Plays: Two* (Bloomsbury).

key word is repeated but with a different meaning.[31] In this sense, 'I am,' when reiterated the second time as 'I Am' acquires a new, deeper, and incremental meaning accounted for by its capitalization. Reiterating a more-than-survivalist-existence means to demand political recognition not just because some people are made to exist as such, but also in the name of our continuous re-articulations of *life as politics*. What we are is no longer what we could be once we attempt to cross thresholds of biopolitical (b)ordering such as those that see survival as a measure of life *with* death. Reiterating our incremental differences from what 'I am' to what 'I Am' means reaffirming that there are political needs that we can only account for if we wake up from our normalising political amnesia and embrace the notion of *life* as *politics* which emerges from the deficit of life as *method*.

Borders and Migration: 'Affirmative Survival' in the Age of Organised Mobility

People trying to cross frontiers in the search for better conditions of living invest their existence in looking for alternatives to the path of insecurities that has been given to them. This search entails the construction of different figures of migration. For instance, in our securitised life, as Hayter notes, "migration for economic betterment, rather than being considered, as it should be and as it was when Europeans did it, a sign of enterprise and courage, is now regarded as criminal and somehow shameful".[32] Their initial economic insecurity is seen as a result of a mediocre performance and, since individual performance is now the cornerstone of some sort of capability approach to security, also when in transit migrants are judged according to their individual capability to achieve security.[33] As Bauman remarks, the risk of relying on a society that recognises first and foremost its

[31] Examples of antanaclasis are found in Shakespeare's writings where he uses this structure to convey double meanings by repeating the same word, with a different meaning, in a sentence. For instance, in Othello he writes: "put out the light, then put out the light" which has a double signification: in the first part Othello will put out the candle, in the second part he will end Desdemona's life". *See* Post J. (ed.) (2013) *The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare Poetry* (Oxford University Press).

[32] Hayter T., (2000) *Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls* (London: Pluto Press 20014), 64.

[33] I am echoing here Amartya Sen's idea of empowerment through human capabilities and freedom as being related to the conditional opportunities given or not given to people. *See* Sen A. (2001) *Development as Freedom* (UOP – Oxford).

members through their capacity to perform has detrimental consequences as it further commodifies vulnerable subjects to the needs of the market.[34] This is problematic in the sense that security becomes something one needs to prove to deserve and not something attached to shared responsibilities of states. Individual security needs to be achieved while collective insecurity is attached to migrants' bodies and identities by securitised means of circulation. At the same time, the recognition of migrants as victims of circumstances is soon turned into migrants' incapability to deal with their circumstances. Responsibilities are often shifted from the level of the state to that of individuals becoming the measure of their incapability to *better* survive. The dangers of such discourses are clear as they end up drawing a line between those who can provide for themselves and those who should be providing for themselves, making security the distinctive outcome of personal capabilities. These discourses that highlight individual performances for the sake of apportioning blame and reduce state responsibility are nonetheless imbricated in narratives which deny the migrants' a collective political voice. A politics of perseverance which highlights migrants' agency does not rest on notions of individual performance but on organised mobility which serves the purpose of re-inventing alternatives to the state-centric limits of security. The ways in which migrants self-organise and establish alliances with citizens and aid organisations tell us something about how (b)orders are crossed, re-adjusted and experienced. More importantly, it forces us to politically confront biopolitical normative life and actively reinsert migration within a different framework of complex everyday negotiations. Some of these negotiations rely on the self-organisation of migrants in mobility.

From this perspective, the move from self-reliance to self-organisation is made transitorily visible once we posit social connections, networks of support, and the projectuality of movement that migrants exhibit, at the core of new strategies of

[34] Bauman Z., *Strangers at Our Door*, 60.

manoeuvre. Migrants' decision-making and assessment of the dangers on their journey to EUrope, is now part of a wider system of networking that involves the search for safe routes, the collection of information about asylum procedures in different countries, the constant communication in social media networks and the re-articulation of circumstances in which they find themselves. The sharing of a network of instances becomes an opportunity for migrants to renegotiate their position across borders and routes. Physical borders are being displaced by migrants who create politics itself by encountering and collaborating with people who originate from different places. Once specific frames of reference are lost (such as the right of citizenship and the legal protection of a particular nation-state) new cultural categories are deployed that rely on the search for commons. By communicating across cultural barriers, self-organising reconstructions of meanings and identities, migrants themselves rearticulate their positions through journeys and multiple engagements with powers of (b)ordering. It is here that contingent practices of security are carried out that go beyond metaphors of lines and walls, and that, by default, disallow the border from limiting access to a dispersed site of interrogation of generative potential. Thinking migration as organised mobility, instead of a performing security of individual fate, helps us understand the strategic ways through which migrants engage in political acts by also escaping confrontations with the state. Organised mobility is not just mobility outside the law. More broadly, it is a project of "imperceptible politics" that reorganises insecurity of movement and reiterates needs, wants and emergent politics.[35] Looking at social learning and self-organisation in ways that are conjectural, processual, and less deterministic means focusing on a different idea of agency so that even autonomy within survival can account for the many forms in which (b)ordering can be resisted.

[35] Papadopoulos D. et al., *Escape Routes.*

Autonomy of Migration: Excesses of Sociability in Motion

The approach of the Autonomy of Migration (AoM) represents an important turn in Migration Studies. Autonomy of Migration refers to a series of ideas about migratory movements that shift attention from the practices of control of the State to the ways migrants experience mobility. Such experiences are no longer seen as mere responses to controlled mobility, but as a creative force to insert within and beyond structures of containment. As Papadopoulos and others remark, "migration is autonomous – meaning that – against a long history of social control over mobility, migration is and continues to be a constituent force in the formation of sovereignty".[36] Most importantly, the AoM's approach rethinks the role that migrants play within border control dynamics, stressing the fact that their 'illegalised' condition does not represent a deterrent to their political engagements and movement. Migrants are not simply forced to respond to their situated vulnerability but are active constructors of their own reality. From this perspective, the agency of migrants is vital. The 'excluded' mostly act outside visibility and recognition, giving life to their politics of perseverance: "the AoM is a movement that is created and reproduced because of need and compels those who take part to create relationships based on deep interdependence. It is replicated over and over again and, in this repetition, creates a movement that expresses the freedom of movement".[37] This is consistent with the idea advanced earlier in this chapter of the importance of political reiterations for the legitimisation of the contemporary politics of the excluded.

The mobility of people is prior to the possibility of political power to control it.[38] Such ontological primacy reshapes the debate about migration and refashions it by giving importance to the political re-constitution of limits that are always crossed. Based on a materialist-Marxist reading of history that sees the struggles for re-asserting uneven

[36] *Ibid*., 202.
[37] *Idem*.
[38] *Ibid.*

positions of power as structural to the composition of our reality, Boutang's idea of autonomy is indebted to the efforts that 'living labour' make in their everyday struggles to regain power over themselves and their activities. From a discourse of autonomy, Boutang moves to a discourse of degrees of autonomy, in order to highlight the various forms of everyday resistance that are silenced because of the need of not allowing other stories to surface.[39] Drawing on the tradition of *operaism,* struggles and invisible subversion are at the core of what Boutang considers in excess to the integrationist method of representative democracies. Within representation, refusal, escape, and dissent can only signify disagreement according to the citizens' own role expectations. These normalised representations stabilise action within a framework of legibility, but do not allow us to see the power of the unqualified.

From the perspective of the AoM, therefore, there is another reading of migration, excesses and migrants' agency more broadly, a reading that we can only grasp once we abandon the idea that there is no space for mobility beyond the production and reproduction of capital. On the assumption that control is not a totalising mechanism of coercion, but the regulator of the "speed of absorption" of economic migrants for the neoliberal end of optimising the economy of mobile populations,[40] we can see that such orderly institutionalisation of movement is not only the space and time of contemporary politics. For the purpose of understanding migrants' mobility outside its state-centric capitalisation, we need to look into their differential inclusion within a system of citizenship control. This is suggested by Papadopoulos and others. As the authors notice, the tripartite relation of labour-mobility-security works under the distributive umbrella of citizenship, that is the only way through which there can be a relation between rights and

[39] *See* Moulier Boutang, Y. (1998) *De l'esclavage au salariat. Economie historique du salariat bride* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France).
[40] Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., 'After Citizenship', 180.

representation.[41] Citizenship is a form of governing migration in the sense that it defines who is a subject of rights and who is entitled to have rights.[42]

In line with this, it can be argued that the "right to have rights" invoked by Arendt is not simply dismissed by the function of citizenship or lack of thereof, but it represents a further assertion of what legitimises political action or a political life.[43] The double-R axiom of rights and recognition is the starting point for understanding a modern polity, but, as every other starting point, its privileged position of analysis is one that is never exhaustive but one that needs to be reconciled with what can be called the function of non-citizenship.[44] Because we operate in an integrationist system of politically convergent homogenisation, Papadopoulos and others question what happens to all of those who are mobile but cannot be incorporated within these logics of inclusion. In order to validate and recognise their constitutive role, the authors suggest that we need to give migrants' mobility a centre stage:

> "Migration is not primarily a movement that is defined and acts by making claims to institutional power. It rather means that the very movement itself becomes a political movement and a social movement".[45]

The social and subjective aspects of mobility *ante* control are recognised by the AoM. From this viewpoint, movement before control is not seen as movement without control. As Papadopoulos and Tsianos stress, migration is not romanticised as operating detached from control,[46] the point is rather that mobility is not just reactive to it as "it creates new realities that allow migrants to exercise their own mobility against and

[41] *Ibid.*, 181.
[42] *Idem*.
[43] Rancière J. (translated by Julie Rose) (1995) *Dis-agreement. Politics and Philosophy* (Minnesota/London – University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
[44] Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., 'After Citizenship'.
[45] *Ibid.*, 184.
[46] From this perspective, the consequence of a politics of detention and deportation in the management of migration are not dismissed by the AoM. The AoM investigates the way through which mobility and movement are asserted not simply as a reaction to the assertion of control but as a 'spirit' of creating a different kind of politics outside what is usually framed as being the result of control. On the theme of deportation, detention and movement, *see* De Genova N., Peutz N. M. (2010) *The deportation regime: sovereignty, space and the freedom of movement* (Durham: Duke University Press).

beyond existing control".[47] Such realities are experienced differently as they are inserted within a different logic than that of citizenship. While in the view of European societies migration is encouraged only if it can be institutionalised within a tripartition of inclusion (labour-mobility-security), Papadopoulos and others note that, by supporting rights and representation through citizenship, we end up restricting movement more as their complementary relationship of subtraction is reinforced. At the same time, because there cannot be rights and representation without citizenship, we need to make a different effort in order to see the politics of migrants that emerge outside this "integrationist polity".[48] To achieve this, it is necessary to abandon the subject-form idea of political presence and look at the political and social practices that migrants put in place within their story of movement. More importantly, the authors remark, the creation of these "imperceptible politics" are made vital through 'escape'. According to them, "movement has now become escape", that is the subversive dis-identification from regimes of power control to the construction and dissent of everyday strategies of refusal.[49] "Escape is about dissent and construction, it is not protest",[50] as it does not address institutional politics, while it creates its own intervals of meaning. Seen in this way, escape has a life of its own as it is incommensurable to what prevalent forms of politics entails. The predicament of resistance is then revisited here as a measure of unseen subversive acts that are already political beyond, and besides, being co-opted within a theoretical whole. The approach that Papadopoulos and others advance is extremely important for this thesis as it represents the key for understanding the kind of politics that emerge from considering a (b)ordered forms of survival as a condition to overcome.

We can then identify another idea of excesses that complements the ones that serve for (b)ordering migrants. On the one hand, excesses are the biopolitical reduction that

[47] Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., 'After Citizenship', 184.
[48] *Ibid.*, 187.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] Papadopoulos D. et al., *Escape Routes*, 61.

mechanisms of control create for the securing of worthy life. According to this, excesses are the result of what biopolitical processes of (b)ordering deem as unproductive for the constant normalisation of governable life. This caesura determines who needs to be securitised and 'humanised' as 'proper' in a dynamic relationship where life is diminished and recovered at the same time. This idea of excesses as a biopolitical function has been discussed throughout the thesis. On the other hand, excesses are the result of an excess of sociability in motion, necessity and potentiality that people on the move exhibit not as a mere consequence of their biopolitical containment, but as an alternative way to experience their condition of exteriority to their given politics. The reason for this can be found in the fact that the crafting of excesses and the vital necessity to exceed are linked by movements that calls into question two different rationalities of security.

While biopolitical mobility reduces life and focuses on the capacity to control it, the search for security alternatives for migrants expands possibilities of life. From reduction to expansion, excesses are both the pre-condition of biopolitics and that of subversive mobility. Nevertheless, it is only when we place excesses within a framework of mobility that we can better grasp the peculiarity of rethinking movement for the demands that migrants articulate. Such demands are what bridges the gap between the political and the apolitical. The fact that such demands are unfiltered, unheard, non-confrontational or only partially taken into consideration by institutional politics does not mean that they are not there. A more complex view of migration demands us not only to look at the unseen as more than a product of the seen, but also to link "imperceptible politics" with security in ways that are convergent with migrants' unfiltered demands and their 'rejected' politics of movement. In this view, modes of confronting survival are always a contested issue.

Even though the AoM's approach has been mainly criticised for seeing movement before capital and control - while recognising their interdependence, -[51] for ending up proposing a binary framing of control vs mobility,[52] and for creating a big narrative on migration,[53] these analyses allows us to clearly resituate excesses as form of resistance to the (b)ordering of migrants, and biopolitical life more in general. This demands us to look at the ways through which political confrontations are not simply avoided through escape and imperceptible resistances, but also to consider how the politics of perseverance expand political conditionalities. Movement is not the same in every situation as it is often part of (im)mobility of circulations. These inverse excesses cannot be simply inserted within a broader narrative of movement but need to be understood for their complex disorderly endeavours to generate a different kind of order from a constellation of relationships. The politics of perseverance is what gives transitory movement a voice. As already pointed out, this is not suggesting, as in this case, that migrants are simply reactive to control, but that survival as control and care is also rearticulated from within the emergence of migrants' political endeavours.

The consequences of seeing the search for security as a driver of movement means looking at the AoM from a more complex perspective. This perspective is here revisited in terms of what this search can do to political crossings. AoM recognises mobility *ante* control but it also links it with migrants' excesses in sociability. The creation of alternative dynamisms to the juridical-ideologically fixed reality of univocal order represents a securitised responsibility to the problem of the production of a biopolitical body. The problem of security that biopolitics presents to the subjects of mobility, therefore, is the production of *excesses as reduction*. The problem of security that a more

[51] For a more exhaustive perspective of their different interdependence, *see* Mezzadra S., 'The Gaze of Autonomy. Capitalism, Migration and Social Struggles', *UniNomade 2.0*, 19-09-2010. Available at: http://www.uninomade.org/the-gaze-of-autonomy-capitalism-migration-and-social-struggles/ [accessed 23 January 2018].
[52] *See* Vaughan-Williams N., *Europe's Border Crisis*.
[53] *See* Sharma N., 'Escape artists: migrants and the politics of naming', *Subjectivity* (2008), 29, 467-76.

complex approach to the AoM exposes to the need of governance is *excesses as expansive*. As migrants' quests for safety are also in excess to their *excesses,* in respect to their position within proper politics, it is against their degreed existence that the incommensurability of their humanity and their securitisation is being questioned. We are looking at a politics where the emergence of resistances to reduced modes of living that re-orient the injustice of circumstances of insecurity towards the lived experience of borders, is given centre stage.

Moving from the Edges: Borders are Above All Lived

In *No Borders: The Politics of Immigration, Control and Resistance,* Natasha King looks at how people on the move refuse borders. In particular, she focuses on the challenges that migration poses to the securitisation practices of the state revealing the ways through which people actively confront it. As King puts it, "in the act of moving without permission, or in actively contesting controls that limit their lives, people refuse the border and oppose the state at the moment".[54] The struggle for freedom of movement is the refusal of the border and the profoundly inscribed nature of division that it perpetuates within and among states. This struggle reflects *moments* of refusal that oppose the state both intentionally and unintentionally. Within this, borders' production of 'human illegality', is not a deterrent for the mobility of people who practice their freedom of movement despite controls. Movement across territorial borders is the measure of what King calls a "no border politics", that is the recognition of political acts of rejecting borders by crossing them.[55] This refusal of borders, that is an opposition to the state, poses a dilemma as it is within the state that rights are demanded or guaranteed. Migrants need to appeal to the state to see their freedoms guaranteed, but they also challenge it by

[54] King N., *No Borders*, 4.
[55] *Ibid.*

refusing the territorial limits set by its jurisdiction. This impasse is constitutive of a broader politics of refusal that is incidental to the contestation of a status quo by resistance.

Within Social Movement Studies, resistance is predominantly theorised as a collective practice that engages with the power of the State. Resistance is contestation in the sense that it is mainly based on quests for re-appropriation from within a system of power dominated by the State.[56] What happens outside this framing of contestation, King remarks, remains mostly unexplored as resistance remains thought as a force of dissent but not as a creative and destructive practice of negative freedom.[57] Without discounting resistance as disputative exercise for questioning relationships of domination, the invisible acts of autonomy within migratory movements are now the actualisation of individual desires that bring into line migrants' safety with their self-organising dynamics of creative security. Life within control is the everyday making of activities that represent the *moments* of the political. King suggests that autonomy is now the imminent constitution of present instances that rearticulate experience within the refusal of borders. The contents of "no borders politics" is oriented towards autonomy, but it also recognises the role that demands for rights play for those who are non-citizens. King stresses that the political dilemma of needing the state while attempting to remain independent from its control is somehow negotiated through a "no border politics" as the concatenation of *moments* of autonomy. What is not traditionally viewed as a practice of politics is now considered as such for the reason that keeping moving is already by itself a political statement.

The difficulty of understanding border-crossings as a political assertion of a negative freedom lies in the fact that it forces us to look at the unintended effects of

[56] On the idea of social movements as re-appropriation of social relations relationships, *see* Melucci A. (ed. by Keane J., Mier P.) (1989) *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society* (Temple University Press).
[57] King N., *No Borders*, 130

unintentional acts pursued "by people who have no intention of behaving politically – and this makes it hard to think of it as political, if what we think of as political is intentional activity".[58] As the creation of alternatives ways of being to the dictates of the state, "no border politics" create reality through the transgression of limits set by borders. These alternative *moments* of autonomy exemplify how the edges of politics move within the ways politics is lived, as a re-bordered reality of transgressed significations. Seeing people on the move through their ability to produce different forms of existence based on "imperceptible politics" of necessity mediated by a "no border politics", forces us to reflect upon the ways in which we can rethink (b)ordering as lived experience. Papadopoulos and others identify a second world that exists in the making where migrants organise their lives creatively, negotiating the negative effect of borders. As the authors state, a World 2 of migration and "mobile commons" is always in the making. This is "the world of transmigrants whether they are on the road, in a new country, or in a new neighbourhood, whether they are settled, clandestine, have refugee status, or are documented workers".[59] Drawing on Winner's idea that organisation is the practice of producing alternative ontologies and ways of life,[60] the organisational ontology of mobile commons relies on the ability to "cultivate, generate and regenerate the contents, practices and affects that facilitate the movements of mobile people".[61] More precisely, Papadopoulos and others isolate five precise contents that are at the core of these expansive commonalities: the invisible knowledge of mobility that keeps people on the move informed; an infrastructure of connectivity that supports their digital connections; a series of informal economies where services are offered and where production and

[58] *Idem.*
[59] Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V. S., 'After Citizenship'.
[60] Winner L. (1986) *The whale and the reactor: a search for limits in an age of high technology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), *qtd in* Papadopoulos D., Tsianos V.S., 'After Citizenship', 191.
[61] *Idem*.

reproduction could be exploitative; different forms of transnational communities of justice to rely on; a multiplicity of relations of mutual care and cooperation.[62]

In these "fields of the everyday", as the authors call them, the mobile commons become the form of political reality that migrants express as essential manifestation of what their search for security entails. The recognition of migrants' political agency is taken on another level as the debate is fully re-oriented from resistance to their dispersed moments of creative necessity.[63] Such moments are recognisable through different lens of temporary movement. As seen, the transitorily emergent structures of solidarity in Rome and Calais are key for understanding how *life as politics* is pursued against that of a method.[64] Borders are a method through which we can think (b)ordering – from the privileged position of writing about them - but for the many who have to cross borders to then being (b)ordered otherwise, life is the potential of their politics. Such life aims to bring back meaning to what has been voided of political sense. The only way to see these excesses of sociability beyond their shaped existence is that of moving from the edges of politics to the core of their reinvention within a politics of necessity: 'borders are above all lived' through the refusal, crossing and desire for security of a different kind of contestation. As part of this contestation, the restitution of this politics to life, or better the restitution of life to this politics, is something that art aims to reorder.

Borders and Art: Confronting Migration through Public Visual Art

Borders as 'lived' boundaries, as we have seen, are constantly being negotiated by the many actors who cross them as conditions of *life* and *death* are assigned to these multiple edges. These negotiations continue on each side of borders where migrants *persevere* through strategies of resistance, visibility/invisibility, presence/absence, denunciation,

[62] *Ibid.*, 91-2.
[63] On the political agency of migrants, *see* Squire V., *The Contested Politics of Mobility,* 6.
[64] Fassin D., 'Another Politics of Life is Possible'.

protesting and escape and, most importantly, reiterating their politics of necessity in alliance with networked solidarities. The "imperceptible politics" of migrants, however, are not only politicised in their possibility to be represented otherwise but are also part of a spectacle that makes possible the theatricality of borders on the ground. The 'reality' of migration in EUrope is increasingly characterised today by its spectacular representation that answers the need of populist politics, the construction of the migratory problem as a security issue and the protection of sovereignty and national identity. Facilitated by a massifying and statist language that promotes flows over individuals, migrants are often shown on overcrowded boats, in excess to the capacity of European nation states to host them, therefore reinforcing a myth of invasion and uncontrolled mobility within limited jurisdictions. The space of the Mediterranean Sea epitomises this well and it is in border zones in general (whether on land or sea) that the visibility of migration becomes a symbol and a deterrent for strategies that states put in place to showcase their authority, deter arrivals and exercise their politics of rescue. As De Genova has exhaustively argued, what happens at borders is often the result of spectacles of security staged for the exclusion or inclusion of migrant labour.[65] Geopolitical borders, therefore, display features that are not only functional to delimiting territories but also aim at making manifest securitarian and humanitarian responses to migration at large.

These responses are often influenced by representations of borders, migration and migrants that emerge from their depiction as images. Images are pictures and ideas that give form to what is being represented, qualifying their content as meaning. As Guy Debord has famously argued, images have supplanted genuine human interaction as a succession of spectacles is functioning as a frame of reference for understanding reality.[66] The relation between images and spectacles is one of irreducible co-dependence once

[65] De Genova N., "Spectacles of Migrant 'Illegality': the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (May 2013), 36(7), 1180-98.
[66] Debord G. (1967) *Society of the Spectacle*, (Zed Books: 1994). Thesis 9.

reality is simplified so that it can be made to exist as a medium for displaying *visual performances*. While in the language of the state these visual performances are always contradictory, working to allow the double focus of security and humanitarianism to be maintained, the language of art challenges different aspects of thinking about these boundaries. Politicians and certain groups often mobilise the spectacle to perpetuate ambiguous notions of legitimacy – where a saver protects the nation against the 'unwanted', but also vulnerable individuals are rescued by it – and artists and activists defy these performances by presenting works of art that aim to decentre narratives about borders, migrants and (b)orderings more broadly.

Migrants are often univocally considered to be a security threat both to the qualified citizens and the order of the state of reception; otherwise, they are perceived as victims of their own circumstances in need of help, or even helpless. To counter this, a series of works of visual art – particularly art installations and murals – are making borders and (b)ordering visible within society by putting into question notions of inside and outside, life and death. Such representations raise social consciousness about alternative framings of migration but, most importantly, they have also the capacity to expose our own implications with seemingly distant (b)ordering practices and policies. As Jill Bennett has argued, by bridging the gap between diverging experiences, art acts as a medium in which the possibility of connecting is no longer a matter of immediate witnessing.[67] As such, art mirrors politics enabling people to recognise not just the humanity of an 'other', which art re-addresses, but also exposes how the normalisation of contemporary migration policies precludes ways of rethinking the limits of (b)ordering.

[67] Bennett J. (2005) *Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma and Contemporary Art* (Stanford University Press). On this theme, *see* also Lindroos K., Möller F. (eds) (2017) *Art as Political Witness* (Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich Publishers).

Public visual art marks its presence in spaces that are inclusive, as they grow within ideas of commons and civic life,[68] spaces that are in continuous change, appearing and disappearing, evolving into something different, transformative, and almost suspended in time. While we need to keep in mind as a starting point that access to public spaces is often unequal and ideas of neutrality need to be challenged as deceptive,[69] public visual art represents a model of distributive art in which the outside is not only the space of museums or particular exhibitions.[70] A broad definition of public visual art takes public space and visibility at the centre of visual representations of the social world that are not valued according to traditional artistic criteria per se, but in terms of their disruptive, creative and relational potential. The potential of public visual art resides in its ability to stimulate political imagination, opening up not just the space of the visible but also that of the unthinkable.[71] Re-thinking entrenched boundaries, therefore, demands us to consider the uses of art as embodied interventions that aim to re-ground praxis of life. A wide range of street art interventions, murals, art installations, graffiti and so on, make up a new symbolic order where contestation takes the face of activism and resistance though artistic engagements. Art can oppose powerful and dominant representations of our social world in its political context but can also express alternatives to ways of thinking about politics. In their circular relation, "politics builds on art just as much as art is guided by political values and discourses".[72] Art is embedded in social and political life in ways that make us wonder what we believe boundaries are. These boundaries are those of nation-states, of cities, of our neighbourhoods, of everyday life, of people, of our mind. The materiality of what is visually represented through art becomes a situated history mediated by images that grow in the manifestation of present boundaries.[73]

[68] Stavrides S. (2016) *Common Space: The City as Commons (in Common)* (Zed Books).
[69] Berry J. (2018) *Art and (Bare) Life* (Berlin: Sternberg Press), 284.
[70] Miles M. (1997) *Art, space and the city: Public art and urban futures* (London: Routledge).
[71] *See* Rancière J. *Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics*.
[72] Awad S. H., Wagoner B. (ed) (2018) *Street Art of Resistance* (Palgrave Macmillan), 20. See also Edelman M. (1995) *From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creation Shape Political Conceptions* (The University of Chicago Press).
[73] Gadamer H. G. (1989) *Truth and method* (translated by J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall) (New York: Continuum).

Aspects of thinking about public visual art are addressed by the emergence of creative contestations that are centred on activism. According to Groys, art activism is 'the ability of art to function as an arena and medium for political protest and social activism".[74] Central to this definition is the idea that art can change conditions of the real, and not just represent or re-represent political and social settings.[75] While we should be careful when attaching a potential for systemic change to art activism, what seems rather interesting is the role that art plays in rethinking matters of the real beyond its dominant framings. Criticism towards the 'aestheticization' of political action has been raised, rooted in many discourses that emphasise how politics and spectacles are bounded to neutralise the reasons and effect of political actions.[76] At the same time, it is argued that art can also function as a critique to its own totalising aestheticization once it is considered to be theoretically relevant to politics. Admitting that only total aestheticization exists, in fact, would mean to accept "that we see the current status quo as already dead, already abolished".[77] Far from this, art revitalizes possibilities for *life as politics* exactly because status quos need always to be challenged. From visual art to how we relate to it, the affective dimension of art understood as experience[78] is said to expand life, posing problems that are never defined once and for all. Before considering the theatricality of walls and the political significance of mural art, it is important to reflect on how art and migration/borders, life/death, meet through art installations that engage with the more recent migratory movements in EUrope.

Public installation art is a form of street art that involves the configuration of objects that are democratised in their capacity to be seen and, like murals, present a great potential for contingent visibility. These artistic forms of representation function as

[74] Groys B., 'On Art activism', *e-flux* (June 2014), 56. Available at: https://www.e-flux.com/journal/56/60343/on-art-activism/ [accessed 2 January 2020].
[75] *Idem*.
[76] *See* Benjamin W., *Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (New York: Schocken, 1992).
[77] Groys B., 'On Art activism'.
[78] Dewey J. (1934) *Art as Experience* (Perigee Books, 2009).

counter-spectacles that connect us with the already hyper-visible struggles of state-centric fabrication: they are counter-spectacularised examples of border-life. More importantly, art installations are designed not only to favour connections with the issues represented, but also to change the perception of space in which they are established. Their contingency as open-air art museums that inhabit temporarily, or more permanently, our neighbourhoods, cities and situated politics, serve to rethink violence and migrants' struggles at physical borders in terms of a *space continuum*. "Borders are everywhere"[79] so that alternative ways of resisting them are also made visible everywhere. This de-spatialization of borders, therefore, configures objects in spaces that are considered to be significative to the medium of art installations.

For instance, we can think of artist Ai Weiwei who brought migrants' struggles to resist within two cities situated far away from the south of the Mediterranean Sea. By covering Berlin's Konzerthaus in Life Jackets recovered from Lesbos,[80] and placing twenty-two lifeboats on the façade of Palazzo Strozzi in Florence,[81] Ai Weiwei de-spatializes the politics of managing migration and their deadly declination within symbolic spaces of urban and everyday life. The striving of migrants to survive is here epitomised by these two objects, life jackets and lifeboats. What Ai Weiwei seems to denounce is then not simply the right of safe passage that migrants should have recognised but the very idea that this non-right has become a struggle for survival. While these installations can be seen as a tribute to the lives of refugees lost at sea,[82] it is possible to recognise the intersection of life *with* death once we take a closer look at how these objects of survival function as mediums to life. It seems very difficult, in fact, not to note

[79] Balibar E. *Politics and the Other Scene*,71.
[80] 'Art with a purpose: Ai Weiwei brings refugee life jackets to Berlin venue', *Euronews*, 15 February 2016. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2016/02/15/art-with-a-purpose-ai-weiwei-brings-refugee-life-jackets-to-berlin-venue [accessed 12 July 2019].
[81] *See* Ai Weiwei's installation: https://www.palazzostrozzi.org/mostre/aiweiwei/?lang=en [accessed 15 July 2019].
[82] 'Berlin Konzerthaus: Ai Weiwei erinnert mit Schwimmwesten an ertrunkene Flüchtlinge', *DerStandard*, 14 February 2016. Available at: https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000031064535/berliner-konzerthaus-ai-weiwei-erinnert-mit-schwimmwesten-an-fluechtlinge?ref=rss#forumstart [accessed 2 January 2020].

how showcasing life jackets and lifeboats not only raises attention towards the *drowned* but also towards the *rescued*, the ones that are made to remain in excess. Recovered from the shores of EUrope, these objects used to emblematize death, also raise essential questions about the lack of security of people on the move and the way in which such lack is considered 'normal' in their struggle to survive in order to reach EUrope and the structural violence inherent in (b)ordering.

Life Jackets, a lifeboat and items of clothing are the objects used by war artist Arabella Dorman who choose St. James's Church in Piccadilly, London, as a set for her two-art installation works on the migrants' journey and plight. In *Flight* (2015) (fig.37) the artist displays, hanging under the volt of the church, a rubber dinghy, almost capsized. This particular boat was recovered from the Greek Island of Lesbos where was used by sixty-two people that arrived there from Turkey on a vessel with a capacity of about fifteen people. Next to the dinghy are three life jackets falling into the void, towards us.[83] These orange life jackets are two adult-size and one child-size evoking the idea of a family, or in the context of a Church of England parish at Christmas, of the 'Holy Family' itself. The small life jacket seems to be falling further into the abyss while what appears to be his/her parents' are just behind, about to follow. As Dorman puts it:

> "Installed over the Christmas period, the three lifejackets evoke the flight of the Holy Family to Egypt and ask the viewer to engage with the subject on both a metaphysical and physical level. The setting of the boat invites the viewer to embark upon their own spiritual journey, while a suspended interplay of light, form and shadows above the nave reflects the uncertain, rootless and volatile experience of life as a refugee".[84]

[83] Dorman A., *Flight*. Available at: https://www.sjp.org.uk/flightvideocd.html [accessed 2 January 2020].
[84] Dorman A., *Flight*.

Figure 37. Flight by Arabella Dorman, St James's Church, Piccadilly.[85]

As Squire has argued, redeploying discarded objects and turning them into objects of art "forges connections or associations between different subjects-objects-environments in ways that transform 'people' and 'places' through which they pass, as well as the various connections they forge".[86] An object of trash becomes an object of value.[87] In this process of re-evaluation, these objects call into direct question the reasons for exposing migrants to struggles for survival when crossing borders.

This is also explicit in Dorman's following work linked to *Flight*, *Suspended* (2017) (fig.38), showcased in the same Church, where the artist seeks to address the materiality of suspended lives, that are those of many migrants stranded in cities and detention centres around EUrope. These lives exist suspended between the double-axiom of a past and a future that seems to be equally compromised. This art installation

[85] Jones J., "Flight by Arabella Dorman Review", *The Guardian,* 20 December 2015. Picture available at: https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/dec/20/flight-by-arabella-dorman-review-relic-of-a-rough-crossing-illustrates-refugee-crisis [accessed 2 January 2020].
[86] Squire V., ''Desert 'Trash': Posthumanism, Border Strugglers and Humanitarian Politics', *Political Geography* (2014), 39, 11-21, 19.
[87] *Idem*.

comprises hundreds of items of clothes that have been discarded by the many migrants who arrived at the island of Lesbos.[88] These clothes are suspended from the vault of the Church, where lights brighten and darken up the space, making visibility fluid, and demanding the viewer to contemplate the fragmented experiences of migrants though their multi-coloured clothes hanged in multiple sizes.

Figure 38. Suspended by Arabella Dorman, St James's Church, Piccadilly.[89]

Dorman's *Flight* and *Suspended*, and Ai Weiwei's life jackets and lifeboat art installations, use real objects, recovered from real life experiences of migrants that symbolise what remains of their stories, of themselves, so that they can be imagined as acts of *'being-with'* beyond individual survival.[90] These belongings are not just preserved,

[88] Dorman A., *Suspended*. Available at*:* https://www.sjp.org.uk/suspended.html [accessed 2 January 2020].
[89] Sherwood H., 'Artist hangs refugee's clothing in London church to highlight crisis', The Guardian, 13 December 2017. Picture available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/13/artist-arabella-dorman-refugees-clothing-london-church-highlight-crisis [accessed 2 january 2020].
[90] Nancy J. L. (2000) (translated by Robert Richardson and Anne O'Byrne) *Being Singular Plural* (Stanford University Press).

they are re-purposed so that people can be transformed through things.[91] The theatricality of these installations also bring to the fore problems of representation when real life objects are staged as *means of other possible significations.* In particular, art helps us to reveal what can be considered to be the paradoxical uses of these objects not just because they are displaced in installation works as means of art, but also because alternative significations are extrapolated through spectacle.

Christoph Büchel's controversial art project *Barca Nostra* (Our Boat) has raised the question of art as a spectacularised form of disaster or criticism regarding the uses of 'tragedy' for the manifestation of empathy.[92]. Here the wreck of a boat on which about eight-hundred people died in the Mediterranean on the night of 18 April 2015 went on display on the occasion of the Venice Biennale art festival in May 2019. The boat, which was in fact a coffin for hundreds of people whose bodies were later recovered by the Italian navy[93], was lifted from the Mediterranean Sea after a decision of the former Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi who vowed to give the victims a proper burial.[94] This effort echoed the initiative promoted two years before by the former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta who in the aftermath of a shipwreck near Lampedusa in October 2013 declared: "The hundreds who lost their lives off Lampedusa yesterday are Italian citizens of today".[95] If Matteo Renzi put the emphasis on giving dignity to migrants who died by recovering their bodies and giving them appropriate burial, Enrico Letta's proposal to grant them posthumous Italian citizenship further reinforces the idea of how the value of certain lives can be re-articulated as deserving humans only after their death is

[91] On a more exhaustive framing of humanitarian recycling as politics of precariousness that create renewed relations among people, across space and things, *see* Squire V. (2015) *Post/Humanitarian Border Politics between Mexico and the US: People, Places, Things* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
[92] *Cf.* Lorenzo Tondo, 'I have seen the tragedy of the Mediterranean migrants. This 'art' makes me feel uneasy', *The Guardian*, 12 May 2019. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/12/venice-biennale-migrant-tragedy-art-makes-me-uneasy [accessed 5 January 2020].
[93] Lorenzo Tondo, 'I have seen the tragedy of the Mediterranean migrants'.
[94] 'Remains of bodies from migrant boat that drowned 800 to be raised off Italy', *thejournal.ie*. Available at: https://www.thejournal.ie/bodies-raised-matteo-renzi-victims-2853487-Jun2016/ [accessed 5 January 2020].
[95] Valentina Pop, 'Italy grants citizenship to Lampedusa dead', *EuObserver,* 7 October 2013. Available at: https://euobserver.com/justice/121681 [accessed 5 January 2020].

ascertained. With this in mind, and instead of reducing this art installation to a univocal meaning, *Barca Nostra* calls into direct question the public spectacle in which the governance of migration is taking place by performing a counter-spectacle. Becoming entrenched to art, counter-spectacles allow for a different kind of political denunciation, one that unleashes other possible significations about those events instead of keeping them trapped exclusively within state-centric narratives. At the same time, the very title, *Barca Nostra* (*our* boat) de-territorializes the border and practises of (b)ordering by implicating viewers into the technologies of power.

The boat of *Barca Nostra*, life jackets, lifeboats, and items of clothing retrieved from the shores of EUrope, might be exploited by spectacles but their significance cannot be reduced to their framing *as* spectacles. As migrants are often made to remain institutionally (in)visible and in excess within the borders of European nation-states, art as counter-spectacles intervenes to make violent policies and practices of (b)ordering known through the radicality of these objects.[96] These are objects of life and death, struggle and survival. The materiality of these objects intersects with more abstract conceptions of what is human life and what are the contents of security: *'their' humanity, 'our' Humanity; 'their' safety, 'our' Security.* Art creates a *continuum* that interrupts univocal significations of matters of life and death, empathy and responsibility, by turning vision into imagination. Migrants' belongings and objects of crossing do not serve to hide the figure of the migrant, but they are the counter-spectacularised elements that allow people on the move to be seen, imagined, understood, recognized.

In the process of rethinking biopolitical borders, art calls out not just human suffering and/or politically denounces the structural violence of borders but helps us intensify thought about borders, their management and policing, and the implication of

[96] *See* Bryan Sitch, 'Radical Objects: A Refugee's life Jacket at Manchester Museum', History Workshop, 7 December 2017. Available at: http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/radical-objects-a-refugees-life-jacket-at-manchester-museum/ [accessed 6 January 2020].

society at large in these processes. Art, bringing to the fore objects of crossing that are necessary for those whose mobility is bordered, for those who have to live *with* death, invites us to reflect upon the fact that survival is a politicised issue. These objects remain, further calling into question survival as a mean to life. This contestation often extend through walls where artistic depictions painted on them openly challenge the violence of borders and which are located within the boundaries of our everyday lives. Before looking at how art meets walls through murals, we need to consider the biopolitical function and sovereign fiction of walls and question their theatricality as borders. This disjunction of walls from material borders to walls as murals helps us confront ways of thinking about borders that are both symbolic and 'objective'.

Theatrical Boundaries: Borders as Walls

Anti-immigrant infrastructures are on the rise in EUrope. According to a report published by the Centre Delas and the Transnational Institute, since the 1990s about 1000 km of walls have been constructed to protect European borders.[97] The ways in which the European Union and its member states have militarised borders, by also securitising and differently humanising people in their migratory passages, concur to turn space and human mobility into a matter of (b)ordering. The political commitment to walling in EUrope answers the need to fortify territory in order to deal with two parallel crises: security and migration.[98] From the fences of Ceuta and Melilla in the Moroccan-Spanish border built at the end of the 1990s, to our contemporary times, walls have become a consolidated reality in the fabric of border-making. In 2017, it was possible to count fifteen walls built by European states to deal with migratory flows.[99] These physical walls

[97] TNI report, 'Building Walls: Fear and securitisation in the European Union', *Transnational Institute*, 9 November 2018. Available at: https://www.tni.org/en/publication/building-walls [accessed 10 January 2020].
[98] *See* TNI report, 'Building Walls', 16. Here is *qtd* Dimitris Avramopoulos, the Commissioner for Migration, Internal Affairs and Citizenship of the European Commission, who in a speech in 2017 stated: "Europe has had to deal with two parallel and simultaneous crises on migration and security".
[99] *Ibid.*, 23.

came to complement more established virtual or digital(ised) walls.[100] As symbolic and material manifestations of political boundaries, walls are historically contingent infrastructures.[101] If today we live in a world of walls, in fact, this is because different motivations have been provided throughout history for their necessity. Jones identifies three main reasons that underpin wall construction:

> "establishing sovereignty over ungoverned or unruly lands; protecting the wealth of the state and population; and protecting cultural practices within the state from the possible influence of other value systems possessed by immigrants".[102]

The desire to establish walls is then grounded in their capacity to mark differences that need to be first of all materialized.[103] The abstract idea of sovereignty finds its raison d'être in the convenience of borders that can be fixed. Walls aim to *fix space in time* and, in the broader sense, the border wall works as a concept, meaning "a political divider that comprises complex technologies, control methods, legislative provisions and securing the border discourse".[104] Walls then are not just understood as physical barriers, but they are also gateways, punctuated by checkpoints that are modulated by states to control movement.[105] In the construction of walled in and out identities, borders are transmuting into regimes of (b)ordering that provide indirect evidence that movement cannot be stopped, but that the identity of those 'inside' the walls needs to be preserved regardless of this. Walls as security barriers function as sociotechnical devices where the referent of control is not just the territory as in the geopolitics of security, but the productive mobility of people.[106]

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[100] *See* Andersson, R., 'Hardwiring the frontier? The politics of security technology in Europe's "fight against illegal migration', *Security Dialogue* (2016), 47(1), 22–39; 'The New European Walls', *Wired*, 15 November 2018. Available at: https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2018/11/new-european-walls/ [accessed 10 January 2020].
[101] Till E. K., Sundberg J., Pullan W., Psaltis C., Makriyianni C., Celal R. Z., Samani M. O. and Dowler L., 'Interventions in the political geography of walls', *Political Geography* (2013), 3, 52-62, 62.
[102] Jones R., 'Why Build a Border Wall?', *Nacla Report on the Americas* (8 November 2012), 45 (3), 70-2, 70.
[103] *Idem*.
[104] Vallet E., David C.V., 'Introduction: The (Re)Building of the Wall in International Relations', *Journal of Borderland Studies* (2012), 27(2), 111-119, 112.
[105] *Idem*.
[106] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'How walls do work: Security barriers as devices of interruption and data capture', *Security Dialogue* (2016), 47(2), 151-164.

Mobility as circulation reconceptualises security barriers so that flows can be managed. Ballif and Rosière talk of "teichopolitics" as the politics of building barriers on borders for numerous security purposes.[107] Teichopolitics, as biopolitics of walls, is primarily concerned with controlling migration so that privilege can be protected, and undesirable movements can be prevented.[108] While there are different typologies of border barriers, and these cannot be reduced to walls or fences, they are the most common and visible infrastructures of containment.[109] Containment is about "selectively differentiating"[110] between good and bad flows so that barriers can direct how and when borders should materially stay open or closed. As Pallister-Wilkins has eloquently argued, "barriers are not simply concerned with prescribing, securing and administering the *intra muros* […] but with governing movement across them".[111] Far from structuring space alone, Pallister-Wilkins continues, security barriers constitute an "environment of life" by working with expanding circulation.[112] Walls and fences as security barriers are analytic devices that serve the purpose of interrupting movement and capturing data.[113] They also function to extend the potential of borders as it is in the case of considering walls as theatrical devices which project 'security.'

As Amoore and Hall have argued, borders share key qualities with theatre. Borders display their theatricality by performing rituals of control, regulation and differentiation where the staging of spectacle ensures their securability.[114] But the border is not simply "like the theatre", functioning to give pretence to characters, places and stories.[115] At the

[107] Rosière S., Jones R., 'Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences', *Geopolitics* (2012), 17(1), 217-234, 220.
[108] *Ibid.*, 221.
[109] *Ibid.,* 222. In particular, Rosière and Jones identify four types of border-barriers: fences, walls, frontlines and closed straits. These are then further classified in terms of barrier morphology and cross-border relations.
[110] Ferrer-Gallardo X., 'The Spanish-Moroccan border complex: Processes of geopolitical, functional and symbolic rebordering', *Political Geography* (2008), 27, 301-21, 309.
[111] Pallister-Wilkins P., 'How walls do work', 154.
[112] *Idem*.
[113] *Ibid.*
[114] Amoore L., Alexandra H., 'Border Theatre: on the arts of security and resistance', *Cultural Geographies* (2010), 17(3), 299-319.
[115] *Ibid.*

border, a particular kind of space comes into being, producing a political stage that appears to be theatrical. It is here that appearance is produced as a way of making both borders and border crossers involved in sequences of identification.[116] Rituals that are performed at borders, as in theatre, form these sequences that serve to make a series of categories recognisable.[117] Because of these rituals, that originate for the materialization of the encounter between borders and people, crossings are also symbolic. Within these border performances, the existence of walls is predicated upon the necessity to make these rituals governable. Walls are theatrical as they pretend to border, making acceptable their existence *tout court*. As Wendy Brown has highlighted in *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty,* the progressive erosion of nation state sovereignty has been followed by global wall building where the protection of territory is staged for purpose of containment.[118] In a "post-Westphalian order", where nation-states' sovereignty is being eroded by global political relations, Brown argues that "the new nation-state walls are iconographic of this predicament of state power".[119] Despite their dominant material presence and dimension, the new walls of globalization often function theatrically, projecting power that states cannot exercise so that their performance often comes to contradict the production of sovereignty.[120]

Walls purport to stage the image of a sovereign state that is disappearing, so that their theatricalized and spectacularized presence realigns "sovereign impotence".[121] Thus, new walls project ideas of containment and security, making coincide sovereignty, as a border concept, with borders as sovereign reality. As Brown explains, this is what makes walls relevant in today's world as even though they "bear the irony of being mute, material and prosaic, [they are also] potentially generative of theological awe largely

[116] *Ibid.*, 303.
[117] *Ibid.*, 313.
[118] Brown W. (2010) *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (Zone Books: New York).
[119] *Ibid.*, 24.
[120] *Ibid.*, 25.
[121] *Ibid.*, 26.

unrelated to their quotidian functions or failures".[122] It is the desire for walls that wishes for power so that the fiction of state sovereignty can be maintained. Shifting attention from the politics of walls as devices for governing circulation to their theatricalization, Brown reminds us that walls cannot simply be regarded as tools of policing but also as the extension of neoliberal capitalism.[123] By providing a sense of order that is first of all staged, security as movement, and economy as circulation, intertwine to facilitate the liminality between new ways of (b)ordering and re-(b)ordering.

Drawing on Peter Andreas' work on the USA – Mexico border, Brown stresses the fact that the political relevance of walling today consists in their capacity to perform the image of the border so that this can be thought to exist as integral to state sovereignty.[124] Border walls act as a "theological reminder" that only certain people and nations can be 'protected', but not others. Walls articulate *security as protection*.[125] "Fantasies of impermeability", as Brown calls them, materialise through new walls understood as visual signifiers that exceed human power and state sovereignty.[126] The porosity of walls is regulated through an imaginary that produces at the same time ideas of safety and unsafety, so that walls open and close by modulating sovereign protection. What walls mediate is the illusion that political power can protect because of the materiality of barriers - and can keep people and territories safe. The sum of these ideas enriches imagination, but at the same time restricts it by guiding our thinking about walls as sites of "pure interdiction".[127] Far from this, and moving away from *borders as walls* to *walls as counter-spectacles of (b)ordering,* border walls need to be confronted with strategies

[122] *Idem*.
[123] *Ibid.*, 92.
[124] Andreas P. (2009) (2nd ed.) *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) *qtd in* Brown W., *Walled States*, 91.
[125] Brown W. (2010) *Walled States,* 103-104.
[126] *Idem.*
[127] Callahan W., 'The politics of walls: barriers, flows, and the sublime', LSE Research Online (May 2018), 1-40, 37. Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87781/1/Callahan_Politics%20of%20walls%20barriers%2C%20flows.pdf [accessed 20 January 2020].

of resistance that can artistically tear it down.[128] As such, we are no longer at borders, strictly speaking, but we are thinking about walls with borders as (b)ordering in order to gain a different understanding of the many relations that they can mark.

Thinking theoretically with borders through walls means addressing the question of how walls can exceed their intended effects.[129] This demands us not only to question what walls do or how they work, but also to reflect on what a different rethinking of walls can do to interrupt wider constructions about borders. Far from being the expression of a rational security policy, the walls of (protest) murals that populate our everyday life intersect with political border-lines that are the measure of processes of (b)ordering life *with* death that are assigned to some. Certainly, these walls are different from the ones that we find at the edges of nation states. Keeping in mind the theatricality of their imaginary at borders, walls are not just the expression of anxieties of less sovereign states, they are also the visual construction of politically and spatially contested trajectories of merged and ubiquitous (b)ordering projects. The limits of borders (as walls) are exposed by forms of artistic re-(b)orderings where disjunction from sovereign imperatives of walling becomes a form of collective reflection about the unequal, violent and arbitrary effects of borders.

Walls as counter-spectacles of (b)ordering: the activism of murals

As already seen, walls as territorialised and sociotechnical devices proliferate worldwide. In EUrope, the "Schengen Wall"[130] continues to extend, institutionalising power spatially and symbolically. The complex social life of walls, however, is not simply reducible to the political and moral organisation of the European Union through the fortification of its edges. If we are to understand how migrants' struggles –in their different articulations-

[128] Brown W., *Walled States,* 14.
[129] *Idem.*
[130] 'Europe starts putting up walls', *The Economist*, 15 September 2015. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2015/09/19/europe-starts-putting-up-walls [accessed 11 January 2020].

can come into being on walls, we need to look at them by recognising their engagements with political debates and political resistance.[131] This means shifting attention from *borders as walls* to *walls as counter-spectacles of (b)ordering*. The possibility to visually gaze anew, as Amoore and Hall observe, does not grow out only from the possibility of being proximal to an object/subject of reflection.[132] What we should appreciate is the possibility of artistically intervening in debates so as to arrest the smooth-running sequences of borders, wherever their effects might be felt.[133] As such, the more comfortable reality of borders in our daily life is confronted with walls as sites of artistic intervention. The violence of their ritualised existence is transfigured once our perspective on walls takes us away from thinking about how they protect and segregate at borders,[134] to how they can impact upon the imminent dimension of life through dispersed murals.

Ingrained in the rhythm of the urban space, from cities to towns, from symbolic places to everyday public life, murals do not display power per se but merge (b)ordering with walls so that the effects of 'objective' borders can be visualised on their surfaces. In the previous chapters I considered the institutional, and not, uses of visibility to regulate and strategize migrants' movement. Murals are not understood here as something that can only be seen or be visible as such, but as a visual opportunity to readapt "lines of sight" about migration and borders more broadly. As Amoore has eloquently shown, specific modes of visualization are always at work in contemporary border security so that "unknown features" can be pre-identified.[135] Attention here becomes a tool for governing and pre-constituting both migrants and borders. At the same time, Amoore argues for the possibility that art possesses to mobilise a different kind of attentiveness to the one

[131] Callahan W., 'The politics of walls', 9.
[132] Amoore L., Alexandra H., 'Border Theatre', 312.
[133] *Idem*.
[134] *Ibid.*, 314.
[135] Amoore L., 'Lines of sight'.

already present within the space of (b)ordering aimed at surveillance and control. It is always possible to alter visuals of the border and refocus attentiveness to trigger "a revised reflection on how we live and how we wish to live".[136]

Borders as walls as rituals, therefore, become objects of artistic interventions that far from providing solutions about political questions, deploy artistic vision with the aim of interrogating, through interruptions, the ways in which we inhabit the world.[137] These interruptions make securability uncertain so that certainty about state-centric representations of borders and migrants can be challenged.[138] Paradoxically, it is uncertainty that becomes valuable for giving meaning to the possibility of understanding how art can interrupt the univocal function of walls. Walls that divide reproduce the border as a political artefact; walls that unite interrupt the border *through* political artefacts.[139] From walls as markers of boundaries to their affective capacity to articulate interruptions that are artistic in vision, murals exist by addressing public imaginaries of (b)ordering. Walls as devices for governing circulations, as already considered, are material but also theatrical as they perform the border. On the assumption that the border is becoming the migrant body itself,[140] the politics of walling reorganise how (b)ordering practices are meant to work in ways that affect migrants' bodies and lives.[141] Rethought along these lines, murals change the appearance of a surface that can be visualised without asking for permission, touching aspects of migrants' life so that a form of *surface justice*[142] can be located in our political landscapes. By situating artistic interruptions

[136] Amoore L., Alexandra H., 'Border Theatre', 315.
[137] *Idem*.
[138] *Ibid.,* 303.
[139]Timothy W. Luke, 'Design as Defence: Broken Barriers and the Security Spectacle at the US-Mexico Border', in Stephenson M. O., Zanotti L. (eds.), *Building Walls and Dissolving Borders: The Challenges of Alterity, Community and Securitising Space* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 115-31.
[140] *See* Amoore L., 'Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the war on terror', *Political Geography* (2006), 25, 336-351, 337.
[141] Minca C., Rijke A., 'Walls, walling and the immunitarian imperative', *in* Mubi Brighenti A., Kärrholm M. (2019) *Urban Walls. Political and Cultural Meanings of Vertical Structures and Surfaces* (Abingdon: Routledge), 80.
[142] Andron S., 'The right to the city is the right to the surface', 207 *in* Mubi Brighenti A., Kärrholm M. (2019) *Urban Walls.*

within the interstices of (b)ordering, murals implicate us in the process of rethinking discourses and practices about borders.

Even though the visual art of Muralism is not widely spread within the European space, as it is in other parts of the world starting from Mexico where it originated at the beginning of the twentieth century, it represent a great opportunity for rethinking our embeddedness with migration, rewriting ideas of belonging and justice. Artists such as Bansky, MTO, Massimo Mion and BLU, among others, have engaged directly with the ongoing management of migration and borders in EUrope by creating murals that deal with displacement, struggles, political disqualifications and deaths at sea. In Calais, one of the most controversial (b)ordering areas in EUrope, Bansky painted three murals addressing the treatment of migrants and refugees. The first one represented Steve Job, the late chairman and co-founder of Apple, as a Syrian refugee carrying on his back a rucksack typical of migrants but also a prototype of an Apple computer in his right hand because his biological father was born in Homs, Syria.[143] The second mural was a version of the French painter Theodore Gericault's oil *Raft of the Medusa* (1818-19) where the famous 1816 shipwreck of the titular frigate implicated in colonial expansion is remobilised to feature a boat carrying refugees [144] -- in both cases a boat (a rescue boat in Gericault's case and a cruiser in Bansky's) passes by but does not rescue the shipwrecked in a way that highlights the work's title which appeared on Bansky's website: *We're not in the same boat*. In the third one we are confronted with the image of a child with a telescope pointing to the shores of Dover with a small suitcase at her feet. [145] Hovering

[143] Hannah Ellis-Petersen, 'Bansky uses Steve Jobs artwork to highlight refugee crisis', *The Guardian*, 11 December 2015: https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/dec/11/banksy-uses-steve-jobs-artwork-to-highlight-refugee-crisis [accessed 11 January 2020]. Bansky's mural of Steve Jobs has been later defaced.
[144] Angie Kordic, 'What is the meaning of the new Bansky's piece in Calais?', *WideWalls*, 12 December 2015: https://www.widewalls.ch/banksy-steve-jobs-calais/ [accessed 11 January 2020]. This mural has been wiped out in 2017.
[145] *TheLocalFR*, 'UK street artist Bansky paints at Calais camp', 14 December 2015. A picture of the mural is available at: https://www.thelocal.fr/20151214/uk-street-artist-bansky-paints-at-calais-camp-france-migration [accessed 11 January 2020].

over the child and telescope is a black vulture signposting the different forces that profiteer from the migrants' predicament.

Bansky has also brought the border and the effects of (b)ordering right in the heart of London with a mural that highlights how the border between France and the UK is cross-managed and both governments are responsible for the police violence and hostile environment migrants are exposed to. The mutual responsibilities of France and the UK in perpetuating border violence in Calais have been highlighted in a mural he painted outside the French embassy in London where the young Cosette from *Les Misérables* is crying because she is engulfed in a cloud of tear gas. The mural, that featured a scannable QR code linked to a YouTube video in which it was possible to witness the police tear gassing migrants in the former camp called the 'Jungle': mural and video, therefore, served the purpose of bringing the border practices of both governments within the shared political jurisdiction and influence of France and the UK.[146] Even though these murals are now somehow *out of sight* as they have either been painted over, damaged, or subjected to weather, the broader implications of their absence are still valid.

In Massimo Mion's *European Programme for Migration*[147] (fig.39), located in Venice where the artists lives and works, a child plays battleship and in so doing forges a powerful analogy with the ways in which politicians decide who lives or die by offering or withdrawing rescue and treat people as numbers and quotas to be shared among member states; by invoking a game, moreover, the mural also denounces the absence of a substantial, shared, and well-conceived strategy to address migration.

[146] Hannah Ellis-Petersen, 'Bansky's new artwork criticises uses of teargas in Calais Refugee Camp', *The Guardian*, 24 January 2016. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/jan/24/banksy-uses-new-artwork-to-criticise-use-of-teargas-in-calais-refugee-camp [accessed 11 January 2020].

[147] *See* Massimo Mion, 'European Programme for Migration'. Available at: http://www.massimomion.com/tag/european-programme-for-integration-and-migration/ [accessed 11 January 2020].

Figure 39. European Programme for Migration by Massimo Mion, Venice 2015.

Figure 40. The Mediterranean Door by MTO.[148]

The French artist MTO's *The Mediterranean Door* (fig.40) and *The Mediterranean Tunnel* (fig.41) are murals which deal directly with the plight of migrants' risky journeys in search of safety and remind us of how movement is unequally managed and repressed within and beyond the borders of the EU. In particular, MTO's murals are a sequenced

[148] MTO, *The Mediterranean Door*. Available at: https://twistedsifter.com/2015/08/the-mediterranean-tunnel-by-mto/ [accessed 11 January 2020].

representation of the challenges that migrants experience in order to reach EUrope. In *The Mediterranean Door* (fig.40), the French artist depicts a migrant trapped into a tunnel, attempting to push the wall up in order to emerge to the surface. Painted horizontally, this mural, completed for the Malta Street Art Festival at Sliema's sea front in 2014, makes the border appear as a layer. The migrant at the bottom of it appears to be stranded between two worlds, and his is the hardest to visualise. He struggles to survive while life beyond it flourishes, capturing well the idea that (im)mobility is never accidental to the determinism of borders. Here, the mural provides a double image of a wall, performing both as a mural and as a border which is also a ladder that neatly divides the underground from the surface of the wall. The door here is not just the Mediterranean per se, as a space in which migrants are made rescuable or un-rescuable, but also the borders of the European Union more broadly.

Figure 41. The Mediterranean Tunnel by MTO.[149]

[149] MTO, *The Mediterranean Tunnel*. Available at: https://twistedsifter.com/2015/08/the-mediterranean-tunnel-by-mto/ [accessed 11 January 2020].

The same migrant is the subject of MTO's *The Mediterranean Tunnel* (fig.41) painted in 2015. This is a two-part mural that represents the Mediterranean as a tunnel, this time highlighting not the forced spatial (im)mobility of migrants but their difficult crossing from Sliema, Malta, to Sapri, Italy. In the first mural painted in Malta we see a migrant entering a walled tunnel, while in the second mural the same migrant exits it in the south of Italy. In both cases, we can see only half of the migrant's body, to symbolise his transitory status, cut in two by borders that trap as much as they connect. The rift mask on the migrant's forehead, like lifejackets and lifeboats in other works we have previously analysed, appears to be an item of survival but it also evokes the sea which does not appear in the mural (as it was the case also for *The Mediterranean Door*) allowing MTO to broaden the subject of his work to comprise land and sea migration and border crossing. The figure of the migrant that MTO represents is one who struggles to survive from the space of the Mediterranean to land. Focusing on the hyper-spectacularised idea of the sea as an unsafe path, these two murals do not only engage with the present but also raise the question of what happens to migrants once their (im)mobility in islands, in this case Malta, extends after borders are crossed, with their arrival to mainland Italy. We can see then how these murals reproduce not borders as borders, but *borders as counter-spectacles of (b)ordering* that are converted into thinking about the violent effects of these boundaries.

By openly defying their regime of normalisation through interruptions, mural art intervenes in morphing our imaginaries of borders. The Italian street artist Blu represents the borders of the EUropean Union as a circle with barbed wire that come to replace the stars of the EU flag (fig.42). Outside a fortified Europe, in a blue field, are a float of undistinguishable people who are trying to enter the European territory. Painted in 2012 in Morocco, near the border fences that separate the North African country and the

Spanish city of Melilla, that is geographically in Africa and politically in EUrope, this mural represents a perfect example of the interstitial intervention of art.

Figure 42. Blu's mural in Melilla, Spain [150]

The mural, in fact, occupies this space between two places, namely Africa and EUrope, highlighting how (im)mobility is maintained in the area and the dangers that many migrants face while gathering across this border. The many people that surround the territorial space outside the borders of the EU are already inside its space of control even outside the fences of the enclave of Melilla. This mural does not only denounce the violence of EU borders and their perpetual fortified design. It also forces us to look at the circularity of European internal borders depicted as empty in the inside - there is not 'us', there is only 'them': our moral engagements with the ways in which we design our security and justify distant hierarchies of suffering is therefore made manifest.

The affective capacity of these works to impact our imagination, interrupt and raise awareness about our own entanglements with borders and (b)ordering processes and

[150] Blu's mural. Available at: https://streetartnews.net/2012/04/blu-new-mural-in-melila-spain.html [accessed 11 January 2020].

highlight how our distraction,[151] allows the suffering and (b)ordering of others while our re-focalization on the problem through art makes available the possibility of "re-pos[ing] the problems life poses itself".[152] As Massumi observes, aesthetic politics extend the range of affective potential, immediately connecting us with political aspects of life.[153] Affect, understood as "the power to affect and being affected",[154] intensifies thinking in the sense that life is no longer just about 'us' but as 'us' with 'others': "with intensified affect comes a stronger sense of embeddedness in a larger field of life".[155] Affect then is about the passing of a threshold, the crossing of a border, where a different notion of care can emerge. We start caring for a larger idea of life so that we can affirm it for ourselves and others.

'Affirmative' migration in this chapter is linked to the politics of perseverance that migrants practice so that their life can be reiterated through their resistances, struggles, escapes, mobile commons and so on. Along these lines, the affective politics that arise through art interrupt the flow of imposed significations that qualify borders, migrants and our role in it so that biopolitical life can be first questioned and then resisted. What is interrupted with art is no longer only a form of normalisation but also a form of disconnection where the intersubjective element of affect is stripped away from our relations with borders. These relations, in fact, reduce life, constructing borders as a matter of survival and the migrant that crosses them as surviving a life that has yet to be fully there. These artists' efforts to challenge (b)ordering through art translates into ways of challenging the dichotomy of victim/criminal which frames discourses on the migrants in order to reveal that instead of (alleged) victims or criminals there are beings who painstakingly 'affirm' living. As Mazzara's engagement with art and borders has shown,

[151] Amoore L., 'Lines of sight'.
[152] Massumi B., *The Politics of Affect*, Preface, xi.
[153] *Ibid.*, 36.
[154] *Ibid.*, Preface, ix.
[155] *Ibid.*, 6.

this "aesthetic of subversion" offers a new narrative about the migratory experience[156] and allows life as politics to emerge and find a voice in these acts of subversion. To regain political responsibility towards our connections, and re-claim our disconnections, might be useful to think of ourselves as what Rothberg refers to as "implicated subjects".[157] Rothberg argues that we need to think at how our interconnections shape injustices by acknowledging our own implications with specific histories and present circumstances. We do not need to be direct agents of harm in order to recognise that the ways in which we inhabit the world generate inequalities that we need to confront because we are implicated in them. As Agamben has suggested, it is only when "the citizen has been able to recognize the refugee that he or she is – only in such a world is the political survival of humankind today thinkable".[158] Art intersects these dynamics challenging the normative construction of life within biopower, biology and politics,[159] where some deserve to survive while others deserve to live. As Berry puts it:

> "Art's ongoing attempt to distribute aiesthesis, or sensuous perception, away from the omnipotent control of the author provides an essential resource of resistance to biopower and its attempted collapse of life's infinite interrelationships into propertied individualism. In this respect, if art is unable to change life in any socially totalistic sense, it is constantly challenging the experience of what it means to be (captured as) living beings, within a living world. By experimenting with forms and relations of life outside the norms of biopower, the best art resists power over life by redistributing our sensuous, conceptual and aesthetic experience of it".[160]

Conclusion

As the politics of control need to be situated within those of resistance, I have considered a multiplicity of engagements that migrants and artists establish with life as *their* politics. Life *with* death understood in biopolitical terms aims to reduce possibilities for migrants' to radically engage with their political conditions of survival. *Life as politics* transcends

[156] Mazzara F., *Reframing Migration*, 110.
[157] *See* Rothberg M. (2019) *The Implicated Subject: Beyond Victims and Perpetrators* (Stanford University Press).
[158] Agamben G., 'Means without End'.
[159] Berry J., *Art and (Bare) Life*, 21.
[160] *Ibid.*, 21-2.

this (b)ordering re-ontologising life as a matter of "ordinary encroachments" of *life with politics*. In this chapter, these engagements of *life with politics* have been considered by positing life not as a pre-given ontological category, but as an emerging value whose content is fulfilled by the migrants' possibility of being and acting politically. Therefore, by focusing on borders and survival, borders and migration, and borders and art from a different perspective from crossing, it has been possible to ground *life as politics.* The ways in which we can think of *life as politics* are highly indebted to the act of rethinking processes of (b)ordering that helps us not only to highlight how the state only promotes basic survival but also to show the migrants' persevering forms of political engagements. Making visible the (im)mobilising rationale of (b)ordering becomes an act of political witnessing that engages with needs beyond borders.

CONCLUSION

Figure 43. "Indifference and apathy are parasitism, perversion, not life. That is why I hate the indifferent", Antonio Gramsci. Orgosolo Mural (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

To survive, to continue to exist after death, means to outlive life. Survival can be seen positively as a reference to what remains alive in spite of dire circumstances that have been overcome. This idea of survival has been rewritten in the thesis in order to account for ways of governing life *with* death where causing migrants to just survive has been framed as a biopolitical strategy of (b)ordering. I have argued that (b)ordering informs a

particular rationale for governing migration that gives those who need to be governed very little space for manoeuvre. Rather than focusing on the governance of life *in* death (a life shadowed only by death), I have attempted to focus on forms of survival understood as a process where both life and death are maintained as possible but I have also looked at survival as affirmation, a process through which those who should be managed through (b)ordering, rearticulate their own position by crossing geographical, legal and rhetorical borders.

The intertwining of survival, (b)ordering and migration has been explored in the thesis with the aim of rethinking relations between people on the move and borders. The (b)ordering of migrants is consistent with logics of survival where life is considered to be disposable but also only minimally recoverable. This double focus is sustained by articulating migration, and constructing the figure of the migrant, as a life that is *a risk* and *at risk*. Sophisticated ways of (b)ordering migrants now range from the virtualisation of their identity, the linking of politics of rescue to those of reception, the assertion of forms of policed humanitarianism where calculated tolerance and exhaustion have become two faces of the same coin. Most importantly, survivability is a condition that aims to (im)mobilise the political potential of migrants who, however, are able to resist and persevere in their search for a more fulfilling life and whose struggles to become visible and make political demands are supported by committed activist aid workers and artists: as a matter of fact, while the thesis has considered the governance of life *with* death, it has also engaged with migration as a relation with (b)ordering that repurposes *life as politics*.

In this work, I approached theory and fieldwork as a 'living inquiry' where the possibility of intensifying thinking becomes the goal of my research process. In particular, by openly challenging conventional constructs of social research, I have explored contingent practices of (b)ordering by framing ideas *through* theories, and by rethinking

the nuances of these theories *with* others, in order to open up new experiential spaces. It is within the interstices of these spaces that my research questions developed. Elements of this approach include refocusing on 'living theory' as my research methodology which also accounts for 'discoveries' and 'encounters' which happened in Rome and Calais. Visual representations as methods for enlarging my expressive capacity to engage with migration and borders have also played a key role in the thesis.

In chapter one of the thesis I theoretically situated survival as a specification of (b)ordering processes where life and death are made to coexist as a biopolitical form of mere survival, but I have also considered how these processes deepen into more general ideas of what matters for 'security' and articulations of the 'human' within it. These processes (b)order migrants' bodies but also delimit possibilities of politically engaged life. By exploring the work of Agamben and Mbembe, this discussion has been complemented by a reading of survival as a (b)ordering project where the limits of qualifying life and death for the subjects of migration are never fully transcended. In chapter two, I introduced the themes of borders – mobile, virtual and polysemic – and figures of migration, and how their construction is predicated upon a politics of excesses that contributes to the making of uneven mobility in EUrope. The negative borders of the EU function to include and exclude migrants so that their lives can be inserted within circulations that capture, disperse and marginalise the political value of their lives. From camps as containers to speed boxes of containment, the space and time of migration are both targeted as a suspended ordering of biopolitical life.

The making of migration and borders has been further explored in chapter three by confronting (b)ordering in the Mediterranean Sea, where migrants' lives are made rescuable and un-rescuable, to then explore their channelling into circuits of (im)mobility on land. From hotspots, islands and encampments of camps, I considered the politicised space of a (protest) camp in Rome. This particular case helped us to better understand the

(b)ordering of migrants' presence both spatially and politically. Most importantly, *Piazzale Maslax* represented an 'experience' of resistance where migrants and aid workers came together to resituate the terms of their political survival. In chapter four, I focused on strategies of everyday (b)ordering in Calais where a rationale of survival informs the policing of humanitarian interventions: aid workers and their activities are minimally tolerated and violently repressed. I concluded this chapter by introducing what I call the politics of perseverance: these are the expression of how strategies of (b)ordering are being redefined on the ground by migrants with but also without their 'alliances' of movement. I discussed these emergent politics in greater depth in chapter five.

Moving away from what (biopolitical) (b)ordering specifies as political life, I advanced the idea of *life as politics* to account for migration as a creative force. Borders make migrants but migrants are more than the result of processes of (b)ordering. As such, while biopolitics makes limits to what life should be, *life as politics* expresses what life is for those who affirm it as more than governance of ordered survival. Grounded in practices of 'lived experience', *life as politics* recovers life not as an object of government but as an opportunity to politicise claims to it through nonmovements, escape, imperceptible politics, art endeavours and so on. By committing to rethinking the unequal effects of (b)ordering, the thesis has sought to 'cut' across the injustice of governing life and expose the *life as politics* of those who persevere in making it their own. This commitment has been put in writing in the thesis keeping in mind Gramsci's words about the risk of living life with indifference: "I [too] believe that living means taking sides".[1]

[1] Gramsci A, *Odio gli Indifferenti* (Chiare Lettere, 2016).

According to Foucault "knowledge is not for knowing, knowledge is for cutting".[2] I take this idea for repurposing knowledge to close with two final observations which 'cut through' some of the dominant discourses I have tried to challenge.

Cut I: Solidarity Struggles

The European Union's approach to migration has been that of criminalizing not only migrants who make demands but also organisations, activists and citizens who, often, have been considered to be facilitators of 'illegal' migration. In the thesis, I have considered alliances between migrants and aid workers, and indirectly artists, considering them to be vital to counter or 'cut through' (b)ordering practices. The formation of collective alliances of migrants and non-migrants is transversal: as Tazzioli also insists, there is always a network in support of these struggles even if it is often difficult to identify and thinking through "transversal alliances enables de-essentialising migration as a supposedly self-standing terrain of struggle or sociological field".[3] In line with this, we need to keep in mind that aid grassroots organisations, or humanitarian activists, are only few of the actors involved in resisting (b)ordering: citizens, majors, various members of civil society, lawyers, doctors, scholars and many other commit in their everyday lives to affect change therefore enabling alternative ways of thinking about migrants, their struggles, their rights and their (political) agency more broadly.

Cut II: *There Is No Sea In Sardinia*

In *There Is No Sea In Sardinia,* the Sardinian writer Marcello Fois offers a picture of his native island that rejects its condition of "Caribbean of the Mediterranean" subjugated to a logic of recreation and leisure. In particular, Fois advocates for the necessity of

[2] Foucault M., 'Nietzsche, Genealogy and History', *in* Rabinow P., *The Foucault Reader*, 88.
[3] Tazzioli M. (2019) *The Making of Migration: The Biopolitics of Mobility at Europe's Borders* (SAGE Publications Ltd), 142.

developing a rethinking of Sardinia that opposes the way in which it is reduced to a commodity by the dominant imaginary.[4] In Fois's view, the Mediterranean Sea is not erased, forgotten or wiped out from geographical maps but it needs to be relativized if we want to escape from the trap of reducing Sardinia to a commodifying string of beaches, hotels, and all-inclusives at the expenses of a full vista which also includes its daily life and daily struggles. For instance, as Fois observes:

> "For those who live [in Sardinia], winter is almost a natural condition. Certainly for those who are used to thinking about the emerald Sardinia, about Sardinia as a region with only one season, it may seem strange to think about the mountain, the alpine climate, the dry cold, the snow…Yet you only have to turn in-land and you can see the mountains that plunge into the water". [5]

The effort that Fois asks us to make, in other words, is one of disjunction; he wants us to problematise an equation (Sardinia=Sea) that prevents us to see a myriad of 'things' that the equation itself erases. This analytical move helps us rearticulate discourses about people and places from a perspective that accounts for a whole which can tells us a different story. In a similar vein, we could look again at other Mediterranean islands like Lesbos or Lampedusa or realities akin to Calais or *Piazzale Maslax* which are closely associated with the so-called migration 'crisis' and migrants camps, and refuse to just see them as hells on earth where the life of victimised or potentially dangerous migrants is reduced to its bare essentials. As I have tried to suggest, in fact, these are also places in which, amidst many difficulties, resistance and perseverance loom large, dreams are still dreamt, and political life is painstakingly articulated.

[4] Fois M. (2008) *In Sardegna non c'è il Mare* (Editori Laterza).
[5] *Ibid.,* 35.

Figure 44. There Is No Sea In Sardinia. Orgosolo Mural (photograph: Antonella Patteri)

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